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Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s best known political work, the Social Contract, begins and 
ends by pointing to its incompleteness. Rousseau indicates that the Social Contract’s 
completion would require an elaboration of the principles of international relations. 
However, Rousseau neither completes the Social Contract nor explicitly sets forth a 
theory of international relations. The contradiction between pointing to the necessary 
completion and its simultaneous absence can be solved by arguing that the principles 
of international relations contradicted those of the Social Contract. A close textual 
analysis of the pertinent works, Rousseau’s Social Contract, the Discourse on 
Inequality, the Geneva Manuscript, he State of War, and the Abstract and Judgment 
of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace, demonstrates this thesis.  
The argument begins by showing the presence of two diverging principles in 
the Social Contract and their implications for international relations. The dominant 
set of principles of political self-rule necessarily leads to an international state of war. 
A secondary set of principles of security leads to the demand of international peace. 
Rousseau rejects the international implications of the latter set of principles, which 
can take the form of the Roman Catholic Church, balance of power, empire, and 
  
commerce as sources of international order. Instead, Rousseau strongly suggests 
natural law and confederations as solutions consistent with political self-rule. Yet, 
even these solutions fail ultimately to overcome the state of war. Rousseau’s intention 
in suggesting possible solutions to the international state of war was to moderate th  
potentially deleterious effects of democratic self-rule. 
The incompleteness of the Social Contract is therefore due to the structure of 
international relations, whose principles are at the same time constituted by political 
societies and contradicted by them. This implies that the pursuits of security and 
freedom are mutually exclusive, contradicting in particular Immanuel Kant’s claim of 
their compatibility and contradicting those contemporary theories of international 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question why Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s most 
famous political work, the Social Contract, remained incomplete by his own 
admission. As the end of the Social Contract singles out international relations as the 
concluding subject, the answer must lie in setting forth Rousseau’s theory of 
international relations. The difficulty in making this exposition is the absence of a 
single, coherent text by Rousseau on this subject. 
The answer provided in the dissertation to the question of why the Social 
Contract remained incomplete and why a clear elaboration of international relations 
is absent from Rousseau’s work is that he shares with his modern predecessors, 
especially with Niccolò Machiavelli, the notion of international relations being 
unbounded by morality and governed by considerations of prudent determinations of 
security and independence. This follows from Rousseau’s argument of the historical 
changes of the human species. Consequently, the fundamental state of human social 
life is war.  
This study thereby confirms the hypothesis that Rousseau’s political 
philosophy must be seen as a continuation of Machiavellian political philosophy and 
not as a fundamental break with it. Rousseau’s Machiavellian heritage comes to th  
fore most clearly by focusing on the limits of his social contract theory. On the other 
hand, in the Social Contract Rousseau sets forth a political ideal which seeks to 




very un-Machiavellian. Therefore, the full exposition of a Machiavellian description 
of international relations would have sharply contradicted the intended effect of the 
Social Contract and the Emile. By hesitating to clearly set forth his view of 
international relations, Rousseau can be most appropriately called a reluctant realist. 
 
1.1 Poli t ical Philosophy and the Future of the Post –Cold War 
World  
By arguing that Rousseau ultimately viewed international relations as a Machiavellian 
state of affairs, one has to confront the dominant scholarly opinion that international 
relations can be pacified and that it is only a matter of time before this goal is 
achieved. While this seemed an unlikely scenario for much of the 20th century, this 
opinion has found a large number of adherents since the end of the Cold War. Their 
argument rests most prominently on Immanuel Kant’s essays on this matter. Ye, 
Kant’s argument is at the same time derived from Rousseau’s argument. If it can be 
shown in this dissertation that Rousseau strongly fostered the hope for peace while 
ultimately believing in the unattainability and undesirability of international pe ce 
then the Kantian hopes are not only weakened but one also regains an awareness of 
the inconveniences which would have to be accepted in exchange for peace. 
The question of the possibility of man-made peace gained renewed relevance 
at the end of the 20th century. Three conditions seemed to favour the final victory of 
modern liberalism and its characteristic aspirations for perpetual human peace,
freedom, and prosperity. First, the end of the Cold War and the contemporaneous 




States became the sole superpower of the world and it seemed possible to expand the 
influence of capitalism and democracy far beyond their previously confined sphere of 
influence (Krauthammer 1990/91, 23-33.).1 The third wave of democratization began 
to swell and engulfed numerous countries in Europe (Huntington 1991, 12-34.).  
Furthermore, the “shrinking” of the planet has greatly contributed to a new 
scale of global relations. Since the second half of the 20th century, global 
communications, global transportation, global economic relations, and global 
migrations have increased on a scale never seen before. This change in global 
relations has had mixed results. For example, while global economic relations bring 
economic prosperity and medical advances to the most remote parts of the globe, 
what used to be local conflicts now can possibly spread to the opposite end of the 
globe. The interdependence of the world has, for better or worse, reached never 
before seen proportions. 
Since 1945, the most important change in the technological change of warfare 
has been the invention of nuclear weapons. Nuclear war entails the possibility of the 
destruction of both warring parties or the destruction of the entire human race. The 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons would imply a greater reluctance to resort to 
warfare as a means of political action. But contrary to some early hopes, nuclear 
weapons have not led to the complete abolition of warfare. War remains a possibility 
in the pursuit of one’s political interests. The impact of nuclear weapons had become 
visible in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, where the 
                                                
1 For criticisms of Krauthammer’s thesis see, Mark S. Sheetz and Michael Mastanduno. 1997/98. 




mutual restraint of both sides can be greatly attributed to the existence of nuclear 
weapons.  
The hegemony of the United States, democratization, globalization, and 
nuclear weapons seemed to justify hopes for a “democratic peace.” This doctrne, that 
democracies hardly ever fight wars against each other (Doyle 1986, 1151-1169), 
remains one of the few reliable axioms in international relations theory.2 However, 
the Kant-inspired democratic peace theory did not remain unchallenged. There are at 
least four other theories of the structural conflicts in the post-Cold War world. 
Similarly to democratic peace theory, these four theories return to the debat s of 
modern political theory beginning with Machiavelli.  
In a variation of the Kantian democratic peace thesis, Francis Fukuyama and 
Samuel Huntington argued instead that ideological forces would lead either to an end 
of history or to a new alignment of ideological conflicts. In Fukuyama’s Kojeve-
Hegelian theory3 of the end of history, the ideological possibilities have been 
exhausted. Modern political philosophy has come to its completion in the modern 
capitalistic republic, which manifests itself in a number of administrative units called 
states. These, as all administrative units, experience conflicts, but they cannot rise to 
the level of armed conflicts or wars. Instead, they resemble the conflicts of a large 
profit-maximizing corporation. Contrary to the Kantian thesis, Fukuyama’s thesis 
claims that the end of conflict is mostly due to a de facto world state and not to the 
inherently peaceful relations among modern republics. 
                                                
2 For a good summary of the debate see, Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. 
Miller. 1996. Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
3 For this formulation see Pierre Hassner. 1997. Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International 
Relations. In The Legacy of Rousseau, eds. Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of 




Huntington’s thesis of a “clash of civilizations,” by contrast, assumes that the 
Western world has not achieved a total victory as Fukuyama suggested. Instead, the 
Western world ended its internal conflict, a kind of civil war. Now, the previously 
secondary conflicts rise to prominence between the Western republics and the Eastern
world in its various manifestations (Islam, Hindu, Confucianism, Buddhism). As the 
list shows, the new ideological battle lines are drawn along religious lines. In other 
words, Huntington argues that the large religions are the dominant forces determining 
community membership. There are exceptions, but they are irrelevant on a global 
scale. Globally, the decisive conflicts will be among those forces which can command 
men’s allegiance and willingness to die. 
One powerful criticism of Huntington came from Benjamin Barber (1995) 
who argued that serious practical challenges remained to complete the process (ibid., 
3-22). In particular, as he famously put it, the dialectic between “Jihad and McWorld” 
remained the decisive threat to democracy. By that he meant the contradictions 
between the continued dominance of tribal life in the world and its confrontation with 
aggressive capitalism. He pointed out that these encounters would lead to great 
conflicts if they could not be countered by a prior dissolution of tribal allegiances or 
moderation of capitalism.  
Finally, Umberto Eco (1977) and Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1993) observed 
a new “medievalism.” Both also agreed that macro-stabilization had taken plac and 
that the great ideological conflicts had come to an end; but below the macro-level, 
they argued, new forms of allegiance and violence would spread somewhat randomly 




commercial republic, the human desire for community based on passions would seek 
new outlets and find them without being geographically stable. Furthermore, a new
global hierarchy based on economic inequalities would see violence manifest itself 
more and more within the administrative units instead of through them. This was 
explained by the fact that the state remained too strong to be challenged by any group, 
in particular because of the impossibility of a persuasive alternative. However, the 
injustice of economic inequality, the lack of community and patriotism would 
manifest themselves in sub-state violence. In rare cases this violence could also 
succeed in undermining and destabilizing a weak state. 
In addition to the philosophical analysis of contemporary international 
relations, academic international relations scholarship has also sought to develop its 
own views of the post-Cold War situation. In general, the serious contenders for the 
theoretical dominance of the field of international relations are variants of realism and 
constructivism. Constructivism positions itself only in opposition to realist theories f 
international relations, broadly defined so as to include classical realists, neo-realists 
and neo-liberals. If one further takes the position that neo-realists and neo-liberals are 
very close theoretical positions, and the leading exponent of constructivism, 
Alexander Wendt, agrees that this is a reasonable suggestion, one is left primarily 
with the opposition of realism and constructivism (1999, 31). For Wendt, 
constructivism includes the so-called English school, the World Society theory, 
postmodern international relations, and feminist international relations (1999, 31-32).  
The alternative perspectives on international relations can be reduced to 




peace are, and how much influence human art has on these phenomena. Therefore, 
they essentially deal with the same questions which were answered by the theorists 
discussed above. The works of Kenneth Waltz and Alexander Wendt are 
representative for contemporary realism and constructivism respectively. Similarly to 
the authors discussed above, they rely in their conceptualization of international 
relations on the works of modern political philosophers. In contrast to the visions of 
international relations discussed above, the theorists of international relations try to 
provide general or theoretical explanations of the structure of international relations. 
Their aim is therefore claims to be more comprehensive and “scientific” than the 
more historically bound explanations given above.  
Alexander Wendt’s constructivist theory suggests that the post-Cold War 
world opens up new avenues for the human manipulation of inter-state relations. 
While the era of nation-states was characterized by a “naturalistic” con ept of 
anarchy, the end of the Cold War has demonstrated that anarchy can be changed by 
human efforts. The structure of international relations depends on the divergent 
construction of actors and, due to the increasing democratization and globalization of 
the structure of international relations, it will change in the future accordingly. This 
has to be complemented by a change of the actors’ own imaginations or construction 
of international relations. Wendt’s goal is to “help move the international system 
from the law of the jungle toward the rule of law” (1999, 10). He thereby implies that 
he shares the description of international relations as originally determined by the law 
of the stronger and a concern with security. Furthermore, Wendt believes that the 




cultural time in international politics will move forward, I do think one can argue that 
it will not move backward” (1999, 312).  And further: “If there are any structural 
changes, they will be historically progressive” (ibid.). For Wendt, the peak of history 
is reached with the political thought of Immanuel Kant (1999).4 For the time being, 
however, political reality mostly remains at a Lockean “culture of anarchy,” with the 
exception of Europe, which has embraced a Kantian culture. Therefore, Wendt 
fundamentally agrees with the view of the post-Cold War world, which sees an 
inevitable progress toward world peace.  
 On the other hand, Waltz and other realists deny that the progress toward 
world peace is likely, desirable, or possible. The contemporary realists fall into 
defensive and offensive realist camps, depending on their respective opinion on the 
necessity of aggression in international affairs.5 For the realists, the post-Cold War 
world is not essentially different from the Cold War world. While the world is not 
dominated by the confrontation of the two superpowers, the confrontations among 
states continue to define international relations. One might say that they defend the 
Lockean vision of world politics (in Wendt’s terms) as the last word on international 
relations. 
 It is difficult to determine the validity of these different interpretations of 
contemporary international relations. It is remarkable what influence the classic 
canon of political philosophy had on all the dominant interpretations of the present 
                                                
4 Despite Wendt’s obvious preference for Kant one wonders whether he does not follow Hegel. Instead 
of arguing with Kant that perpetual peace is a morally necessary, but unattainable, goal, he suggests 
with Hegel or Marx that perpetual peace can be attained in the near future. 
5 For offensive realism see John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New 
York, NY: Norton. For defensive realism see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. 2000/2001. Security-Seeking 
Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered. In International Security 25, 3 (Winter): 152-86; 





international order. In contemporary studies of international relations the connecti  
between political philosophy and theories of international relations is rarely made 
obvious. Yet, the necessarily derivative character of theories of international relations 
implies that all theories of international relations are derivate from political 
philosophy. One first has to talk about the constitution of social actors before one can 
talk about their interactions. The crisis of the Western world after the end of the Cold 
War has showed clearly the inadequacy of theories of international relations when 
divorced from an awareness of its reliance on political philosophy. It therefore seems 
advisable to follow them in their approach and seek at first what motivated their 
reliance on political philosophy for evaluating contemporary affairs. 
  
1.2 Modern Polit ical Philosophy, International Relations, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
Among the different descriptions of contemporary international relations, it was
primarily the theories of the early moderns (i.e. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Lcke 
and Montesquieu) which were vindicated by current events (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 
1999, 2). It is also the modern political philosophers to whom the contemporary 
analysts of international relations return. For example, the United States of America, 
the most powerful country in the world, is said to be based on Locke’s political 
philosophy (Laslett 1988, 2-3). It is therefore reasonable to argue that due to the pre-
eminence of the United States, Lockean political philosophy is the effective poltical 
philosophy of the world.6 For example, Benjamin Barber used a quasi-Lockean model 
                                                




of the democratic nation-state in order to criticize Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s neo-
Hegelianisms.7 
 Modern political thought, beginning with Machiavelli, puts much greater 
emphasis on international relations than previous political thought. Instead of using 
the concept to indicate the advancement of one’s soul toward knowledge or 
redemption, modern political philosophy pursues first and foremost “comfortable 
self-preservation,” in Locke’s famous words. This is not to deny that they also aim at 
freedom, or that there is a higher aim implied than mere self-preservation, but this 
leaves open precisely the substance of individual excellence.  
In this regard, it is decisive that Machiavelli is the political philosopher of war 
par excellence. Machiavelli’s focus on political virtue, on war, and on victory 
strongly suggested that moral considerations should be secondary to those of security 
and glory. Machiavelli renews Alcibiades’ case against Socrates, but largely ignores 
Socrates’ defense. Therefore, courage is elevated at the cost of moderation, justice, 
and wisdom (Strauss 2001, 183-184). Even wisdom is now relegated to the service of 
courage. 
It has been observed (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, 146; Tuck 1999, 9) that 
international relations became much more important for the moderns because they 
exemplify the modern’s conception of the essence of human nature. As Leo Strauss 
noted, the moderns take their bearings from the extreme or exceptional situation 
while the ancients took their bearings from the ordinary situation (Strauss 1953, 178). 
The moderns are thus preoccupied with preserving security amid the threat of anarchy 
                                                





and disorder, whereas the ancients, assuming the existence of stable orders, sught to 
pursue the noble and best political regime. 
Therefore, the implications of Machiavelli’s teachings on international 
relations are a liberation of the conscience from moral concerns, in particular a 
liberation from the Roman Catholic Church in deed and thought. But the price which 
had to be paid was an amplification of the power of kings and princes. Their conflicts 
were suddenly unrestrained by considerations of an after-life or about their subj ct . 
One is reminded of the great Machiavellian Frederick the Great who told his soldier  
after a battle: “dogs, do you want to live forever?”8 The restraints now issued from 
being subordinated to other kings, through alliances, or in a balance-of-power system 
instead of from the Catholic Church, which had been able to exercise considerable 
through the threat of excommunication. 
With Machiavelli’s teaching being openly professed, one sees the need for 
some moderation.9 The first attempt to moderate Machiavelli’s teachings was made 
by Hugo Grotius. His work on the Right of War and Peace tried to set forth a 
universal doctrine of international law. By using the consensus among states, eith r 
Christian or otherwise, as its foundation, Grotius concluded that war for personal 
interest was unjust and therefore prohibited. On the other hand, Grotius retained the 
notion of a just war for humanitarian causes. This had the political consequence of 
simultaneously attacking the Roman Catholic Church and justifying the wars ag inst 
it.  
                                                
8 See Christopher Duffy. 1985. Frederick the Great: A Military Life. London: Routledge.  
9 Strauss has suggested that Machiavelli openly taugh  what was only said privately by the Ancient 
Greeks. In other words, Machiavelli’s writings were an act of extraordinary and irresponsible daring 




Even though Hobbes himself did not have the best reputation – the beast of 
Malmsbury as he was called – in comparison with Machiavelli Hobbes appeared 
much more moderate. In particular, Hobbes sought to harness the revolutionary 
implications of Machiavelli’s teaching while retaining the attack on the Catholic 
Church.10 For that purpose, Hobbes introduced the notion of natural law into 
Machiavelli’s teaching. Instead of leading to individual perfection or excellence, 
Hobbes stated that it was a natural law to seek one’s survival or self-preservation. 
This reduced the Machiavellian dualism of survival and glory to a single-minded 
liberal emphasis upon survival. In fact, glory or the pleasures of the mind were 
deemed to be nothing but vainglory by Hobbes. 
The foundation of modern theories of international relations is laid by Thomas 
Hobbes.11 Hobbes is therefore traditionally presented as the originator of the “realist” 
school of international political thought.12 He stands for a very bleak account of 
human nature and the base goals human beings pursue. For Thomas Hobbes, 
international relations resemble the “natural state of man” (XIII, 82-86). and the state 
of nature. “Yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their
independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; 
…; which is the posture of war” (XIII, 85).  
 In the state of nature, human life is “nasty, brutish, and short” (ibid.). There is 
a fundamental equality among all human beings based on their equal ability to kill 
                                                
10 It is first and foremost an attack on the Church and not on Christianity because Christianity itself 
provides a very useful education in obedience. 
11 Niccolò Machiavelli preceded Hobbes in this project. 
12 Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. International Relations. 7th Edition. New York: 
Pearson and Longman, 2006; Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations 




each other. This fear of violent death and their desire to survive, leads humans to 
conclude a contract, which establishes a sovereign capable of maintaining peace and 
security among the contracting parties. In order to establish the state, each party has 
to relinquish all rights except for the right to self-preservation. Hobbes establishes in 
this manner a sphere which will remain outside the influence of the sovereign. 
Still, as Richard Tuck argued, the state of nature remained a permanent 
possibility for Hobbes, continually threatening the peace and order created by the 
sovereign (1999, 203-204). The continuation of the state of nature among sovereign 
states provided only the most obvious example of the truth of this assertion.13 
In international relations scholarship, Hobbes has often been read the founder 
of a “structural view that sees interstate anarchy as the defining cause of the state of 
war” (Doyle 1997, 111-112). This interpretation is based on the parallel between the 
state of nature among individual men and among states.  The difficulty arises becau e 
the law of nature, which would demand from the sovereign to seek peace, only 
becomes effective through the pronouncements of a sovereign, who by definition is 
absent in the state of nature. While this indeed provides the incentive for men to exit 
the state of nature and transfer their natural rights to a common sovereign, the same 
procedure does not take place among sovereign states because the already existing 
sovereign states are too protected from the vagaries of the state of nature to forc he 
cooperation of multiple sovereigns. Furthermore, every sovereign state has to observe 
the law of nature. While this might not take place in all instances, every sovereign has 
to adhere to this reasonable standard. Yet, who will enforce the natural law? Hobbes 
                                                
13 For Hobbes, the state of nature was not just a thoug t or juridical experiment. Any caution of 




almost must believe that the people would enforce – but in his writings he argues that 
the people cannot and should not enforce the sovereign’s violations of the natural law. 
Therefore, effectively the international relations scholars might be right to accuse 
Hobbes of failing to remedy this weakness of his political philosophy. In practice, 
Hobbes’ political philosophy might lead to an exacerbation of the use of military 
force.   
 While Locke has traditionally been considered a fundamentally different 
philosopher than Hobbes, (see Doyle 1999, chap. 6), at closer look, many of the 
differences dissolve. Others as different as Leo Strauss and C.B. MacPherson argue 
that Hobbes and Locke share more than separates them and, what is more important, 
share the essential differences. In particular, Hobbes and Locke share the fundamental 
assumption that the end of government lies in securing the self-preservation of its 
citizens. They differ in their estimation of the power a government needs toward this 
end. The obvious difference between them is therefore the more limited power of 
government in Locke’s political philosophy. Yet, one should not commit the error to 
argue that Hobbes’ sovereign’s power is unlimited, because the sovereign’s power is 
always limited by the natural law. 
 With regard to international relations, Locke’s modification of Hobbes 
manifests itself mainly with a view to conquest. As property becomes sanctified and 
part of the state of nature, conquest can never give any right to land. Furthermore, war 
should not affect the non-fighting part of the opponents. In contrast, Hobbes had 
claimed that any acquisition by conquest was justified. Locke restricts the just 




land took place by violent conquests. Yet, he considers these violations immoral and 
against divine law. The conclusion is that Locke goes even further than Hobbes to 
limit international war and redirects international conflicts to the realm of non-violent 
conflict through trade (followed by Montesquieu). However, Locke makes domestic 
more violent by giving citizens’ anger a new justification. He thereby forces a 
government to become responsive to the demands of its citizens. Hobbes had 
restricted the right to rebellion to the extreme circumstances of a violent criminal and 
a soldier, both of whom could reasonably be expected to be ineffective in their 
demand to be released from persecution or their duties, respectively. 
Hobbes’ political philosophy has become the foundation for modern political 
philosophy. In reaction to Hobbes, the revision of the natural law tradition was 
facilitated by Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Emmerich de Vattel, and others. 
They attempted to retain a basis for a non-mercenary morality. In essenc , the 
international lawyers of the 17th and 18th century tried to find means to moderate the 
state of nature existing among states. The basis of their arguments was accounts of 
the effectiveness of international law, which, for them, was synonymous with natural 
law. Going even beyond them, a number of scholars—such as William Penn, Emeric 
Crucé, Henry IV and Sully, and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre14--sought to rationally solve 
the problem by creating an empire.   
Before we come to Rousseau, one should first note that while Hobbes and 
Locke tried to maintain a moderate foreign policy, Rousseau’s successors Kant and 
Hegel sought to expand modern political principles and thereby constitute a universal 
                                                





empire (Hassner 1997, 201). They suggested that the universal basis of modern 
political philosophy on the desire for self-preservation could not stop at the borders of 
the nation-state but would necessarily be extended. In fact, this made it necessary to 
abandon the right to self-preservation as the basis for political societies. Kant and 
Hegel concluded that the differences among states were less important than the 
unifying features of human desires, and that these common features would eventually 
lead to the conclusion that war was an unreasonable mode of action for those who had 
founded their states on the desire for peace and security. As we had seen, our 
contemporary debate focuses much more on the political philosophies of Kant and 
Hegel than on Hobbes and Locke. One might be therefore equally justified to argue 
that it was not the neo-natural law school which was vindicated by current 
international affairs but instead the neo-imperialistic school of Kant and Hegel. 
According to Hassner, Hobbes and Locke “hope that an emergent world society, 
resting on a way of life that is commercial rather than warlike, will mitigate the 
continuing plurality and rivalry of states” (1997, 201). On the contrary, the Kantian 
and Hegelian schools all aim to constitute a universal order or, in Alexandre Kojève’s 
terms, a universal and homogenous state (Strauss 2000[1961], xiii; 146).15  
The political philosopher who stands in-between the most popular accounts of 
our international relations is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau is the political 
philosopher who participates in the early modern philosophers’ account but also 
prepares the ground for Kant and Hegel. Rousseau’s pivotal role for modern political 
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only universal but also politically and socially homogenous (with allowances for irreducible 
physiological differences), that is to say of a State hat is the goal and the outcome of the collectiv  




philosophy has often been acknowledged.16 But, as will be made clear in this 
dissertation, his importance extends to contemporary international relations.  
 Leo Strauss identified Rousseau as one of two modern political philosophers 
(the other is Edmund Burke), who unsuccessfully attempted a return to ancient 
political philosophy (1953, chap. 6A). According to Strauss, Rousseau’s mistake was 
that he built his political philosophy, which resembled ancient political philosophy, 
on the foundation of Hobbes, i.e. on the natural right of self-preservation (1953, 277). 
However, Rousseau was the first to fully capture the ambivalence which was inherent 
in the modern project. He saw that the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason, 
progress, and science would not be able to achieve its goal. The goal of the 
Enlightenment to create a secular paradise would come at a cost to a fully human
experience and that cost might be higher than the benefits. In particular, Rousseau 
saw the inherent fanaticism of the Enlightenment. While the Enlightenment as a 
political philosophy liberated philosophy and brought reason into broad daylight, it 
came at a cost for non-philosophers. The life of non-philosophers was improved by an 
increase in material wealth, greater sophistication of tastes, and civil, moral, and 
political freedom. On the negative side, it risked to be unbearably oppressive in terms 
of love, friendship, and happiness. Rousseau thought that it was necessary to confront 
these disadvantages. 
Rousseau’s strange position between Machiavelli and Hobbes on one side, and 
Kant and Hegel on the other, can show us better than anyone else the contradictions 
inherent in our current conceptions of international relations. One can summarize the 
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and Nathan Tarcov. 1997. “Introduction.” In The Legacy of Rousseau, eds. Orwin and Tarcov, 




debate between these two camps as to whether international relations can be 
conquered by man or if it must remain in the last analysis the realm of natural right. 
This question remains at the heart of our contemporary debate. Rousseau is the 
political philosopher who stands in-between both positions; somehow continuing and 
radicalizing the thoughts of his predecessors, thereby laying the foundation for his 
successors, and still maintaining his distance to all of them. Looking more closely at 
the complexity of Rousseau’s writings on international relations holds therefore the 
promise of revealing the complexity of our situation to the fullest.17  
More concretely, Pierre Hassner suggested that Rousseau rejected the option 
for empire as well as the moderate course of Hobbes. Yet even further, Rousseau al o 
rejected isolation as a feasible option (1997, 201-202). In other words, Rousseau was 
at a loss when it came to international relations. In contrast, I believe I can show that 
the confusing spectacle of international relations which Rousseau presents is 
ultimately coherent. In opposition to Hassner it seems that the apparent confusion 
fulfills the function to distract from Rousseau’s fundamentally modern assumptions. 
In sum, the aim of modern political thought is to pacify inter-human relations, 
primarily domestically and secondarily externally. This presumes that the hig st 
political aim is comfortable self-preservation. It leads to the primacy of the state’s 
security function externally and internally. It defines all those states as enemies who 
seek their own self-interest in eternal or personal glory. All other states are potential 
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this list. But one should not forget either that Rousseau is sometimes considered the first existentialist, 
albeit an existentialist with a sensitive heart (cf. Richard L. Velkley. 2002. Being after Rousseau: 




allies or even friends as long as one’s own self-preservation is not threatened. This 
stands opposed to the traditionally highest political aim of happiness.  
Rousseau agrees that the men of nature pursue their self-preservation. He 
adds, however, that happiness is also the natural end of the men of nature. In contrast 
to earlier political thought Rousseau suggests that happiness is unconnected to reason 
and society. Even worse, reason and society prevent the experience of happiness 
almost entirely. Rousseau is therefore primarily concerned to outline the social and 
political conditions which will do the least harm to man’s happiness. While a return 
to the natural and best condition is impossible, Rousseau seeks a political society 
which will provide for the necessary self-preservation while least compromising the 
natural soul of man.  
Due to his consideration of human happiness, Rousseau’s political aims in 
domestic and international politics diverge from each other. While large republics or 
empires are unproblematic from Hobbes’ or Locke’s viewpoint, from Rousseau’s 
perspective they become unacceptable. Rousseau criticizes his contemporaries from 
the perspective of a virtuous man. From this perspective, the small republic is the bes  
regime and not the large republics or empires. Rousseau also criticizes the small 
republic from the perspective of the philosopher and from the perspective of a 
Christian. From the latter perspective, which he takes less often than the other tw , 
the small republic is flawed because it lacks or diminishes the concern of citizens for 
their fellow men. The Christian perspective at its best is capable of softening the 




criticizes all social or political life. Political life appears as only bondage and war in 
the pursuit of vainglory.  
It is my contention that Rousseau is the only modern political philosopher 
who adequately captures the tensions inherent between international relations and 
domestic politics. This tension can now be expressed as simultaneously advocating 
Realpolitik, cosmopolitanism, and nationalism. As Rousseau believes that these 
tensions are ultimately irresolvable, he presents his readers with a confusing spectacle 
of contradictions and paradoxes. Rather than resolve these tensions, as those who 
came after him sought to do, or to ignore the problem all together, as did those 
moderns who came before, Rousseau decides to at least point to them. By following 
this procedure, Rousseau’s vision of international relations is superior to those of his 
predecessors and successors because he points to practical limits of the modern 
political project.  
 
1.3 Overview of the Argument 
Providing an explanation for the Social Contract’s incompleteness requires a 
reinterpretation of Rousseau’s writings on international relations. Modern accounts of 
Rousseau’s political philosophy, and in particular those which have tried to read 
Rousseau as a theorist of international relations, have, first of all, suffered from an 
unnecessarily narrow selection of his works. Instead of casting their nets wid , these 
interpretations have rested on only a small number of Rousseau’s remarks.  
 Most importantly, the thesis of Rousseau’s reluctant realism stands in tension 




all, it is opposed by those who claim that Rousseau was successful in one way or 
another in overcoming the fundamental structure of international relations as a state
of war or that he succeed in setting forth a perfect state.  
It has been claimed that confederations, the social contract, or the education of 
Emile provide the blueprint for overcoming of the state of war. The first claim is at 
the same time the first major interpretation of Rousseau’s international political 
thought. This argument was made by Joseph-Lucien Windenberger, and more 
recently by Michael C. Williams (1989/2005) and Yuichi Aiko (2006),18 who argued 
that Rousseau had succeeded in providing the general outlines of perpetual peace 
(1899, 105; 188). According to Windenberger, Rousseau saw that the small republic 
would be too vulnerable to external enemies. Therefore, a confederation became 
necessary. “To realize it, one cannot count neither on religion, nor on force, nor ‘on 
the book’” (1899, 188). Windenberger continues to argue that the confederation can 
only be properly constituted if it is restricted to legitimate republics as Rousseau had 
described them in the Social Contract (1899, 208; 237). Windenberger concludes: 
“The international contract corresponds exactly to the social contract” (1899, 231). 
“The theory of J.-J. Rousseau, when it is a question of the power of confederated 
States, as when it is about those of citizens, is therefore very neat” (ibid.). The 
confederation, constituted only by small republics, completes the Social Contract and 
brings perpetual peace.  
Kenneth Waltz, in his interpretation of Rousseau as a “third image” theorist, 
made Rousseau the cornerstone of his new theory of international relations. Waltz 
                                                





argued in Man, the State, and War that Rousseau explained war not based on human 
nature or domestic politics, but that he explained war in reference to the international 
system (1954, 165-186). This argument is not entirely persuasive because Waltz 
leaves out the ambiguity with which Rousseau expresses himself regarding 
international relations. In addition, it is not clear, in what essential way Hobbes 
differs from Rousseau. With regard to international relations, the Hobbesian and 
Rousseauian state are indistinguishable. It is only in the original state of nature in 
which the two accounts differ but these differences are not mirrored in the state of 
nature which exists among states. Waltz does not discuss in any detail the paradox 
that the original state of nature is a state of peace while the state of nature among 
states is a state of war. Furthermore, Waltz suggests that Rousseau was mainly 
focused on the structure of international relations. Yet, Rousseau was primarily 
concerned with the domestic structure of the political societies constituting 
international relations. 
Stanley Hoffmann argued in an article (1963), and again in the introduction to 
Rousseau on International Relations (1991), that Rousseau had been successful in his 
attempt to create peace through the Social Contract.19 In particular written against 
Kenneth Waltz (1954), Hoffmann claims that Waltz had falsely attributed the 
opinions set forth in Rousseau’s Abstract of the Plan for Perpetual Peace to 
Rousseau himself while ignoring Rousseau’s Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual 
Peace. While Hoffmann’s criticism of Waltz is accurate, his own argument goes too 
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far by suggesting that the Social Contract provided a solution for domestic as well as 
international conflicts.  
Finally, Grace Roosevelt comes to the conclusion that “Rousseau’s political 
and educational writings indicate that the divergent values of patriotism and 
humanitarianism are not mutually exclusive in the long run” (1990, 181). Her 
argument relies on the notion of “perfectibility” in the S cond Discourse and by the 
possibility of the education of Emile.  However, this reading of Rousseau goes 
against Rousseau’s skepticism of the course of history. “All that human wisdom can 
do is to forestall changes, to arrest from afar all that brings them on” (Letter to 
d’Alembert, 305[V, 68]). It also does not take into consideration what happens to 
Emile and Sophie in Les Solitaires. While Roosevelt was the first to fundamentally 
revise the reading of The State of War given in the Pléiade edition of Rousseau’s 
works, her interpretation of Rousseau regarding international politics seems far too 
optimistic.  
 If these interpreters had claimed that Rousseau succeeded in overcoming the 
state of war, others claimed that the state of war would persist. These interpreters are 
therefore much closer to the interpretation presented in this dissertation. However, 
contrary to the claim made here these interpretations all share the opinion that 
Rousseau put forth the aim of peace in all honesty. Here the claim is made that 
Rousseau was aware of the limitations of his own argument. 
Among the earlier interpreters of Rousseau as being incapable of overcoming 
war is F.H. Hinsley (1963). Importantly, Hinsley points to two positions in 




However, Hinsley comments that “his inconclusiveness and defeatism were, indeed, 
the result of his failure to reconcile his historical arguments with the initial 
assumptions of his moral and political philosophy” (1963, 55). Hinsley further 
suggests that Kant was able to resolve the contradictions which Rousseau was unable 
to find (1963, 60-61). While this points in the right direction, it is not necessary, 
contrary to Hinsely, that the tension is resolvable or that Kant correctly resolved the 
tension.   
Carter (1987), Goyard-Fabre (1994; 2000), Asbach (2002), and Boucher 
(2004) conclude that Rousseau was ultimately unable to provide a solution to the state 
of war even though he desired to find a solution for it (Carter 1987, 211-212; Boucher 
2004, 363). Carter in particular dismisses Rousseau’s cosmopolitanism (1987, 198; 
208). However, this raises the difficulty of Rousseau’s intention in writing from a 
cosmopolitan or humanitarian perspective. The account of international relations as 
only a state of war leaves aside Rousseau’s entire positive project of the Emile and 
the Social Contract. It is not sufficient to claim that these are defective from the 
perspective of the philosopher, one must also explain why they are central part of 
Rousseau’s political philosophy. 
Pierre Hassner (1997) argues that “in his practical answers concerning 
international relations Rousseau does not succeed in avoiding the very contradictions 
and ambiguities he wants to suppress” (207). “The diversity of his influence was at
the price of much hesitation and an ultimate failure to cut the Gordian knot of the 
“mixed state” (ibid.). Yet, Hassner does not show that Rousseau was unaware of these




that the “mixed state” remained because Rousseau believed that an alternative way of 
life had to exist, which transcended the limitations of the state. 
In the following chapter it will be established that the state of war constitute  
the fundamental condition of international relations. This chapter first elaborates on 
the observation that Rousseau’s political works were never completed despite his 
frequent promises to finish them. Rousseau’s decision to begin and end the treatise 
with a reference to its incompleteness points to the problem of international relations.  
A tension exists between the condition of universal war, which points to the 
demand of universal peace, and the primary demand to establish a legitimately ruled 
political society. The latter leads to the plurality of states and is based on an unjust 
attribution of territory to a limited number of men. The injustice of any political 
founding remains part of every political society and cannot be overcome without 
destroying its own existence. Therefore, every political society finds itself n the 
position to simultaneously desire to further advance peace while having to reaffirm its 
own existence through war. It points to the conclusion that every political society is 
necessarily imperfect. Therefore, the incompleteness of the Social Contract points to 
imperfection instead of the otherwise dominant impression of perfection created in 
that work. In addition to the necessary and desirable plurality of political societies, 
the case for the permanence of the state of war can also be derived from human 
history. Rousseau makes this argument especially in the Second Discourse.  
Chapter three reviews four different arguments which Rousseau leveled 
against contemporary solutions of the state of war. For different reasons, Rousseau 




solutions which his contemporaries had suggested and which derived from either a 
Christian’s perspective or the perspective of the p ilosophes. Among these three, 
Rousseau prefers the balance of power, moderated by commerce, to the other three 
options. The balance of power is the solution suggested by first by Machiavelli, while 
its modification was elaborated by Locke and Montesquieu. However, it relies on 
permanent war and competition. For Rousseau, this is clearly an unsatisfactory state 
and he will seek to improve upon Locke and Montesquieu in particular.  
Rousseau’s own attempted solutions are presented in chapters four and five. 
Chapter four explores the solutions of natural law, international law, and the law of 
the war, and discusses how far these solutions would suffice to the end the state of 
war. In the end, neither of these three types of law is accepted by Rousseau as the 
perfect solution to the state of war. In particular, Rousseau rejects international law as 
it is in his opinion nothing more than an expression of the accidental congruence of 
self-interest. However, Rousseau comes very close to suggesting the existenc  of 
natural law. 
In addition, Rousseau introduces a novel understanding of the state of war, 
which differs from the permanent state of war underlying all human relations. Based 
on this understanding of the state of war, a law of war also necessarily exists which 
limits the actions of states. These have the status of prudential rules which no state 
should violate in most circumstances. Yet, if the laws of war contradict a state’s 
survival, it may violate them. In fact, Rousseau uses the phrase “state of war” in two 
distinct senses: first, to refer to the state of war which is not subject to any law, and 




The confederation as Rousseau’s most prominent solution to overcome the 
state of war is explored in chapter five. While I show that Rousseau finally rejects this 
option as well, he advertises it loudly as the best possible option, superior in 
particular to the unbearable balance of power. The confederation remains necessary 
as a moral symbol of hope. The confederation reflects the hope of most people for a 
better and more peaceful world, despite its practical impossibility. However, as 
Rousseau saw, the confederation would require the illusion of local independence, 
otherwise it would undermine the stability of its constituent units. Therefore, 
Rousseau chooses to advertise the confederation only with the aim of limiting 
republics and monarchies alike, as well as to provide an aim for the subjects and 
citizens of those states. Rousseau thereby anticipates and inspires Immanuel Kant in 
his plans for a perpetual peace. 
Finally I conclude that Rousseau’s primary view of international relations was 
Machiavellian. Yet, he also made a strong case for natural law, law of war, and 
confederations. Even though Rousseau held this argument to be flawed, he used it in 
order to counter the prevailing opinions on international relations. Furthermore, 
Rousseau believed that this argument was a necessary complement of the domestic 
solution presented in the Social Contract. While Rousseau’s writings lend themselves 
to be radicalized, it appears that he offered a primarily nationalistic vision of 
international relations, opposed this with his humanitarian vision. Lastly, he 
contradicted both political solutions from his anti-political, individualistic 
cosmopolitan viewpoint. The last vision, however, lends itself only with difficulty to 








C h a p t e r  2  
COMPLETING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: 




2.1 Introduction  
Rousseau’s most famous work on politics, the Social Contract, appears to be 
incomplete. The Social Contract begins and ends with a reference to the incomplete 
nature of this work. In the Notice, Rousseau writes: “This small treatise is drawn from 
a larger work, undertaken many years ago without consulting my strength and long 
since abandoned.” In chapter nine of book four, entitled “Conclusion,” he writes: 
“After setting down the true principles of political right and trying to found the State 
on its basis, it would remain to buttress the State by its external relations; which 
would include the right of nations, commerce, the right of war and conquests, public 
right, league, negotiations, treaties, etc. But all this forms a new object too vast for 
my short sight; I should always have fixed it nearer to myself.” (SC, IV.9, 224[III, 
470]). In a work which is considered by many one of the most important, most 
polished works of political philosophy, it is remarkable that its most obvious 
characteristic, its imperfection, should have been ignored by most readers. 
But the Social Contract is not simply incomplete. Rather, the Social Contract 
is incomplete with regard to one particular issue: external relations. In addition to this 
reference in the Social Contract, Rousseau discussed this topic in two other works. In 




work and second, that the more complete work would have had the title Political 
Institutions. 
I examined the state of this book [i.e. the Political Institutions] and I 
found that it still required several more years of work. I did not have 
the courage to pursue it and to wait until it was finished to execute my 
resolution. Thus, renouncing this work, I resolved to extract from it 
what could be detached, then to burn all the rest, and pushing this 
work with zeal, without interrupting that on Emile, in less than two 
years I put the finishing touches on the Social Contract (C, X, 432[I, 
516]).  
 
In the Emile, the content of much of the Social Contract is summarized. Yet, the pupil 
Emile experiences the teachings of the Social Contract during his travels, while 
everyone else has access to these teachings only through Rousseau’s writing . Here, 
we find an extensive elaboration on the short paragraph contained in the Social 
Contract.  
Once we have thus considered each species of civil society in itself,
we shall compare them in order to observe their diverse relations: 
some large, others small; some strong, others weak; attacking, 
resisting, and destroying one another, and in this continual action and 
reaction, responsible for more misery and loss of life than if men had 
all kept their initial freedom. We shall examine whether the 
establishment of society accomplished too much or too little; whether 
individuals – who are subject to laws and to men, while societies 
among themselves maintain their independence of nature – remain 
exposed to the ills of both conditions without having their advantages; 
and whether it would be better to have no civil society in the world 
than to have many. Is it not this mixed condition which participates in 
both and secures neither per quem neutrum licet, nec tanquan in bello 
paratum esse, nec tanquam in pace securum? Is it not this partial and 
imperfect association which produces tyranny and war; and are not 
tyranny and war the greatest plagues of humanity? 
Finally we shall examine the kind of remedies for these 
disadvantages provided by leagues and confederations, which leave 
each state its own master within but arm it against every unjust 
aggressor from without. We shall investigate how a good federative 
association can be established, what can make it durable, and how far 





The Abbé de Saint-Pierre proposed an association of all the 
states of Europe in order maintain perpetual peace among them. Was 
this association feasible? And if it had been established, can it 
presumed that it would have lasted? These investigations lead us 
directly to all the questions of public right which can complete the 
clarification of questions of political right. 
Finally, we shall lay down the true principles of the right of 
war, and we shall examine why Grotius and the others presented only 
false ones.  
I would not be surprised if my young man, who has good 
sense, were to interrupt me in the middle of all our reasoning and say, 
“Some one might say that we are building our edifice with wood and 
not with men, so exactly do we align each piece with the ruler!” It is 
true, my friend, but keep in mind that right is not bent by men’s 
passions, and that our first concern was to establish the true principles 
of political right. Now that our foundations are laid, come and 
examine what men have built on them; and you will see some fine 
things! (E, V, 466-467). 
  
This shows that Rousseau had consistently considered his political writings to include 
the principles of domestic and external politics. Furthermore, by comparing the 
quotes from the Social Contract and the Emile we can get a fairly accurate idea of the 
issues which Rousseau would have covered with regard to external relations. By 
outlining the structure of the above quote from the Emile, we find that Rousseau 
planned to deal with the following three themes:  
In the first theme, Rousseau explores “whether the establishment of society 
accomplished too much or too little.” Rousseau points here to one of his fundamental 
principles, that society is an unnatural human invention. Further, Rousseau expresses 
here his skepticism regarding the ability of human art to improve upon nature. The 
most important indication of the insufficiency of human art is the plurality of political 
societies or the existence of international relations. 
The second theme seeks solutions or, better, “remedies” for the insufficiency 




the remedies are thought in solving the problem of international war and competition. 
Rousseau would have to show how confederation could be established, how they can 
last, especially in light of their tension with sovereignty. In particular, Roussea  will 
look at the already existing example of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual 
Peace and whether it can solve the problem of establishment and durability. The main 
problem raised here seems to be how the solution to external relations would conflict 
with the solution to domestic relations.  
Lastly, this leads more generally to an inquiry into the relationship between 
public right and political right. The third issue comprises “questions of public right” 
and the “true principles of the right of war.” It is unclear how the concepts of public 
right and right of war are related to political right. In his enumeration in the Social 
Contract, Rousseau had enumerated seven aspects of external relations, “right of 
nations, commerce, the right of war and conquests, public right, leagues, negotiations, 
treaties, etc.” (SC, IV.9, 224[III, 470]), three of which he now refers to in the Emile in 
reverse order: leagues, public right, and the right of war and conquests. It has been 
suggested by Sven Stelling-Michaud that the enumeration in the Social Contract can 
be divided by taking the right of nations as the main concept. The right of nations in 
turn can be divided into three subordinate concepts: 1. commerce, 2. right of war and 
peace, 3. public right or the leagues, negotiations, treaties, etc. (Pl., III, 1507). 
Stelling-Michaud further claims that Rousseau used public right in the sense in which 
we today use public international right/law (Pl., III, 1508). However, we do not need 
to rely on recent secondary sources but instead can turn to the definition of these 




relationship to other kinds of right by Diderot and Boucher d’Argis. Stelling-
Michaud’s categorization is confirmed in the article on the right of nations. Based on 
this categorization, in the Emile Rousseau fails to mention commerce and the general 
concept of the right of nations. 
This reduction of topics is not unique to external relations. Other important 
examples are the exclusion of the topic of the lawgiver and on civil religion from 
Emile’s experiences in his voyages. As with the other exclusions, so the exclusion of 
the right of nations and commerce appears to be significant. While we will discuss 
this in our chapter on Rousseau’s concept of natural right, it will suffice here to point 
to the two concepts which Rousseau excludes. First, the right of nations is comprised 
of the general and private right of nations. Furthermore, commerce is part of the 
private right of nations (Encyclopédie, V, 135).20  
Based on these three issues, we would therefore suggest that the 
incompleteness of the Social Contract is primarily problematic with regard to the 
status of civil society, the possibility of peace, commerce, and the right of nati ns. 
We now have an overview of the issues which the problem of external 
relations had raised for Rousseau. But we are still uncertain in what way Rousseau’s 
answer would be relevant. Even though the Social Contract is incomplete by 
Rousseau’s own admission, this does not answer the question whether this is 
significant at all for our understanding of international relations, of the Social 
Contract, or of Rousseau’s political philosophy. It is my claim that it is not an 
accident that the Social Contract remained incomplete, and that it had to remain 
incomplete with regard to international relations. In a work as carefully crafted as the 
                                                




Social Contract, Rousseau could have concluded the Social Contract with the chapter 
on civil religion. Instead, he went out of his way to indicate that the work is 
incomplete. Yet, it is very difficult to discern why he left the Social Contract 
incomplete and why he did so in particular with reference to international relations. 
The subject matter of international relations poses a difficulty for Rousseau and for 
the theory of the legitimate political regime, which he presents in the Social Contract. 
The incompleteness reflects a deeper tension in Rousseau’s political philosophy 
between the best and the good way of life, i.e. between man and citizen. The 
incompleteness is relevant for us today because the tension which Rousseau pointed 
to is felt particularly intensely in international relations and is therefore a suitable 
starting to point to inquire our modern predicament.  
 
2.2 Previous Attempts to Complete the Social Contract  
If the history of debating the Social Contract gives us any indication, it appears at 
first that the issue of the incompleteness of the Social Contract is rather insignificant. 
The first academic study dates from 1899, i.e. about 140 years after the Social 
Contract was published (Windenberger 1899).21 The belated response indicates that it 
might not have been a primary interest of Rousseau’s readers. However, the belated 
response does not mean that the subject was insignificant. Instead, readers became 
only slowly aware of the importance of international relations for Rousseau’s political 
thought. As Robert Derathé writes in his introduction to the Social Contract in the 
Pléiade edition, Rousseau began only to be studied in France in a non-partisan 
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manner around the end of the 19th century (Pl., III, cxiv). Before that, the study of 
Rousseau had been overshadowed by his popularity during the French Revolution. 
Rousseau’s work was consequently discredited by the political failure of the 
revolution. Both, the royalists and the liberals were opposed to his ideas. For 
example, Benjamin Constant’s critique of Rousseau became the quintessential 
classical liberal rejection of Rousseau for about a century. 
Furthermore, before the French revolution the Social Contract was not widely read. 
The Emile and the New Heloise were much more widely read. A major change 
occurred when the first French critical edition of Rousseau’s work by Dreyfus-Brisac 
in 1896 became available. The obvious problem of the conclusion of the Social 
Contract did not escape his careful readers, and they now had a number of additional 
essays and fragments available to probe this problem more deeply. It was soon after 
the publication of the critical edition that Windenberger attempted to solve the puzzl 
of the end of the Social Contract. He complemented the material from the critical 
edition with his own research in the archives and found a number of additional 
fragments, essays, and letters that shed light on the problem of external relations. 
Therefore, the lack of a quick response to this problem should not discourage us from 
seeking for some meaning in the omission. It might even be a most promising avenue 
of research to get to the heart of Rousseau’s political philosophy, instead of leading
away from it as it might first appear. 
As mentioned, Windenberger was the first to suggest an answer posed by the 
conclusion of the Social Contract. He assumed that the Social Contract could be 




identified the general will and equality as the two central principles set forth in the 
Social Contract and applied these to international relations. Furthermore, by 
comparing his extension of Rousseau’s principles with Rousseau’s essays on 
perpetual peace, Windenberger found that both solutions agreed with each other. He 
concluded that the principles of the Social Contract could only be applied to a 
confederation, striking a balance between security and inalienable sovereignty. 
Therefore, the Social Contract finds its completion in a confederation of republics. 
This is a significant result because it shows how republics can solve their external 
security dilemma while at the same time ensuring domestic legitimacy. In this 
reading, Rousseau appears as the father of modern republics and of modern 
international organizations.  
While it is obvious that Rousseau meant to discuss international relations, it is 
not convincing that he meant to discuss it in the manner of Windenberger. The realm 
of international relations seems structurally not analogous to the realm of human 
relations. Rousseau mentions in the Notice, as we have seen, and in a letter to 
Moultou (CC X, 41-42), that the larger work of the Political Institutions, which 
supposedly would have included a discussion of international relations, was “beyond 
his forces” or “too vast for his short sight.” From Rousseau’s remarks it appears that 
the task of finishing the Political Institutions, or the part on international relations, 
was more complex than extending his principles of political right to external 
relations.  
It is therefore necessary to look for alternative reasons as to why Rousseau did 




believe he could finish the Social Contract. For example, Lassudrie- Duchêne (1906, 
89) has argued that Rousseau’s deteriorating health prevented him from undertaking 
such an extensive project. Yet, not only did Rousseau live for seventeen years after he 
published the Social Contract, but he completed during that time major works such as 
Letters Written from the Mountain, Confessions, and Dialogues. It is therefore 
unlikely that his health prevented him from completing the Social Contract.  
Second, the Social Contract is indeed complete. Here, the difficulty is that it 
seems superfluous for Rousseau to begin and end the Social Contract with a reference 
to its incompleteness. Therefore, we still need to peruse the Social Contract carefully 
for those aspects that would point to its intrinsic incompleteness.  
Lastly, and this reason might simply be a complement to the previous 
argument, the Social Contract might be incomplete because the Social Contract is 
based on one set of principles, while it is contradicted by another set of principles. 
The two references would therefore point beyond the Social Contract itself to 
another, possibly higher set of principles, that the principles of the Social Contract 
either contradict or form a special case of a broader set of principles. In either case, 
the incompleteness of the Social Contract would point to the limits of the argument of 
the work. Furthermore, Rousseau believed that these limits would become most 
visible with regard to international relations.  
 
2.3 Reasons Intrinsic to the Social Contract  
The reasons for leaving the Social Contract unfinished may follow directly from the 




of the argument of the Social Contract in order to see whether the argument of the 
Social Contract points to external affairs. We will see that the aim of the Social 
Contract is to promulgate the principles of political right. These, however, are based 
on the condition that the state remains small and therefore vulnerable to external 
threats. Consequently, the argument of the Social Contract seems to necessitate its 
completion by setting forth the principles by which the small republic could protect 
itself and its legitimacy against external threats. Then, we will turn to Rousseau’s 
argument in the Discourse on Inequality where he outlines the permanence of the 
state of war among states. Both arguments lead to the conclusion that the problem of 
external relations exposed the limits of Rousseau’s political thought. 
Rousseau claims at the end of the Social Contract o have set forth “the true 
principles of political right and trying to found the State on its basis” (SC, IV.9, 
224[III, 470]). Also, at the beginning of the Social Contract, Rousseau set forth his 
aim in the following manner: “I want to inquire whether in the civil order there can be 
some legitimate and sure rule of administration, taking men as they are, and the laws 
as they can be…” (SC, I.intro., 131[III, 351]). And in I.1, Rousseau makes the famous 
statement that “man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. One believes 
himself the others’ master, and yet is more slave than they. How did this change come 
about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? I believe I can solve this 
question” (SC, I, 131[III, I.1]). The function of the “true principles of political right” 
is the establishment of legitimate political rule (Gildin 1983, 1). As Gourevitch has 
remarked, civil society enslaves men but it may do so legitimately (1997, xvii; see 




be understood to be complete in this regard, i.e. that it determines how political rule 
can be legitimately established. One may therefore agree with Reinhard Bran t that 
the Social Contract does not point beyond itself (1984, 109).  
While Rousseau succeeds to demonstrate the principles of political right, he 
also has to minimize an alternative formulation of the aim of the Social Contract. In 
order to focus on legitimacy, Rousseau has to diminish the importance of other 
possible goals of a political regime. Most importantly is his diminution of the 
importance of external security. In contrast to Thomas Hobbes, for example, the 
raison d’état is not its self-preservation or security, but its legitimacy. For Hobbes, 
the reason of all individuals to consent to the social contract is due to their equal fear 
of violent death. The state’s central task and reason for being is to ensure the physical 
security of all subjects. If the state ceases to provide this security then the individuals 
are again free to provide for their own security, or to choose themselves the means to 
their self-preservation. It appears that for Rousseau the claims of legitimacy take 
precedence over the claims of self-preservation. Gildin suggests that freedom and 
equality were Rousseau’s highest aims while it was peace for Hobbes (1983, 12).  
Yet, in the formulation of the explicit aim of the social contract, Rousseau also 
states that the social contract must ensure the self-preservation of all its members: 
“To find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods of 
each associate with the full force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, 
nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before” (SC, I.6, 138[III, 359]). 
The need of a social contract arises because each man’s own forces are insufficie t to 




self-preservation” (SC, I.6, 138[III, 359]). Rousseau summarizes here the 
developments detailed in the Second Discourse. In that work, the need to establish a 
social contract arose because the state of nature had become a state of war and the 
self-preservation of all had become precarious (49-54[III, 171-178]). The aim of the
social contract can be said to establish a political society which does not protectthe 
liberty of some at the cost of enslaving the rest of society. Again, political so iety has 
to be a mutual enslavement of all to the law. 
From this perspective, Rousseau indeed shows in the Social Contract what 
principles establish legitimate political rule. Legitimate political rule means that 
“each man’s force and freedom” as the means to self-preservation are replacd with 
legitimate political institutions, or by political institutions which everyone can 
consent to. Moral and civil freedom replace natural freedom (see SC, I.8, 141-142[III, 
365]). Between the two aims pursued politically, i.e. self-preservation and freedom, 
Rousseau is unwilling to opt entirely for self-preservation, as the comparison with 
Hobbes showed. Instead, Rousseau tries to find a compromise between the two aims, 
while limiting the requirements of self-preservation to a bare minimum. Conversely, 
this means that Rousseau tries to maximize freedom.  
Yet in some sense, the aim of Rousseau’s work, the Social Contract, is not the 
same as the aim of a social contract. Rousseau seeks to make political rule legitimate, 
while a social contract seeks to ensure the self-preservation of men. In III.9, Rousseau 
affirms the aim of the social contract: “[The end of the political associati n] is the 
preservation and prosperity of its members” (185[III, 420]). One might even come to 




Leviathan than to Rousseau’s Social Contract because the former is much more 
effective at ensuring the minimal aim of self-preservation.  
The problem of self-preservation, noted at the beginning and at the end of the 
Social Contract, becomes particularly obvious when one notes the republic’s 
vulnerability to foreign attack. This vulnerability follows from Rousseau’s argument 
that a political regime can only reliably maintain its legitimacy over time if it is very 
small. In order to ensure political legitimacy, Rousseau is forced to name the 
conditions for political legitimacy. Size is one of the most important conditions, 
although not all important conditions for ensuring legitimacy have also a negative 
impact on its vulnerability. 
Rousseau discusses the size of the legitimate states in three different contx s: 
first, he discusses it as a condition necessary for the constitution of the state, second, 
he discusses it in relation to government, and lastly, he discusses it as a condition for 
maintaining sovereign legislative power (cf. Gildin 1983, 90-91). The problem with 
these three different passages is that they seem to contradict each other. While the 
first and last discussion suggest that only a small state could be established and 
maintain itself by remaining legitimately, the central discussion suggests that size 
would not matter. 
The legitimate political regime is not possible “in all climates” as Rousseau 
writes, following Montesquieu (SC, III.8, 181[III, 415]). There are numerous 
circumstantial conditions which have to be present for the founding of a stable 
legitimate regime. The first discussion of these conditions comes in Social Contract 




discussion of the legislator in Social Contract II.7. The need for a legislator had 
occurred after Rousseau had found that the substance of the laws could not be 
supplied by the people themselves.  
By itself the people always wills the good, but by itself it does not 
always see it. The general will is always upright, but the judgment 
which guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see 
objects as they are, sometimes as they should appear to it, shown the 
good path which it is seeking, secured against seduction by particul  
wills, bring together places and times within its purview, weigh the 
appeal of present, perceptible advantages against the danger of remote
and hidden evils. … Hence arises the necessity of a Lawgiver (SC, 
II.6, 154[III, 380]). 
 
As Gildin writes, Rousseau here takes up the problem of wisdom and consent (1983, 
89). Rousseau “explored the circumstances under which these conditions [i.e. the 
conditions necessary for good positive laws] were likely to be met” (ibid.). The 
discussion of Social Contract II.8-10 takes up three kinds of conditions, time (SC, 
II.8), extent of the state (SC, II.9), and ratio of size and people (SC, II.10), which were 
present in a successful founding. These conditions must be necessarily met for the 
initial founding of the state and the later “political legislator” to be successful. Each 
type of condition is difficult to meet on its own, but even rarer is a coincidence of all 
three conditions.  
While Social Contract II.8 deals with the difficulty of encountering a people 
which is at the same time old and young, chapters nine and ten both deal with 
different aspects of size.  
Just as nature has set limits to the stature of a well-formed an, 
beyond which it makes only Giants and Dwarfs, so, too with regard to 
the best constitution of a State, there are bounds to the size it can have 
in order not to be either too large to be well governed, or too small to 
be self-sustaining. In every body politic there is a maximum of force 




growing too large. The more the social bond stretches, the looser it 
grows, and in general a small State is proportionately stronger than a 
large one (SC, II.9, 159[III, 386]). 
 
In Social Contract II.10, Rousseau discusses why a large state would have adversarial 
effects on the people understood as citizens, i.e. as parts of the sovereign, and as 
beneficiaries of mutual action.22 First, a large state is ineffective in delivering services 
to the local population. The larger the state the more levels of administration are 
necessary, more corruption is possible, and consequently the larger the percentage of 
money spent on administration instead of on delivering services. Second, the larger 
state the less effective laws are as an instrument of rule. This comes about because the 
larger state the more diverse the local circumstances and the more difficult and 
inappropriate to apply a general law. This again leads to a secondary effect on the size 
of government which needs additional resources to enforce the laws. Third, patriotism 
is smaller the larger the state. This is because the people have a smaller e otional 
bond with their leaders and with their fellow-citizens. Lastly, the large size of the 
administration to provide services diminishes its reserves to deal with emergenci s, 
above all with external threats. 
The second aspect of the size of states is the ratio between land and people, or 
population density. The ideal population density varies greatly according to local 
conditions. It depends on the fertility of the land, the fertility of the people, the arts 
used for cultivation, but also the desires of the people in what to eat. It is most 
                                                
22 In Social Contract III.13 Rousseau remarks that: “This does not contradict what I said above, II.9, 
about the inconveniences of large States; for there it was a question of the Government’s authority over 
its members, and here it is a question of force against its subject. Its scattered members serve it as 
fulcra for acting on the people at a distance, but it has no fulcrum for acting directly on these membrs 




important for the stability of a state to be able at almost all times to feed its people. 
As Rousseau writes:  
For if there is too much land its defense it burdensome, its cultivation 
deficient, its produce superfluous; this is the proximate cause of 
defensive wars; if there is not enough land, the State finds itself at its 
neighbors’ discretion for the supplement [it needs]; this is the 
proximate cause of offensive wars. Any people which, because of its
location, has no other alternative than commerce or war is inherently 
weak; it is dependent on its neighbors; it is dependent on 
circumstances; it can never have any but a precarious and brief 
existence. Either it subjugates and changes its situation, or itis 
subjugated and it is nothing. It can preserve its freedom only by being
very small or very large (SC, II.10, 160-161[III, 388]. 
 
In order to found a legitimate state which can maintain itself over time it is therefore 
necessary to observe both conditions: a general limit of size based on the human 
limits to efficient administration, homogeneity of conditions, and patriotism, and a 
relative limit of size based on providing for food and shelter. While these conditions 
do not create legitimate government by itself, they are the best condition for it. 
Rousseau suggests here an upper limit to the size of states. He also suggests a lowr 
limit to it, which is less often noticed. This limit is implicit in Rousseau’s opening 
remark that as men have a right size between dwarfs and giants, so do states have a 
limit beyond which they are too large or too small. The lower limit is formed by the 
land needed to adequately nourish the population.  
Rousseau’s second discussion of the size of states comes in the context of his 
discussion of the best type of government. By government, Rousseau means the 
institution or function of executive power separate from the sovereign or lawmaking 
power. After discussing first democracy and then aristocracy, Rousseau concl des 




number of supreme magistrates should be inversely proportional to the number of 
Citizens, it follows that in general Democratic Government suit small States, 
Aristocratic Government suits medium-sized ones, and Monarchy large ones” (SC, 
III.3, 173[III, 404]). And again in Social Contract III.6: “monarchy is suited only to 
large States” (177[III, 410]). This gives the impression that Rousseau accepts the 
possibility of a legitimate monarchy governing a large state. But when one turns to 
his discussion of monarchical government, one is quickly disabused of this notion. 
Monarchical government has a number of defects, the most important of which is the 
ease with each a monarch is able to substitute his own personal will for the general 
will.  
In Social Contract III.6, Rousseau mentions one of the many disadvantages of 
monarchical government: “The distance between Prince and People is then too great, 
and the State lacks cohesion. To form such cohesion, intermediate orders are 
therefore needed: to fill these, Princes, Grandees, nobility are needed” (177[III, 410]). 
This recalls the disadvantage mentioned in Social Contract II.9 where Rousseau had 
talked about the burden of additional layers of administration. It also returns to 
Rousseau’s argument that the people are insufficiently patriotic in a monarchy. 
Moreover, Rousseau introduces an argument against monarchy based on the 
argument that for a monarchical state “to be well governed, its size or extentwould 
have to be commensurate with the faculties of the one who governs.” This implies 
that “a kingdom should, so to speak, expand or contract with each reign according to 
the Prince’s scope” (SC, III.6, 178[III, 408]). The coincidence the two factors, i.e. 




governance. This argument is based on the assumption that there is a constant or 
natural measure of a state’s size, and that monarchical government is more likely to 
make the quality of the prince the measure of it, instead of the ability to provide 
sustenance. The latter is a constant or only slowly changing standard, and therefore 
preferable to the standard derived from the quality of the monarch. 
Lastly, monarchical governments tend to be more stable the larger they 
become. This confirms Rousseau’s earlier statement that “monarchical governments 
are best suited to large states.” Yet, now it becomes clear that the reason that 
monarchical governments and large states go hand in hand is because monarchies, 
which now appear to be exclusively tyrannies, more easily suppress their population 
in large states. “The larger the area which a constant number of inhabitants occupy, 
the more difficult it is to revolt; because it is impossible to take concerted acion 
quickly or in secret, and it is always easy for the Government to get wind of plans and 
to cut communications: but the closer together a numerous people draws, the less can 
the Government usurp from the Sovereign” (SC, III.8, 184[III, 418]). Furthermore, it 
is not only the size of the country but also a corresponding population density. “The 
least populous countries are thus the most suited to Tyranny: wild beasts reign only in 
wildernesses” (ibid.). This implies that monarchies will tend to expand and they will 
tend to depopulate the area under their control, because only in that way are they 
stable. But if one recalls what Rousseau had said earlier about population density one 
notices that the low population density also increases the risk of foreign attack. 
Therefore, monarchies can never achieve stability because by trying to secure their 




are much more preoccupied with external politics than with domestic matters as a 
matter of principle (see also III.8 on the instability of monarchies). 
This brings us to Rousseau’s third and final discussion of size. In a section 
parallel to Rousseau’s first discussion of size, entitled “How the Sovereign Authority 
is Maintained” in (SC, III.12-14) Rousseau addresses the question of how the people 
can best maintain their sovereignty. In Social Contract II.8-10 he had addressed the 
best conditions under which the people can become the sovereign. In book three, the 
tripartite chapter follows upon the problem that the legislative power of the people is 
always threatened. “The principle of political life resides in the Sovereign authority. 
The legislative power is the heart of the State, the executive power is its brain, which 
gives movement to all the parts. The brain may become paralyzed and the individual 
still live. A man can remain imbecile and live: but as soon as the heart stopped to 
function, the animal is dead” (SC, III.11, 188[III, 424]). His advice to maintain the 
state is to ensure the frequent direct participation of the people in law-making. “There 
must be fixed and periodic assemblies which nothing can abolish or prorogue” (SC, 
III.13, 190[III, 426]).  
The small state is necessary because of Rousseau’s rejection of representation. 
Rousseau points to the loss of freedom through representatives (SC, III.15). 
“Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated” 
(SC, III.15, 192[III, 429]). What Rousseau here means is that the sovereignty of the 
people is exercised in legislating. Only if the power to make laws frequently returns 
to the people are the people protected from usurpations of power. Representation is 




Representation is a mechanism to transfer power from the people to a newly 
constituted body, which becomes the effective people. This new body has the 
advantage of making the deliberations more rational. Because of its size, the ease of 
assembly, its ability to focus attention to political issues, the representativ  body is 
capable of avoiding many of the defects of direct democracy. 
Rousseau rejects representation because it presents a danger to popular 
sovereignty. Representation implies that the sovereignty of the people can be placed 
in a body different from the actual people. This new body can then perceive itself as 
the true people or the true sovereign. Yet, in relation to the people as a whole, they 
could develop a particular will contrary to the general will or the will of the people. 
This would be to the disadvantage of the people. Therefore, representation of 
sovereignty in this sense is indeed impossible.23  
Legislation through representatives is for Rousseau not legitimate legislation. 
Rousseau consistently maintains that only self-legislation is legitimate legislation. 
The introduction of an intermediary body between the people and its general will 
implies that the people are in some way defective. Either the conditions for founding 
were not present or the moeures of the people are too corrupt to bear the burden of 
self-government. Therefore, Rousseau concludes in Social Contract III.15 that the 
state has to be small: “All things considered, I do not see that among us the Sovereign 
can henceforth preserve the exercise of its rights unless the City is ver mall” 
(194[III, 432]). The state has to be small with regard to its founding and with regard 
to securing the sovereignty of the people against its government. 
                                                




Rousseau himself draws the consequence of the small size for its external 
power and he suggests a remedy in the form of confederations: 
It is always an evil to unite several cities into a single City, and 
anyone who wants to bring about such a union should not flatter 
himself that he can avoid its natural inconveniences. The abuse of 
large States should not be urged as an objection to someone who 
wants only small ones: but how are small States to be given enough 
force to resist the large ones? In the same way that formerly th  Greek 
cities resisted the great King, and more recently Holland a
Switzerland resisted the House of Austria (SC, III.13, 190[III, 427]).  
 
And similarly at the end of Social Contract III.15: 
All things considered, I do not see that among us the Sovereign can 
henceforth preserve the exercise of its rights unless the City is very 
small. But if it is very small, will it not be subjugated? No. I shall 
show below how the external power of a great People can be 
combined with the simple administration and the good order of a small 
State (194[III, 432]). 
 
Rousseau leaves it in the Social Contract at pointing to the necessity of small 
republics to unite in confederations. Again, the only direct reference in the Social 
Contract besides the beginning and the end occurs here, and it is again with reference 
to international relations. 
In the Social Contract, Rousseau set out to maximize freedom and equality 
while ensuring a minimum of security. This leads to the consequence that the only 
stable legitimate state is also very small. Therefore, not only is the founding of a 
legitimate highly unlikely but also its continued existence due to foreign threats. In 
fact, there are permanent reasons for all states, but in particular for the small republic, 
to expand one’s territory in order to protect oneself against external insecurity.  
For all peoples have a kind of centrifugal force by which they 
constantly act against one another and tend to enlarge themselves at 
their neighbors’ expense, like Descartes’ vortices. This shows that 




least of the politician’s talents to find the proportion between these 
two sets of reasons which most favors the preservation of the State. In 
general it may be said that the first, since they are mer ly xternal and 
relative, should be subordinated to the others, which are internal and 
absolute; a healthy and strong constitution is the first thing to strive 
for, and one should rely more on the vigor born of good government, 
than on the resources provided by a large territory (SC, II.9, 160[III, 
387).  
 
For the small republic, however, the consequences of an expansive foreign policy are 
particularly devastating. Either the republic incorporates the newly conquered 
territories, which threatens its legitimacy by empowering government, or it reduces 
the conquered population to slavery, contradicting its political principles, i.e. its 
virtue.  
Based on its explicit argument, the Social Contract would require its 
completion with regard to the ability of the small legitimate republic to provide for its 
external security or its ability to provide for its self-preservation. In this regard, the 
Social Contract is incomplete. But the question is whether this problem is amenable 
to a human solution. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau not only discusses whether 
this problem can be solved but he also discusses the genesis of this problem.  
 
2.4 Reasons Extrinsic to the Social Contract 
In the Social Contract, it appears that the only threat for the legitimate state comes 
from larger, more powerful, and implicitly also illegitimate states. It appears as if the 
legitimate republic would exist separately from all other states, republican or 
otherwise. Its internal constitution would never lead to warfare except in thecase of 
justified defense against an unjust aggressor. Either just or unjust offensive war 




relations appears to stem exclusively from the difficulty of founding and maintaini g 
legitimate constitutions. Therefore, external relations provide one with anoter reason 
to reform the internal constitutions of states so that they become legitimate. 
Yet, contrary to this impression from the Social Contract, the evidence in the 
Second Discourse and The State of War points to the inevitability of war among 
states, regardless of their internal constitution. In this case, external rlations and the 
possibility of war are equally problematic for legitimate republics and for illegitimate 
tyrannies. While the discussion of external relations was first mostly confined to the 
difficulties which they posed to political legitimacy, the discussion now points to the 
more fundamental problem whether peace is possible among men. If the argument of 
the Second Discourse and The State of War leads to the conclusion that indeed 
peaceful relations among political societies are structurally impossible then this 
would be an important reason why the Social Contract was left incomplete.  
According to Rousseau, the state of war characterizes the relations among 
sovereign states qua sovereign state. Yet, Rousseau also argued that according to the 
original nature of the human species, war was absent from the beginning. Therefore, 
we first need to see what mankind was like in the state of nature and what caused its 
corruption. The state of war among sovereign states can be explained by the 
impossibility of a return to the state of nature and the essence of the sovereign stat . 
 
2.4.1 The State of Nature 
In the Discourse on Inequality and The State of War, Rousseau shows that it is not 




Furthermore, the state of war belongs properly to political societies. Consequently, 
Hobbes’ argument must have been inaccurate on both accounts. Hobbes had argued 
that men were naturally in a state of war and that the state of war is possible among 
men. For Hobbes, the state of war had been the natural state for mankind. It was 
characterized by diffidence, glory, and competition (XIII.6).24 These three factors, 
natural to men according to Hobbes, were the cause of life in the state of nature being 
“nasty, brutish, and short” (XIII.9, 84). This made the exeundum e statu naturali 
necessary and the sovereign state the only rational solution. But in Rousseau’s 
writings, the state of nature had hardly any semblance to Hobbes’ state of war. Even 
more, Rousseau’s state of nature was meant to refute in particular Hobbes, as he made 
clear in The State of War and in the Second Discourse. Most importantly, the state of 
war was not coeval with mankind and there was nothing in human nature which 
pointed by nature beyond the state of nature. Instead, the state of nature showed the 
natural goodness of man.  
As Arthur Melzer has argued, the natural goodness of man means first and 
foremost the natural goodness of man for himself (1990, chap. 1). The meaning of 
goodness is therefore that by nature every man has the ability to survive without 
relying on any other being. Natural man as an individual and as a species is able to 
survive in the state of nature. Rousseau shows in part one of the Second Discourse 
that survival in the state of nature does not require any particularly human abilities. In 
some climates, survival might even be almost effortless. The basic needs of food and 
sleep are easily satisfied, because nature provides man with enough of both. Men are 
more likely herbivores than carnivores. They live in climates suited to their natural 
                                                




strength, which are especially rich in natural sustenance. Other men and animals are 
not a very great threat. Men are more likely to flee other men and animals than to 
stand and fight, mostly because there is no shame in fleeing a naturally stronger 
opponent. Importantly, men are intelligent enough to fear death and do not organize 
their life around the inevitability of death. Death has no meaning for them, and even 
if it did, natural men could not anticipate it. In addition to food and sleep, the only 
additional necessity is sex. However, sex is only necessary from the standpoint of the 
species not from the individual. Therefore, a crucial question for Rousseau is whether 
sex would lead to natural societies. Rousseau denies that it necessarily does because
the possibility exists that women are fully capable of caring for theic ildren by 
themselves. Furthermore, sex does not give rise to other social passions because the 
human female does not have exclusionary periods of conception and the males are 
therefore not in competition for females.  
Rousseau cannot see any natural bond among human beings which would be 
necessary to ensure either the individual’s or the species’ survival. In other words, 
natural man does not need any man-made or artificial bonds to ensure his survival in 
the state of nature. In particular, political society is unnecessary to guarantee the self-
preservation of mankind. The nature of man does not point to societies or the 
necessity of political rule. Rousseau therefore rejects Hobbes’ argument that it is 
primarily self-preservation which causes the establishment of political so ieties. 
Instead, it is pride or amour-propre which leads to political rule (Bloom 1997, 151).  
In addition to the pure state of nature, which showed natural men completely 




Discourse a second stage within the state of nature where natural men live together in 
small villages. Rousseau relaxes here some of the assumptions he had made in the 
first part describing pure natural man. Now, humans live together in huts with their 
families. Rousseau calls this a first revolution and it is meant to show that nature
allows for the development of some social bonds. This state is the only one, with the 
exception of the last stage of civil society, which can be empirically observed. As 
Rousseau writes, most of the savage tribes discovered by European explorers are in 
this stage of human development (SD, 48[III, 170]). In effect, it shows human beings 
in a stage of their most advanced natural development, suitable to all men at all times. 
Any further development of any potential human faculties means an existence against 
nature as a whole and as mankind as part of it. At this stage, mankind continues to 
survive, and survive better than in the pure state of nature, i.e. mankind multiplies 
steadily. However, there is no development of men which would benefit either 
mankind as a whole or continue to be in consonance with nature. Still, it can be of 
great benefit to individual man whose talents remain undeveloped at this stage. 
In the second stage of the state of nature, the stage of permanent abodes and 
families, conflicts indeed become increasingly violent and ferocious. Rousseau’  
description of them is quite evocative of their savagery. Yet, he tries his best to play 
down this side of savage existence by calling this stage the “best and happiest of 
mankind” in order to overcome the prejudice of his “enlightened” contemporaries. 
This prejudice made it all too easy to only look at the savagery (cannibalism among 
them) to show on this basis the superiority of 18th century polite society over the 




be, do not threaten the survival of the species or of the tribes. Instead, they seem to be 
natural consequences of the advantages for men derived from life in tribes. Most of 
the conflicts which Rousseau gives as examples are conflicts within the tribe. These 
conflicts are moderated by pity or compassion. Rousseau argues that man’s natural 
compassion is still capable of moderating the nascent tensions among tribal men. 
These tensions or conflicts are due to an increase in amour-propre, i.e. pride. While 
still devoid of reason, Rousseau therefore shows that the stability of this stage can b  
explained with opposing passions alone, that neither reason nor public institutions are 
required, and that the savagery is due to amour-propre. Imagination has made 
compassion possible, because now men are capable to imagine to be in the place of 
one of their fellow tribesmen. Without man’s own doing, nature seems to have 
accounted for the possibility of the first revolution in man’s relations developments 
and ensured its continued stability. The first two stages of mankind are both internally 
stable and self-sufficient and do not point beyond themselves toward political rule. 
 
2.4.2  Leaving the State of Nature 
The challenge of beginning with mankind solidly anchored in the state of nature is to 
explain the causes of its corruption. In this stable and self-stabilizing state of nature, 
what can possibly have caused the creation of political societies? In Rousseau’s 
account of human nature, the natural human faculty – in fact the only truly natural 
human faculty - of perfectibility has to bear the burden of explaining man’s exit from 
the natural whole and the self-imposed human burden of having to replace it by 




Rousseau had to identify a human faculty which was present in the state of nature but 
would only under exceptional, accidental circumstance produce the result which 
could be observed in human history. In other words, Rousseau argued that the factual 
outcome of human history – political society – should not be confused with nature’s 
most likely outcome – the family and small villages at most.  
The human faculty of perfectibility allows the human species to develop all of 
its other faculties.25 Perfectibility is a certain freedom from instinct (Plattner 1979, 
46-51). While other animals seem to be bound closely to nature – so that they rather 
have to die than eat meat, for example (SD, 25-26[III, 141]) – human beings can 
adapt to changing circumstances. While they are probably herbivorous, they can 
become omnivorous. Another example is the unique fertility of human females who 
do not have particular periods of fertility throughout the year. Therefore, they are 
again less bound to the geographic conditions than other animals, and less subject to 
sudden changes in their natural environment. Perfectibility is the material cause of 
human development; it is not a final cause. The difference between the two is that the 
latter points to a natural human end while the former allows for the possibility that 
mankind would remain forever in the state of nature. The current civil state is 
therefore not the fulfillment of a natural end, which it took human history millennia to 
attain, but it is merely one among many possible outcomes, and it is not necessarily 
the best. While perfectibility in itself might be a fleeting phenomenon, Roussea  also 
must explain how an accidental occurrence in man’s environment could produce 
lasting results. Rousseau consequently needs to explain the generation of memory, 
                                                
25 This means that it is misleading when Rousseau speak  of “natural faculties.” Furthermore, the 




language, and reason by which knowledge could be retained and communicated to 
other men and transmitted to future generations.26  
In Rousseau’s “hypothetical history” of mankind (SD, 19[III, 133]), it was 
only the revolution of metallurgy and agriculture which caused the state of war. In the 
original state of nature, war did not exist. There only was the harmony of the human 
species with nature. The natural constitution of the human species allowed for 
occasional conflicts and even murder. Violence was or is part of the human species, 
but in a condition of plenty and of dispersion there was hardly enough cause or 
opportunity to use violence. Even if conflict occurred, because of the lack of mutual 
relations with one’s fellow beings, it appears to have been impossible to sustain any 
conflict over long periods of time.  
The exit from the state of nature becomes necessary because individual self-
preservation becomes impossible in the corrupted state of nature. This story is first 
told in the Second Discourse and, in a much abbreviated form, in the Social Contract 
(see Scott 1992). In the Social Contract, Rousseau portrays the necessity of a social 
contract as follows: “I assume men having reached the point where the obstacles th t 
interfere with their preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over 
the forces which each individual can muster to maintain himself in that state. Then 
that primitive state can no longer subsist, and humankind would perish if it did not 
change its way of being” (SC, I.6, 138[III, 359]). Therefore, the necessity of a social 
contract follows from the increase in force of the obstacles opposing the individual 
ability of each man to preserve himself. However, Rousseau does not specify the 
                                                
26 For memory, see especially Note XII of the S cond Discourse. For language see Second Discourse, 




causes of this increase. For this, we have to turn to the Second Discourse. In 
particular, we should turn to paragraphs 20-29 in the second part of the Discourse on 
Inequality.27  
According to Rousseau, the accidental cause of the first the state of war, and 
then political societies, was metallurgy and agriculture.28 It was above all the 
observation of the natural processes of metal production which caused this “great 
revolution” (SD, 49[III, 171]). “The invention of the other arts was therefore 
necessary to force the human species to apply itself to the one of agriculture” (SD, 
50[III, 173]). This observation produced results in mankind which made political 
societies necessary, i.e. the accidental occurrence produced lasting results in men. 
The first innovation could produce permanent results because human beings were 
capable to remember the processes of metallurgy and to communicate them to other 
men.  
The two central arts, i.e. metallurgy and agriculture, led necessarily to “the 
first rules of justice” (SD, 50[III, 173]), to a division of labor among men (ibid.), and 
to private property (SD, 51[III, 174]). Those with the greatest talents, especially of 
acquisition, were now capable to use the labor force of the untalented. Natural 
inequalities, i.e. inequalities which always existed, only now became effective in 
ordering the relations among men. Society, or the artificial order, is founded on the 
general acceptance of private property. Furthermore, private property and the 
                                                
27 This is in two regards the center of the S cond Discourse: first, paragraphs 27 and 28 are the central 
paragraphs of the second part. Furthermore, the discussion of metallurgy is in the center of the entire 
book, if one includes the epistle dedicatory and Rousseau’s notes.  
28 By the time the state of war has occurred, political societies have become an inevitable result. Unless 
the invention of metallurgy could have been reversed, mankind necessarily entered into a state of war,
which in turn could only be overcome through political societies. As Rousseau writes in the Second 
Discourse, mankind had often invented agriculture and abandone  it again. Agriculture was therefore 




ownership in the property of labor are justified by resorting to the gods. “That is, the
right of property, different from the one which results from natural Law” (SD, 51[III, 
174]).  
But the human order is threatened by the natural order. “In a word, 
competition and rivalry on one hand, opposition of interests on the other; and always 
the hidden desire to profit at the cost of others. All these evils are the first effect of 
property and the inseparable consequence of nascent inequality” (SD, 52[III, 175]). 
The human or artificial order stands opposed to the fundamental principle of the 
natural order. Rousseau expresses this thought in the two effective principles of each
type of order: the right of the stronger and the right of the first occupant (SD, 52[III, 
176]). The conflict between the natural order and the artificial order becomes 
manifest in the opposition between two rights, i.e. natural right and artificial right.29 
The difficulty is that the rich and the poor claim a right, i.e. the right of the stronger, 
to violate artificial right, i.e. property right. This is contradictory on the part of the 
rich because they violate the right which they would want everyone else to observe. It 
is just on the part of the poor because they act out of necessity.  It is the potential of 
natural inequalities, of talents, which creates a new order (SD, 50-51[III, 174]). This 
new order is in principle just because it derives from nature (end of SD, 67[192-93]). 
But in contrast to the natural order it is unstable (cf. SC, II.6). The instability stems 
from the possibility of pretending to be better than one really is and from greed and 
ambition, i.e. one’s natural preference for oneself (SD, 50-52 [III, 174-176]).  
                                                
29 As Rousseau writes later in the S cond Discourse, the terms rich and poor, and strong and weak are 
ambiguous. The reason is that the rich are not necessarily strong nor the poor necessarily weak, 




The result is that the obstacles to self-preservation are unintentionally man-
made. The social contract of the S cond Discourse arises therefore from the same 
necessity as the social contract of the Social Contract. Yet, the appropriate reaction to 
the corrupted state of nature is very different in the Second Discourse and in the 
Social Contract. While both continue to the founding of a political society, the 
political society in the Second Discourse is based on force and fraud while the 
political society of the Social Contract is based on consent only.  
These accidental developments are decisive because they create a new 
mankind which would, as Hobbes had argued, be incapable of surviving without the 
substitution of political rule for self-rule (1996[1651], XIII). The difference betwen 
Hobbes and Rousseau is therefore that political society is not established due to 
human nature, but that it emerges in reaction to human history. Yet, it is not a 
universal phenomenon but identifiable in time and space. The necessary conditions 
for a part of mankind to leave the state of nature and seek refuge in political societie  
occur only in certain geographic regions and at a certain time. Political society is 
meant to pacify the relations of one specific group of people and for the rest, political 
society is unnecessary but unavoidable.  
 
2.4.3 The Historical State of War 
The invention of political societies becomes an accidental necessity because the 
discovery of metallurgy leads necessarily to a state of war and then to political 
societies. Paradoxically, the relations among political societies recreat  the state of 




nature continues to exist, but only in its last instantiation as a state of war – and not 
as the pure state of nature or the tribal state of nature. This result is at first surprising 
because the moral being “authorized by the consent of men,” (Scott 1992, 699) i.e. 
the sovereign state, seems to be completely autonomous from other similarly cre ted 
moral beings. It was, after all, the obstacles men had created for themselv s which 
made their self-preservation impossible. As self-preservation seems now assured, it is 
as if peace among moral beings would necessarily follow, and that only the internal 
corruption of a moral being would lead to war.  
Rousseau foresees this argument and instead suggests that the relations among 
moral beings will essentially resemble the relations among men in the stae of war. 
But it will be said, since each one of these bodies is so solidly set, how 
can they possibly ever collide? Should not their own constitution 
preserve eternal peace between them? Do they, like men, have to go 
look outside for the wherewithal to provide for their needs? Have they 
not within themselves everything needed for their preservation? Are 
competition and exchange an inevitable source of discord, and is not 
the fact that the inhabitants of all the countries in the world supported 
themselves before there was commerce proof conclusive that they 
could subsist without it? (SW, 66[III, 605]).  
 
Rousseau’s answer to these questions is negative. Each political society is only a 
provisional answer to the problem of self-preservation which men had come to face in 
the state of war. It is important to recall that self-preservation was unproblematic in 
the pure state of nature and even at the stage of “nascent society.” The historical 
changes described above had made self-preservation for individual man problematic 
and forced them into political societies. It is this modified problem of self-




the founding of one political society aggravated the problem of survival for the rest of
mankind and forced them into political societies as well.  
Rousseau pointed to this necessity in The State of War as well as in the Second 
Discourse. “With the first society formed, the formation of all the others necessarily 
follows. One must either belong to it or unite to resist it. One must either imitate it or 
let oneself be swallowed by it.” (SW, 66[III, 603]). Similarly, he writes in the Second 
Discourse:  
It is easy to see how the establishment of a single Society made the 
establishment of all the others indispensable, and how, in order to 
stand up to united forces, it became necessary to unite in turn. 
Societies, multiplying and expanding rapidly, soon covered the entire 
face of the earth, and it was no longer possible to find a single corner 
anywhere in the universe where one might cast off the yoke and 
withdraw one’s head out of the way of the often ill-guided sword 
everyone perpetually saw suspended over it (54[III, 179]). 
 
Rousseau elaborates his definition of the state of war among political societies. “War 
is a permanent state which presupposes lasting relations” (SW, 65[III, 602]).  In the 
Social Contract, Rousseau elaborates further: “since the state of war cannot arise 
from simple personal relations but only from property relations” (I.4, 135[III, 357]). 
Therefore, one can only properly call war the conflicts between political so ieties.  
But this definition does not apply to the state of war described in the Second 
Discourse. There, the state of war was between men claiming the natural right of the 
stronger and men claiming the right of the first occupant. While it remains an 
accurate statement that there is no state of war among men, the last stage of the state 
of nature just prior to the founding of political societies emerged because of property 
relations. The state of war among men prior to the founding of political societies and 




men return to the state of war if the political regime becomes despotic (SD, 65[III, 
191]). It follows that the state of war among men is replaced by a state of war among 
sovereign states and that the state of war always remains a structural feature of human 
relations.  
Yet, despite the structural analogy between the state of war among men and 
the state of war among sovereign states, the entities at war with each other appear to 
be essentially different. This will lead to some modifications of the state of war. The 
first and most obvious difference is that the sovereign state does not exist by nature.
Rousseau often calls the sovereign state a “moral being” (Pl., III, 357; 608). Rousseau 
had shown in the Second Discourse, that man in the pure state of nature was 
completely free from having moral relations with his fellow-beings. Rousseau defined 
moral being as “intelligent, free, and considered in its relations with other being” (SD, 
14[III, 124]; Masters 1964, 94). Scott (1992, 699) pointed out that Rousseau 
distinguishes between two different meaning of “moral being:” that which is moral in 
the sense “established” by “a sort of convention” as men begin to associate togeth r 
and another, more “political” form that is moral in the sense of being “authorized, by 
the consent of men.” The sovereign state is a moral being of the latter type, which 
Rousseau also calls a “being of reason.” Because the sovereign state depends in its 
constitution on the consent of men, it is the consent of all its members, i.e. their 
general will, which is its most distinguishing characteristic (cf. Derathé 1950, 397-
410 and Melzer 1990, 185-188).30 
                                                
30 It is important to note here that the sovereign state will be compared to men as they present 
themselves in the state of war, i.e. not in the pure state of nature or the savages. For example, the 





The sovereign state is not part of a natural harmony. Men, on the other hand, 
are either a part of nature, or, as citizen, part of a state. With mankind’s exit from the 
natural order, the sovereign state becomes an ersatz or supplement nature (Scott 
1992). Yet, the state cannot completely replace nature because men always remain 
partially a natural being, and because the sovereign state seeks to artificially produce 
outcomes which nature produced by itself. As Rousseau writes: citizens “cannot joi  
it [the state] as true members are joined to the body” (SW, 68[III, 606]).31  
Second, the state lacks a nature or a natural measure. It does not know a 
natural size or boundary, and its desires are never equal to its capacities.  
The size of the body politic is purely relative, it is forced consta tly to 
compare itself in order to know itself; it depends on everything around 
it, and has to take an interest in everything happening around it, for
regardless of how much it might wish to remain within itself without 
gain or loss, it becomes small or large, weak or strong, according to 
whether its neighbor expands or contract and grows stronger or 
weaker. Finally, its very stability, by steadying its relations, secures a 
more dependable outcome to all of its actions, and makes all of its
quarrels more dangerous (SW, 67[III, 605]). 
 
The balance between desires and capacities characterized natural man and constituted 
his happiness or at least contentment (E, 80). But the sovereign state always tends 
beyond its current limits. In addition, the sovereign state does not have a natural limit 
and there is always a greater capacity for wealth, etc. (SW, 67[III, 605-06]).  This is 
decisive because the sovereign state is much more courageous in comparison to a 
man. The sovereign state is aware of the possibility of its own death, so it is again 
unlike man in the pure state of nature. However, the sovereign state can by its own 
                                                
31 For example, in this understanding, war might be the equivalent of natural catastrophes, i.e. the 
necessary occurrence which returns everything to its beginning. The difficulty is obviously that men 
are incapable of desiring their own destruction. Therefore, they will try to improve upon nature and 
seek to avoid war. In the end, Rousseau seems to asume, it will be nature which will reassert itself 




efforts hope to extend its life ad infinitum. At the same time its principle of life, i.e. 
the general will, is much better protected than a man’s heart. Both differences would 
lead to much greater daring than a man in the state of war could muster. 
Rousseau explicitly rejects the hypothesis that the only principle of the stae is 
reason (SW, 67[III, 605]). Instead, “the essence of society consists in the activities of 
its members, and that a State without movement would be nothing but a dead body” 
(ibid.). By movement, Rousseau means that the state needs to excite the passions of 
its members. “For this state to endure, the liveliness of its passions must therefore 
make up for the lack of liveliness of its movements, and its will must quicken by as 
much as its power grows slack” (SW, 68[III, 606]). As Rousseau also calls the state “a 
being of reason” he does not mean to imply that reason plays no role in the 
constitution of the state; what he wants to reject is the opposite argument that the st e 
relies only on reason. In comparison with a man, the sovereign state tends towards 
activity and man toward rest. 
The sovereign state shares with man in the state of war the importance of 
amour-propre. The sovereign state “is constantly forced to compare itself in order t  
know itself; …for regardless of how much it might wish to remain within itself … it
becomes small or large, weak or strong, according to whether its neighbor expands or 
contracts and grows stronger or weaker” (SW, 67[III, 605]). This reminds one of the 
passage in the Second Discourse where Rousseau distinguishes between the savage 
and civilized man: “The savage lives in himself; sociable man knows always to live 
outside himself and in the opinion of others; and it is, so to speak, only from their 




the state of war and the sovereign state suffer from the same defect. For both f them, 
amour-propre has become the most important principle of their lives. The difference, 
however, is that this is an unnatural condition for men, while it is the “natural” 
condition of the sovereign state. This is because the sovereign state does not have an 
absolute existence or can truly know itself as a man could theoretically know himself. 
The sentiment of existence, which is the deepest justification for seeking self-
preservation, is not an experience of the state. The state only exists for the sake of 
self-preservation.  
Finally, another difference between the sovereign state and natural man is that 
the sovereign state is by its nature social. Because amour-propre is part of its 
constitution, it has necessary relations with other states. But the natural sociability of 
sovereign states does not lead to peace. On the contrary, relations are defined by 
competition, diffidence, and glory, as Hobbes had claimed in the Leviathan. Hobbes’ 
state of war existed because by abstracting from political institutions he had 
concluded that men as we see them would prefer to have political institutions over 
having no political institutions.32 The state of war exists because there is no institution 
with the power to judge, with the power to enforce judgments, and that there was no 
difference between good and evil and meum and tuum. Everyone remains a judge in 
his own case about the means to his self-preservation. This is the situation of 
sovereign states.  
After the founding of political societies, it appears at first that the war of the 
state of nature has been satisfactorily been replaced by a new and better stat  of 
existence. The existence of men as citizens and subjects in political societie  allows 
                                                




all to develop their talents to the fullest extent possible and only in this way become 
men fully human (SC I.8, 141[III, 364]). However, the possibility of achieving 
happiness through politics is contradicted by the existence of other political societies. 
The greatest inconvenience of the political state is that every citizen necessarily 
becomes an enemy to all citizens of other political societies. This could only be 
overcome by leaving one’s citizenship behind and reuniting with other fellow-men as 
human beings simply. Yet, this again puts one in opposition to one’s fellow citizens 
and threatens to put oneself at war with them.  
Rousseau also notes this paradoxical situation at four different occasions. He 
writes in The State of War:33  
When I consider the situation of mankind, the first thing I notice is a 
manifest contradiction in its constitution, which makes it forever 
unstable. Man to man we live in the civil state and subject to laws; 
people to people, each enjoys natural freedom: which at bottom makes 
our situation worse than if these distinctions were unknown. For by 
living in the social order and in the state of nature, we are subject to 
the inconveniences of both without finding security in either. (62[III, 
610]).  
 
And in the Second Discourse: 
The Bodies Politic thus remaining in the state of Nature among 
themselves soon experienced the inconveniences that had forced 
individuals to leave it, and this state became even more fatal among 
these great Bodies than it had previously been among the individuals 
who made them up. From it arose the National Wars, Battles, murders, 
reprisals that make Nature tremble and that shock reason, and all those 
horrible prejudices that rank among the virtues the honor of spilling 
human blood. The most honest men learned to count it as one of their 
duties to slay their kind; in time men were seen to massacre one 
another by the thousands without knowing why; and more murders 
were committed in a single day’s fighting, and more horrors at the 
capture of a single town, than had been committed in the state of 
Nature for centuries together over the entire face of the earth. Such are 
                                                




the first discernible effects of the division of Mankind into different 
Societies” (55[III, 178-179]).  
 
The situation of men appears to be reflected in the situation of sovereign states. As 
men are simultaneously citizens, subjects, and men the moral being is state, 
sovereign, and power (SC I.6, 139[III, 361]). But the moral entity of the state is only 
derivative from men and does not have an existence independent from their wills. 
Men exist in a mixed state because they participate in nature and in society. The 
moral being of the state also appears to exist in a state of nature and in a civil st te. 
Yet, there is a decisive difference between men and the sovereign state. While for 
men international relations put into doubt the absoluteness of their existence as 
citizens, it does not do so for the state. The state by itself is always only a moral 
being. In order to protect itself and its own existence it has to assert itself 
internationally and seek recognition. It is as if internationally the individual becomes 
aware again of his natural existence as a man. Only if he forgets that he is also man 
and only citizen, i.e. part of the sovereign state, does the individual act towards 
strangers as enemies. The possibility of relating to other men as citizens, and 
therefore as enemies, did not exist in the state of nature. It is only by being part of the 
moral being of the state that a man can act this way.  
One can sum up the difference between the sovereign state and man in the 
following manner: The sovereign state does not exist by nature but because of the art 
of men. As an artificial being, its aim is to ensure the self-preservation and well-being 
of its members. These aims can never be completely achieved because self-
preservation is not an aim in itself by nature. On the contrary, the natural aim of man 




relations are nevertheless far closer than those among individuals” (SW, 67[III, 604]). 
Man aims at a radically individual good while the pursuit of self-preservation and 
well-being is necessarily competitive because of the scarcity of goods. Consequently, 
man seeks an end to motion while the sovereign state seeks the perpetuation of 
motion. In this regard, the ends of man and the state are joined with regard to self-
preservation and well-being, but the ends of man transcend the ends of the state.  
If one recalls Hobbes’ first law of nature, it said that everyone shall seek 
peace, including the state. This becomes more complicated for Rousseau. According 
to Rousseau, men indeed seek peace or repose. Yet, the same is not true for the state. 
While it might go too far to claim that the state seeks war, according to Rousseau the 
state cannot seek peace because that would lead to its own death. As the state needs 
men to become active on its part, the state increases the difficulties for its citizens to 
experience the sentiment of existence for which it was originally incorporated. 
The consequence is the following: a man as human being exists in two 
different relations and in a mixed state. The moral being constitutes the exist nce of 
man as a citizen in order to create peace among neighbors. The moral being is 
threatened by external relations in its existence but the citizen is reminded of his 
natural constitution, i.e. his solitary being. This is an aspect of external relations 
which Rousseau only hints at but does not make explicit. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Based on the previous discussion it appears that the Social Contract is indeed 




only a small republic could secure its own liberty. The internal liberty, however, was 
bought at the price of being vulnerable to external conquest. Furthermore, the Social 
Contract assumes that mankind had previously encountered difficulties to its survival 
which could only be remedied through political societies. The Social Contract 
provides an answer to the legitimacy to political rule but not to the more fundamental 
and prior problem of survival, which was the immediate cause of its founding. 
Therefore, the Social Contract needs to be completed because it neither secures the 
self-preservation of man nor the self-preservation of the legitimate state.  
Yet, the Social Contract is also incomplete because the problem it points to is 
ultimately unsolvable. Even in the best case that mankind will be governed by a 
myriad of small, independent, and legitimate republics, the state of war among the 
various political societies will not end. While all citizens in principle desire peace, 
their ability to act as citizens is predicated on the existence of a general will. The 
general will, however, aims at their common self-preservation and not at their 
individual happiness.  
However, one might claim that if it were possible to secure the survival of 
each political society and its citizens could there be a chance for peace.34 However, 
the assurance of survival does not solve the state of war. It is not mere survival which 
is at stake, but it is the modified self-preservation which led to the founding of 
sovereign states in the first place. That means that the general rule still applies that 
even the small legitimate republic seeks to make itself safer, which means that it 
pursues a relatively superior position to all of its neighbors. Rousseau had elaborated 
                                                




this point in The State of War. Similarly, in the Social Contract Rousseau discussed 
the “centrifugal forces” (II.9, 160[III, 387]) to which every state is subject.  
The impossibility of ending the state of war did not imply that a moderation of 
the state of war was also impossible. Instead, the small, legitimate republic might also 
be the most moderate state. Paradoxically, the most moderate states would also be the 
most vulnerable to conquest by an immodest state. Consequently, this again leads to 
the question how international relations could be made more peaceful and saver for 
republics. Rousseau discussed as possible alternatives the balance of power, a new 
empire, the use of international law, world state, and finally confederations. In the 
following chapters, I will discuss these different alternatives and why Rousseau found 




C h a p t e r  3  
PEACE THROUGH CULTURE AND NATURE: THE 
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, BALANCE OF POWER, 
THE GERMAN EMPIRE, AND COMMERCE 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The self-preservation of the legitimate small republic is a problem which goes to the 
heart of Rousseau’s political theory. The impossibility of creating a world state meant 
that the state of war would always remain a structural feature of human relations. At 
the same time, the good human life in a legitimate republic would be possible only if 
one assumed that the problem of the state of war had been solved. Therefore, 
Rousseau pursued different strategies to address the state of war among states in order 
to suggest avenues to moderate or pacify their relations. One way of addressing thi  
difficulty was by suggesting externally imposed limitations for states. These limits 
would serve the purpose to facilitate the self-preservation of a state by moderating 
external threats. At the same time, these limits would favor the legitimate regime 
more than an illegitimate regime. An alternative strategy would be for a state to 
become more peaceful.35  
Rousseau discusses in his oeuvre a number of possible strategies to pacify the 
relations among states. His most extensive discussion of different strategies is found 
                                                




in the Abstract of Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace.36 
The Abstract is one of four essays which Rousseau wrote shortly after having arrived 
at the country retreat of Montmorency in 1756 at the invitation of his friend Madame 
d’Epinay. He worked on these writings parallel to his work on the Political 
Institutions and Sensitive Morality, both also never completed (C IX, 339-344[I, 404-
410]. All these projects were begun during a period of Rousseau’s life when he was 
“intoxicated with virtue,” (C IX, 350[I, 417]) a period of four years when he saw his 
task to “dispel all these illusions,” which he saw in “the teachings of our wisest men” 
and to remedy the “misery and oppression in our social order.” (C IX, 350[I, 416]). 
As Rousseau tells us in the Confessions, the editing of the work of the Abbé de Saint-
Pierre “had been suggested to me after my return from Geneva by the Abbé de 
Mably, not directly, but through the intervention of Madame Dupin” (IX, 342[I, 
408]).  
Rousseau had met the Abbé de Saint-Pierre at one of the salons of Paris and 
had gained a favorable impression of him (C IX, 413[I, 355]). Rousseau seemed 
attracted to the Abbé and his works due to their entirely anti-monarchical and 
pragmatic nature (C IX, 355-356[I, 423]). The Abbé himself had been a member of 
the Académie Française, but had been expelled from it after the publication of the 
Polysynody (ibid.). In the Polysynody, the Abbé had argued that the administration of 
the monarchy should be taken over by what we today would call “career bureaucrats.” 
This would have left the monarch as the nominal head of state but without any real 
powers. Despite the Abbé’s influence at court, his French citizenship, and his 
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inability to write persuasively, he did not escape suffering the consequences of 
publishing the anti-monarchical Polysynody. Rousseau at first believed that it was 
possible to use the Abbé’s writings to protect himself against a similar or worse fate, 
due to his different status in France. However, as he writes in the Conf ssions, he 
quickly came to a different conclusion. “Fortunately before going any further I saw 
the hold I was going to give against myself, and I withdrew quickly” (C IX, 356[I, 
424]). Thus, despite his commitment to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s family and fries 
and already having spent much time with his works, Rousseau abandoned the project 
to edit the works of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.  
From the Confessions we also know that Rousseau had gone through the 
voluminous writings of the Abbé and read a substantial part of them. Furthermore, he 
had begun to rewrite some of the essays. Of these, Rousseau had finished four, and 
they were all revised to such an extent that he had instructed his publisher to include 
them in his posthumous complete edition, just after the Social Contract (Pl., III, 
cxxxix).  The four writings are really two pairs of essays. The first pair ws the 
Abstract on Perpetual Peace and the Judgment of Perpetual Peace and the second 
pair is the Polysynody and the Judgment of the Polysynody. Rousseau had decided on 
this procedure partly because he had come to the conclusion that his disagreements 
with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre were too substantial and that a more extensive 
reworking of the Abbé’s works would have amounted to publishing his works under 
the Abbé’s name (C IX, 355[I, 422]). 
During Rousseau’s lifetime, only the Abstract was published. It appeared in 




among the European educated classes.37 It was even read in the English colonies in 
America as James Madison’s reaction to it in the National Gazette in 1792 showed.38  
In the Abstract, Rousseau discusses five different strategies to limit or end the 
state of war among states. These strategies are: first, the possibility that the social 
bonds among European peoples could lead to peace; second, that an equilibrium or a 
balance of power among states would eventually also produce peace; third, that a 
European federation modeled after the German Empire could achieve this end; fourth, 
that commercial relations could prevent war, and finally, that a confederation of a 
new kind could lead to peace. Other strategies not discussed, or only alluded to, in the 
Abstract are the pacification of inter-state relations by international law, by domestic 
constitutional reforms, or through a single world-state. In this chapter, I discuss the 
first four strategies, culture, balance of power, empire, and commerce. These are the 
strategies formulated by Rousseau in opposition to Christian political thinkers on one 
side and to Enlightenment thinkers on the other side. 
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3.2 European Culture and Religion 
Early in the Abstract, Rousseau repeats what he had also claimed in the Second 
Discourse, “that by uniting ourselves to several men, we really become the enemies 
of the human race” (APPP, 28[III, 563]; cf. SD, 55[III, 178-79]). In the Second 
Discourse as well as in the State of War, it was individuals who remained in this 
mixed state between the civil and the natural state. In the Abstract, however, it is 
societies which remain in a mixed state. Therefore, the aim pursued in the Abstract is 
to see whether the states of Europe can be united “by bonds similar to those which 
unite individuals, equally subject both of them to the authority of Laws” (ibid.).  
After the introductory part, the first argument which Rousseau takes up in the 
Abstract is a discussion of the society of Europe and the balance of power to pacify 
their mutual relations. Both arguments had been used by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre in 
his Plan for Perpetual Peace to argue for a confederation, and both were regarded at 
the time to account for the relations among European states. The reference to the 
society of Europe was first of all a reference to the common Christian tradition 
uniting the European peoples. “It is above all to Christianity that Europe still owed 
today the sort of society that endured among its members” (APPP, 30[III, 566]). The 
second argument was used in particular by followers of Niccolò Machiavelli. They 
argued that the balance of power would naturally lead to a state of peace among the 
European peoples. The discussion of these two points takes up roughly a third of the 
Abstract, or eight of the total of twenty-five pages. More precisely, Rousseau 




At first it appears as if the European states are already in a peaceful state. 
Rousseau writes:  
All the Powers of Europe form a sort of system among themselve  
which unites them by one single religion, the same international law, 
morals, literature, commerce, and a sort of equilibrium that is the 
necessary effect of all of this, and which, without anyone in fact 
thinking about preserving it, would nevertheless not be as simple to 
break up as many people think (APPP, 29[III, 565]). 
 
While there is not a “public confederation” as it exists for the Germanic Body, the 
Helvetian League, or the Estates General (ibid.), the European peoples are already 
connected by strong ties which Rousseau enumerated in the quote above.  
As Rousseau makes clear in the following paragraphs, the bonds uniting the 
European peoples were not natural but are due to the Roman conquest of Europe 
(ibid.). The Roman conquests meant in reality a union of most European peoples with 
the Roman Emperor as its head. However, the Roman Empire was transformed 
through Christianity. This bond, “stronger than the preceding ones, was that of 
Religion” (APPP, 30[III, 566]). Yet, clarifying Rousseau’s first assertion, the 
European peoples are only united by “maxims and opinions” (APPP, 31[III, 567]) 
and not by a “real community of interests, of rights or of dependency” (APPP. 30-
31[III, 567]).  
In paragraph fourteen, Rousseau returns a third time to the basis of the 
European society (APPP, 31). It again appears at first that Europe quasi-naturally 
forms a society. Yet, in addition to geographic and climatic factors, Rousseau now 
adds technological and commercial relations, i.e. cultural factors, which bind the 
European peoples together. Yet, he ends by saying that “all these causes form out f 




laws” (ibid.). The conclusion is that the central factor, the Roman Catholic Church, 
was most important in holding Europe together as a political society. With the 
erosion of the power of the Roman Catholic Church over European states, the 
European powers remained dependent on each other, but without the necessary force 
to transform this dependence into peace, connected on many levels. The foundation 
of Europe is Christianity on which most of its “maxims and opinions” or, in other 
words, “morals, customs and even its laws are based.” But the unity of “maxims and 
opinions” does not lead to peace.   
Olaf Asbach has claimed that Rousseau saw a number of factors uniting 
Europe, and that Rousseau appears to share the optimism of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre 
(2002, 229-230).39 As was just shown, Rousseau did not think that Europe was by 
nature a unit, as he had made clear in the paragraph on the Roman conquests. Instead, 
he agrees that the development of the modern arts and sciences is an important factor 
uniting the European peoples. But this unity through commerce, the arts, and the 
sciences, does not warrant the evaluation that Rousseau shares here the opinion of the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre on the beneficial effects of these developments. Furthermo e, 
even in the First Discourse Rousseau had not condemned the arts and sciences 
outright, but instead counseled against the prudence and possibility of general 
enlightenment (Strauss 1953, 260). “Those whom nature intended as her disciples had 
no need of master. Such men as Verulam, Descartes and Newton, these Presceptors of 
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Mankind, had none themselves, and indeed what guides could have led them as far as 
their own vast genius carried them?” (21[III, 29]).  
Rousseau then continues to make explicit what had only been implied before. 
Despite the society or the bonds of community among European peoples, they remain 
in a state of war (APPP, 31-32). In this, Rousseau argues, “things are only following 
their natural course” (APPP, 31[III, 568]). The first implication is that maxims or 
opinions, even if they are based on a common religion, do not lead to peace. Instead, 
one might even think that these bonds make conflicts even more likely than if there 
were no relations at all.  
The ancient union of the Peoples of Europe has complicated their 
interests and their rights in a thousand ways; they touch each other at 
so many points, that the slightest motion of some cannot fail to collide 
with the others; the more intimate their relations are the more fatal 
their divisions are; and their frequent quarrels are almost as cruel as 
civil wars (APPP, 32[III, 568]).  
 
The “natural course” is the one which states follow by their nature, i.e. the one 
described in the last chapter. The society of maxims and opinions lacks “laws or 
Leaders” (ibid.). Furthermore, Rousseau carefully blames the confusion of political 
rule in Europe as one of the “hidden but no less real” (ibid.) causes of war. Among 
the numerous confusions he enumerates, the common denominator is that the 
question about who rules is entirely confused in Europe, either internally or 
externally.  
Rousseau now portrays the society of Europe in a completely different light. 
Instead of emphasizing the strong bonds of community among European peoples, 




Consequently, Rousseau concludes: “Let us agree, then, that the relative state of the 
Powers of Europe is properly speaking a state of war” (ibid.).  
Contrary to what some of Rousseau’s contemporaries claimed, neither treaties 
nor public right or reason are sufficient, in his opinion, for ending the state of war 
among European states. “All the partial Treaties among some of these Powers are 
rather momentary Truces than genuine Peace” (ibid.). Furthermore, “the public right 
of Europe is not at all established or authorized in concert” (ibid.) and this leads to the 
consequence that conflicts are “reconciled only by the right of the stronger” (ibid.). 
Public right, which is founded on reason, is opposed by one’s own interests, and 
therefore cannot be the foundation for peace among the European states.  
Consequently, the fundamental cause of the state of war is the lack of laws 
and leaders. Yet, Rousseau earlier had argued that the European society has laws. In 
paragraphs 7, 11, and 14, Rousseau had claimed that there is law common to all 
European states while in paragraph 16 he denied that such a law exists. Rousseau’s 
obvious contradiction leads to the conclusion that the existence of a nominal law has 
to be supported by power in order to effective. This condition also applies to the state 
of war among states. Therefore, it is on the one hand possible to speak of a European 
society which has laws, while on the other hand arguing that this European society 
remains in a state of war. Therefore, it is the lack of leaders or government which is 
the fundamental cause of the state of war among European powers. Rousseau 
reaffirms this at the end of his discussion of the state of European society. “As soon 
as there is a society, a compulsory force is necessary, which orders and concerts its 




engagements the solidity they cannot have by themselves” (APPP, 33[III, 569]). 
Therefore, Rousseau argues that the society of Europe which exists due to history and 
nature will not become peaceful unless there is a common force, which implies also a 
common leader.  
This in some sense takes up the situation of the Second Discourse prior to the 
conclusion of the social compact. Here, a society also already exists, a kind of tr be, 
with a religion, mores, and customs. Still, it is necessary to conclude a social compact 
which makes political rule possible for the tribe to be able to leave the state of war. 
This is to say that the foundation of political rule has to be force and law. “It is true 
that the perfection of the social order consists in the union of force and law” (SW, 
62[III, 610]). The paradox Rousseau points to here is that European society shows the 
existence of law without force. Consequently, it cannot establish political rule, which 
in turn makes the law, even though it exists, ineffective. The alternative case of force 
without law existed in the Second Discourse or in book one, chapter three of the 
Social Contract. Another way of expressing this paradox is that force is necessary to 
establish political rule and is therefore the beginning of political rule, but that force
has to be subordinated to law; one therefore has to forget the beginning of war and 
violence in order to pursue one’s ends, i.e. peace.  
 
3.3 Balance of Power 
After showing that the European cultural ties cannot by themselves lead to peace, 
Rousseau turns to the balance of power. According to Rousseau, the balance of 




desirable configuration of international relations, was seen at the time as an 
alternative mechanism to the cultural ties leading to peace. Rousseau first referred to 
the balance of power at the beginning of this section of the Abstract (in paragraph 7): 
“a sort of equilibrium … is the necessary effect of all this,” (APPP, 29[III, 565]), by 
which Rousseau means an effect of the social bonds connecting all European states. 
However, the equilibrium was not a state of peace. “Perpetual dissensions, 
brigandage, usurpations, revolts, wars, murders which daily despoil this respectable 
abode of the Wise, this brilliant sanctuary of the Sciences and the Arts” (PPP, 
31[III, 568]). In this section, Rousseau rejects the solution of the balance of power 
because it is an inadequate combination of nature and culture, which Rousseau 
suggests can still be improved upon. 
The focus of Rousseau’s discussion of the balance of power is to correct the 
erroneous view of the balance of power, which claims that the balance of power will 
lead either by nature or as God’s work to a peaceful order. Rousseau wants to show 
that neither the state of war nor the balance of power exist or have been brought into 
existence in order to establish a preordained order. Instead, “the system of Europe has 
precisely the degree of solidity that can maintain it in a perpetual agittion, without 
overturning it completely; and if our ills might not be increasing, even less can they 
end, because every great revolution is impossible from now on” (APPP, 33[III, 570]). 
Therefore, “it would be a great error to hope that this violent state could ever change 
by the force of things alone” (ibid.). Rousseau is faced with the difficulty that his 




peace. Against this opinion, Rousseau has to explain how the balance of power is at 
the same time stable and necessarily bellicose. 
For this purpose, Rousseau argues that the balance of power imperfectly 
combines nature and culture. As Rousseau remarks, the new system “maintains [the 
European powers] in a continuous agitation; their efforts always vain and always 
being reborn, like those waves in the sea, which constantly agitate its surface without 
ever changing its level; so that Peoples are ceaselessly laid waste, ithout tangible 
profit for Sovereigns” (APPP, 35[III, 573]). The presence of war would appear to 
indicate great instability instead of great stability. It is therefore necessary to first 
gain some clarity why the presence of war is an indicator for a deeper, structural 
stability, which makes “every great revolution” (APPP, 33[III, 570]) impossible. 
For Rousseau, conflicts among European states are a consequence of the 
intricate web of social connections. More specifically, Rousseau argues that the 
particular interests of each state will inevitably be opposed to the particular interests 
of other states (APPP, 32-33). As Rousseau writes: “Every division is born from 
opposed interests” (APPP, 33[III, 569]). Because in Europe each state depends on 
other states for their security and survival, the pursuit of their particular interest leads 
them to war. This implies that on the contrary, if the European states were not 
dependent on each other for their survival and were not connected to each other 
through other means then there would be much less cause for war. The state of war 
among European states persists and becomes worse because of their social relations.  
One can therefore say that the original or natural state of Europe was a state of




little cause for war; and even if they met there was again hardly any cause for quarrel 
among them. Only after the conquests of Roman Empire were connections among 
most European tribes established.  The force which united Europe under the Roman 
Empire and which continues to work against the natural limits is human ambition. As 
he writes: “This is not to say that the Alps, the Rhine, the Sea, the Pyrenees are 
insurmountable obstacles to ambition” (APPP, 34[III, 571]). These connections were 
later easily maintained through natural, i.e. geographic and climatic factors, which 
transformed the relations among European states. Yet, Rousseau also attributes a 
pacifying influence to the geographical features of Europe. “The position of the 
mountains, seas, and rivers that serve as the borders of the Nations that inhabit it 
seem to have settled the number and extent of these Nations; and one can say that the 
political order of this Part of the world is, in certain regards, Nature’s work” (ibid.).  
Therefore, according to Rousseau, nature has three different and opposing 
influences on European states’ relations. In the first account, all the European trib s 
are isolated from each others as islands in the ocean. Because of the lack of relations 
among them, there also was no state of war. After the establishment of relations 
among them, nature facilitated these relations and had the effect of enhancing conflict 
or perpetuating the state of war among them. This natural effect prevails due to the 
continuing influence of geographic and climatic factors. Nature, however, also has an
opposite effect on European relations by supporting a balance of power among them. 
This effect of nature is achieved by not only facilitating contacts but also preventing 
contacts through mountains, rivers, mores, etc. From these different effects of na ure 




the European states. The original natural determinants for the European tribes kept 
them separated until they were artificially united by the conquests of the Roman 
Empire.  
It now becomes clear that the equilibrium of forces can be understood to work 
on two levels: first, it is an equilibrium among the European states, which works by 
opposing ambition with ambition. Second, it is an equilibrium between nature and 
human ambition. When Rousseau speaks about the balance of power, he means first 
and foremost the latter equilibrium. Only in this sense can one understand his remarks 
that the balance of power was not established by anyone and does not rely on anyone 
maintaining it. In another work, the State of War, Rousseau writes that “it is vain to 
think that nature can be annihilated, it arises anew and appears where it was least 
expected” (66[III, 604]).40  
As the Roman Empire shows most clearly, human ambition was capable of 
uniting the originally disjointed parts of Europe against nature. This requires 
Rousseau to argue why there is a distinction between the time of the Roman Empire 
and Rousseau’s time that precludes the possibility of another empire. The first r ason 
for the mistaken hope of conquest stems from the greater knowledge everyone has 
about their enemies. “All Conquerors who have brought about revolutions always 
presented themselves with unexpected forces, or with foreign and differently 
hardened troops to Peoples who were either unarmed or divided, or without 
discipline; but where would a European Prince take up unexpected forces in order to 
                                                
40 Art can never completely replace nature, which is t e ultimate reason why the confederation cannot 




overpower all the others,..?” (APPP, 33[III, 570]). In fact, any kind of conquest, not 
to speak of the conquest of all of Europe, is very unlikely (APPP, 35).  
The second reason for the impossibility of success to conquer all of Europe is 
due to the emergence of a new kind of balance of power. The central element of the 
balance of power is Germanic Body.41 While Rousseau at first suggests that the 
European balance of power is natural, his references to the system of negotiations and 
the Germanic Body demonstrate that the balance of power is artificial being. As was 
mentioned above, Rousseau gives a cultural and a natural account of the balance of 
power. While arguing that the balance of power is natural, Rousseau contradicts 
himself by arguing that there are two factors which are essential to the stability of 
Europe.  
What forms the true support of the system of Europe is certainly in 
part the interplay of negotiations, which almost always cancel each 
other out; but this system has another even more solid prop; and this 
prop is the Germanic Body, placed almost at the center of Europe, 
which keeps all the other parts in check, and perhaps serves to 
maintain its Neighbors even more than its own members (APPP, 34-
35[III, 571]).  
 
Neither the “interplay of negotiations” nor the “Germanic Body” are made by nature. 
The “interplay of negotiations” refers to the new system of diplomatic relations, 
which had developed as a consequence of a new system of international relations. 
Instead of going through the Vatican or other church officials, the warring sides
increasingly relied on direct or bilateral talks. As war had become less about justice 
than about acquisition, war had become one tool among many in order to deprive the 
opponent of his property. In this period of “rational” warfare for the purpose of 
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acquisition, the aristocracy became the class charged with carrying out the 
negotiations. They were best suited for this task due to their common language and 
their European connections. Furthermore, they were able to carry out the 
negotiations with little emotional attachment and as rational and calculative as 
possible. Beginning in the late Middle Ages, a new system of diplomatic relations 
had been established in Europe.42  
The second and, by Rousseau’s estimate, more important part of the system 
of Europe is the Germanic Body. However, the reference here to the Germanic Body 
is again highly ambiguous. As Rousseau acknowledges in a footnote (APPP, 31), the 
Emperor of Germany was said by many jurisconsults of the Middle Ages to be the 
“natural Sovereign of the world,” and by making this reference Rousseau implied 
that he did not share this opinion. Furthermore, Rousseau shows his awareness that 
the German Emperor was the temporal arm of the Roman Church. But Rousseau 
refers explicitly to the Germanic Body as it was reconstituted according to the Treaty 
of Westphalia of 1648.43 The Treaty of Westphalia became the “Eternal 
Constitution” of the Empire. The Germanic Body is therefore another fairlyrecent 
institution which helped to produce a European equilibrium.  
The Germanic Body can fulfill its function for the maintenance of the 
European balance of power because it is  
“a Body formidable to its Neighbors even more than its own members: 
a Body formidable to Foreigners by its extent, by the number and 
valor of its Peoples; but useful to all by its constitution, which, 
depriving it of the means and the will of conquering anything, makes 
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it into a stumbling block for Conquerors. In spite of the defects of this 
constitution of the Empire, it is certain that, as long as it exists, the 
equilibrium of Europe will never be broken, no Potentate will have to 
fear being dethroned by another, and hat among us, the Treaty of 
Westphalia will perhaps always be the basis of the political system. 
Thus, public Right, which the Germans study with such care, is even 
more important than they think, and is not only German public Right, 
but in certain regards, that of the whole of Europe” (APPP, 35[III, 
572]).  
 
In this quote, Rousseau identifies six factors which explain the importance of the 
Germanic Body: firstly the size, secondly the number and valor of the People, thirdly 
the constitution, fourthly the absence of fear of dethronement, fifthly the Treaty of 
Westphalia, and lastly public right. Rousseau does not use the term public right very 
often. More frequently, Rousseau uses instead political right, which is explicated n 
the Social Contract. In the Emile, Rousseau writes that the “the questions of public 
right … can complete the clarification of the questions of political right” (E, V, 
467[III, 848-849]). Public right is therefore a reference to a higher kind of law. The 
author of the Encyplopédie article on public right, Jaucort, divided public right into 
general and particular public right. General public right in turn is the same as the 
general right of nations, both aiming at the common good of all nations. Particular 
public right, however, is concerned with the particular utility or whatever is 
advantageous for a single state. By focusing exclusively on political right or 
particular public right, Rousseau excludes any notion of the common good of all 
nations. He would therefore speak rather about public law than public right. 
In the above quote, public right contains the three previously mentioned factors: the 
constitution, the lack of dethronement, and the Treaty of Westphalia. Furthermore, 




as provided guarantees to every sovereign of the Germanic Body and its European 
neighbors.  
It is a combination of natural and artificial factors which Rousseau 
enumerated. On the one hand, the size of the Germanic Body and the number and 
valor of its people are established by nature. Furthermore, in the Social Contract 
Rousseau had asserted that the character of a people and their number are influencd 
by natural factors (SC II.8-11). The decisive factor in establishing the Germanic 
Body as the “true support” of the European balance of power is therefore the Treaty 
of Westphalia and public right. The Treaty of Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years’ 
War in 1648, ensured the sovereignty of each state in particular in religious matters. 
The Thirty Years’ War had entirely devastated the territory of the Germanic Body 
and had eventually led to an impasse between Protestants and Catholics. In addition, 
as Rousseau elaborated in the above quote, the Treaty of Westphalia is based on 
public right. 
The difficulty with this argument is that Rousseau had said a few pages 
earlier that the “public right of Europe is not at all established or authorized in 
concert, has no general principles, and constantly changes in accordance with times 
and places, it is full of contradictory rules which can be reconciled only by the right 
of the stronger” (APPP, 32[III, 568]). Also, Rousseau had remarked that “all the 
partial Treaties among some of these Powers are rather momentary Truces than 
genuine Peace” (ibid.). It seems therefore unlikely that Rousseau seriously believed 
that the Germanic Body could sustain the European balance of power over an 




itself deprived of the means to expand, because it is based on the premise that no 
sovereign can be dethroned, and because it leaves all of Europe in a state of unrest.  
This view is further strengthened by Rousseau’s later comments on the 
Germanic Body where he speaks about “the abuses of its Public Order, and the 
extreme inequality of its Members” (APPP, 40[III, 578]) and “since the Germanic 
Body has a permanent Leader, the authority of this Leader must necessarily 
constantly tend toward usurpation” (APPP, 44[III, 583]). These are hardly positive 
comments on the Germanic Body and lead one further to suspect that Rousseau did 
not share the Abbé’s enthusiasm for it. Moreover, one should take into consideration 
that Rousseau wrote during the Seven Years War (1756-63), which saw France fight 
Prussia on the side of the Germanic Body for the first time in centuries. It was this 
war which for all means and purposes ended the role of the Germanic Body as an 
effective neutralizer for Europe and saw the rise of Prussia over the old Empire.44 
Rousseau’s comment might therefore be interpreted to mean that the core 
principles of public right established by the Treaty of Westphalia were the 
reestablishment of the principle of sovereignty of each state in religious matters 
(cuius regio eio religio). In this regard, public right, as it had become established in 
Germany, was going to become, in Rousseau’s estimate, the public right of Europe, 
because it was based on the idea that the order of Germany would benefit Europe as 
a whole. Rousseau’s comments would then indicate that the subordination of religion 
to political power had established a new principle of a European balance of power 
based on countering ambition with ambition. Furthermore, by mentioning public 
right and its particular relevance for Germany, Rousseau referred to the most 
                                                




important German political thinkers, Christian Wolff and Samuel Pufendorf. Their 
use of natural law doctrine continued to the modern natural law doctrine first 
formulated by Hobbes (Strauss 1953, 190). 
Rousseau’s argument up to this point can be understood to mean that the 
balance of power is “natural,” given the social and technological advances made by 
the European peoples and the history of the Roman Empire. However, human 
ambition leads to the attempt to destroy the “natural” balance of power. With the 
help of human art, manifest in a modern system of negotiations and the creation of 
the Germanic Body, two “automatic stabilizers” are in place, which negate the 
effects of the earlier human interventions. Therefore, based on natural relations, men 
can neutralize human effects with other human effects to ensure the virtue of the 
original relations. Of course, the purely natural relations of men to each other were 
completely independent from each other, as Rousseau had indicated at the beginning 
of his discussion (APPP, 29[III,565]). 
The Germanic Body incites the ambition of all participants by appearing to be 
vulnerable to conquest and also worth the effort. At the same time it is able to 
withstand any conquering power long enough for the other European powers to come 
to its support and repel the attack. Internally, the constitution of the Germanic Body 
guarantees all the sovereign states, “despite the abuses of its police, and the extrem
inequality of its members” (APPP, 40[III, 578).  Its weakness, however, 
continuously invites external forces to invade it and try to overthrow it.    
Therefore, the European balance of power has the effect of making conquest 




prevents the conquest of another state. As every state’s existence is guaranteed by all 
the others, conquest becomes almost impossible. Yet, the impossibility of success 
does not remove the causes of conflict mentioned above. States continue to have 
opposing interests and their leaders continue to be ambitious. The impossibility of 
hoping to completely overcome the balance of power also has the paradoxical effect 
of making war among European powers more likely. As the balance of power 
apparently ensures every state’s survival, it also makes it easier for the states’ leaders 
to engage in warfare, because the balance of power minimizes the risks. The balanc
of power among monarchies transforms warfare into something more akin to a sport 
than to a very serious endeavor.  
Furthermore, the balance of power relies on the constant readiness of everyone 
to fight and conquer. This is in Rousseau’s and the Abbé’s opinion the greatest 
disadvantage. Every state is, in the best case, an unwilling participant in the balance 
of power. Everyone is required to use as many resources as possible in order to seek 
to outlast one’s opponents. Moreover, the leaders must be the most ambitious and 
bellicose. The balance of power can be said to support the internal structure of 
European states as monarchies, because republics would endanger not only 
themselves but also the stability of the European equilibrium. Republics could not 
compete because of the relative weakness of their leaders, the slowness of their 
decisions, their inability to secure sufficient resources for war, and their inability to 
sustain war over extended periods of time. In the Judgment on the Polysynody 
Rousseau writes that the Abbé de Saint-Pierre in the end “founds his Polysynody on 




which the Polysynody is in effect, assumes that international relations have become 
save for republics.45 
The rational consequence in this situation would be the one suggested by the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau: if a confederation is not established, at least 
Rousseau’s text will have had the benefit of robbing some states of the argument that 
they are acting for the common good to reestablish the balance of power. More 
importantly, now that everyone knows that nature is opposed to their ambitions and 
that they cannot hope to reach “universal monarchy” (APPP, 33[III, 570]), a 
confederation should be founded to abolish war and to create institutions to 
adjudicate quarrels among states. The rational conclusion is indeed the founding of a 
confederation in order to prevent the future outbreak of war. A further reason to 
make war impossible is the absence of any serious justification of conquest. As was 
shown above, the balance of power in Europe guarantees every state’s survival, 
which also means that there can only be marginal conquests, but no conquests for 
self-preservation, i.e. the deepest and natural cause of war. While that still leaves
retribution, justice, or glory as motivations for war, they certainly have becom  less 
defensible reasons for warfare than mere self-preservation or self-defense. Self-
preservation is immediately comprehensible by everyone while war for the purpose 
of glory, or in the search for justice, requires a more complicated argument.  
Instead, the balance of power can be said to be the common good of all 
European powers, which means the self-preservation of all European states, as long 
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as they are willing to fight. Yet, the balance of power was only established 
accidentally and the overall stability of the entire institution is only maintained at the 
cost of perpetual war. The rational conclusion is therefore to improve upon the 
accidental institution in order to bring forth stability and peace. Rousseau th reby 
elevates the balance of power or peace to the common goal pursued by the 
confederation. Rousseau’s argument is open to the objection that, if this situation 
were indeed as obvious as he portrays it, some of the participants of the balance of 
power might have reached this conclusion by themselves.  
Yet, there are two arguments which speak against this: first, because nobody 
can unilaterally declare peace as it would lead to his demise and the destruction of 
the balance of power and second, because of the effect of commerce, which has led 
to a change of balance of power politics. Therefore, in order to overcome the 
“prisoner’s dilemma,” because every participant in the balance of power would 
individually prefer to choose a better alternative but is prevented from choosing it 
because of his fear that others might turn against him, it is necessary to conclude an 
irrevocable treaty constituting a confederation.  
It is indeed a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the European states are 
in a stable condition. The system is self-enforcing and self-stabilizing. One would
think that the insight into this system would lead to the abandonment of any 
aggressive intention because of the futility of any attempt to overthrow it. On the 
other hand, the system relies on everyone’s belligerence and attempts to overthrow 
the system. Only these attempts guarantee that the system continues to be self-




aggressiveness or ambition or vice. If anyone even tried to become good or to act on 
the insight that the system cannot be overthrown this state would thereby expose 
itself to become a victim of the other power. As long as a state participates in the 
balance of power it is ensured self-preservation, but only under the condition that it 
continues to participate actively in the balance of power. The European system relies 
on for its stability on collective vice and aggressive pursuit of one’s self-interest. 
Still, as Rousseau made amply clear, because of its defects, the system of th 
European balance of power is solid, but does not aim very high. It cannot lead to 
everyone’s highest goal, which is peace, but it ensures every state’s survival.  
 
3.4 The German Empire 
Rousseau’s account of the Germanic Body is surprising as he seems to endorse the 
view that the Germanic Body could be the institutional example on which to model a 
confederation.46 It is a union of states for the purpose of common defense without 
being capable of offensive action. On a larger scale, Europe could become a 
defensive union which no external power could conquer. As the Abbé de Saint-Pierre 
argued in book two of his Plan for Perpetual Peace, if the Germanic Body could be 
made to exist, so could a European Union. In fact, the Abbé argued that the obstacles 
for the existence of the Germanic Body were even greater than the obstacles facing a 
European Union (1713, Vol.1, 61-115). 
Some 20th century historians have understood this passage to mean that 
Rousseau endorsed the Germanic Body as a model for a confederation. In order to 
                                                





understand better the European order of the 17th and 18th centuries, some have argued 
that the Abbé and Rousseau are two political thinkers who seem to have had a more 
positive opinion of the Germanic Body in contrast to the long row of thinkers 
criticizing the Germanic Body.47 This surprising endorsement by Rousseau has been 
referred to by historians when arguing that the criticism of the Germanic Body was 
not shared by everyone. 
However, one fundamental difficulty is whether Rousseau here simply copies 
the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. As Rousseau had remarked in the Conf ssions, and the 
editor of the Abstract in his introduction, Rousseau had introduced some of his own 
ideas under the mantle of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (C, 342[I, 407] ; Rousseau 2005, 
Vol. XI, 26). Yet, obviously some of the ideas were the Abbé’s and the question is 
then whether this particular reference is not simply taken over from the Abbé. At 
first one could easily be convinced that Rousseau simply took it over because there 
are no other references to the Germanic Body, especially as an example to be 
followed in building a confederation. The easy answer is to look at the Abbé’s book 
and compare it to what Rousseau had said.  
Asbach48 shows persuasively that Rousseau’s conception of the Germanic 
Body varies considerably from the Abbé’s (2002, 237). In particular, the Abbé did 
not claim that the Germanic Body had a pacifying impact on European relations. 
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Further, the Empire was for the Abbé an example for the structure of 
institutionalizing legal relations among sovereign states (ibid.).49  
Therefore, setting aside the argument that the Abbé’s argument and 
Rousseau’s argument are identical, the question remains whether the Germanic Body 
was supposed to serve as a model for a European confederation. This indeed makes 
sense in so far as the Germanic Body was a confederation of states which were able 
to pacify their internal relations while at the same being incapable of external 
warfare. Furthermore, the Germanic Body was large enough to withstand any 
external threats. In this sense, Rousseau quoted the Germanic Body together with the
Helvetic and Dutch League as contemporary examples of confederations, combining 
the freedom of republics with the security of monarchies.  
In his later discussion of the confederation, Rousseau cites the Germanic 
Body for its ability to restrain its members and for its member’s devotion to the 
entire state. 
Look at what happens in the Germanic Body, in spite of the abuses of 
its Public Order, and the extreme inequality of its Members: is there a 
single one of them, even among the most Powerful, which would dare 
to expose itself to the ban of the Empire, by openly wounding its 
constitution, unless it believed it had good reasons not to fear that the 
Empire would want to act against it in earnest? … Moreover, there is a 
great deal of difference between depending on someone else, or only 
on a Body of which one is a member and of which each is the leader 
in his turn; for in the latter case one does nothing but secure one’s
freedom by the pledges one gives for it; it would be alienated in the 
hands of a master, but it is strengthened in those of Associates. This is 
confirmed by the example of the Germanic Body; for although in 
many regards the sovereignty of its members is weakened by its 
constitution, and they are consequently in a less favorable case than 
those of the European Body would be, nevertheless there is not a 
single one of them, however jealous it might be of its authority, that 
                                                




would want, if it could, to be certain of an absolute independence by 
detaching itself from the Empire (APPP, 40, 44-45[III, 578; 583]). 
 
It appears that the Germanic Body is indeed the model for the confederation. The 
important difference here is that the main defect of the Germanic Body is its 
constitution as a monarchy with a sovereign. The confederation as Rousseau and the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre envisioned them would be led by a rotating presidency chosen
from the member states. One must therefore take into consideration the anti-
monarchical implication of the confederation and the limitation of the power of 
monarchs.  
Yet, the difficulty is that Rousseau appears very skeptical whether the 
confederation would not be impractical in the end. If our above reading of this 
passage in the Abstract was correct then the answer can only be negative. Rousseau’s 
comment has to be understood in the context of its importance for the maintenance 
of the European balance of power. The constitution of the Germanic Body 
conveniently serves to support the European balance of power. The Germanic Body 
exists to incite ambition, absorb the initial blows, and then be rescued by a counter-
coalition. In turn, the Germanic Body itself is incapable of offensive warfare and 
therefore poses no threat to its neighboring states. This comes at the cost of the 
Germanic Body being perpetually the battleground of European wars.  
It would be neither desirable for Europe to become the battleground of the 
world nor would it be in the interest of any European state to relinquish the initiative 
about one’s well-being to extra-European powers. These extra-European powers
would do the attacking and the counter-attacking and all of Europe would suffer. 




Body only was put in this position after the worst devastation of any European 
country in recent memory. The peace that was established after the Thirty Yea s’ 
War was better than a further continuation of that war. However, as Rousseau also 
seems to have indicated with his reference to the Seven Years War and public right, 
the foundation of the Germanic Body was so weak that its breakdown was very 
likely.  
Another reason to reject the parallel is that neither the Germanic Body as a 
whole nor most of its parts were republics. The Germanic Body was an empire and 
most of its parts were monarchies. Rousseau points to this when he criticizes its 
constitution (APPP, 44-45[III, 583-584]). “Notice, in addition, that since the 
Germanic Body has a permanent Leader, the authority of this Leader must 
necessarily constantly tend toward usurpation; which cannot happen in the same way 
in the European Diet, where the presidency ought to alternate, and without regard to 
the inequality of power” (ibid.).  
 Asbach, in his account of the balance of power, overlooks that Rousseau does 
not openly criticize the balance of power. The fundamental fact for Rousseau is the 
mutual dependence among European powers (APPP, 36[III, 573]). It is the state of 
war, which follows from the mutual dependence, which led to the balance of power. 
In Rousseau’s words, the balance of power was “begun by fortune” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, Rousseau claims that “this much vaunted equilibrium has [not] been 
established by anyone” (APPP, 33[III, 570]). While the balance of power is in a 
certain sense the natural outcome of European relations, it leaves much to be desired. 




Sovereigns” (APPP, 35[III, 572]). This leads Rousseau to the judgment that “the 
imperfection of this society renders the condition of those who compose it worse 
than the privation of all society among them would” (APPP, 36[III, 573]). The 
obvious conclusion is that a confederation would complement the work of nature by 
a work of art, or rather a work of reason (ibid.). The alternative option would be to 
destroy the European society.50 If either of these options is impracticable then the 




One has to say a few words about the role of commerce. Contrary to what Rousseau 
says in other works, commerce is not a simply bad institution.51 One should only 
recall Rousseau’s remark in the First Discourse that “the ancient politicians forever 
spoke of morals and virtue; ours speak only of commerce and money” (14[III, 19]). 
Yet, here Rousseau argues that commerce softens the pursuit of real self-interest and 
allows states to avoid becoming dependent on other states. As he writes: “commerce 
… deprives them [certain Powers] of one of the great means they used to have for 
laying down the law for the others [i.e. other Powers]” (APPP, 35[III, 573]). This 
refers to the different intentions inherent in commerce and war (FD, 14[III, 19]) .
While commerce appeals to material gains and is connected with luxury and moral 
laxity, war requires severity, restraint, and patriotism. Therefore, Rousseau argues 
that commerce makes conquest or the imposition and extension of one’s law much 
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more difficult. Now, as there is luxury and commerce, it becomes possible for states 
to avoid clear dependence. One state might receive food for luxury products, for 
example food for wine in the famous example by David Ricardo. It is to both their 
advantages. However, previously the state receiving wine might have simply forced
the other state to give them the wine for free or the state needing food might have 
started a war. This passage is very important in making the case that commere was 
not simply bad for Rousseau but had political advantages. Furthermore, this kind of 
commerce makes it possible that states forget about their true interests. Commerce 
makes it possible for states to perceive their interest as variable. 
One can also further ask whether the European balance of power and 
European commerce does not signify considerable progress over the previous state of 
European affairs. As Rousseau makes clear, the European balance of power was only 
fairly recently solidly established with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. As 
Rousseau said, the “true support of the system of Europe” is the Germanic Body and 
the system of negotiations, and those are also of fairly recent origin. If one imagines 
what the situation in Europe must have been like before the establishment of the 
European balance of power, one first of all notices that Europe was for some time 
effectively ruled by the Roman Catholic Church. The Church was the final arbiter of 
the conflicts among the European princes and therefore the true sovereign. The 
emergence of Protestantism and the ensuing independence of European princes from 
the Catholic Church meant that the situation of all sovereigns had now become worse 
than before. Each sovereign had not acquired the right to unlimited acquisition. But 




power was therefore the only possible consequence of the demise of the Catholic 
Church and in a certain sense the natural condition of Europe. It was natural in the 
sense that given the establishment of loosely connected states in Europe they had to 
be in a state of war. Under the condition of some natural condition such as 
geography and climate, they would find themselves in a condition of equilibrium.  
Yet, the natural condition of the state of Europe did not mean that it was the 
best condition. As Rousseau wrote, the balance of power leaves the European states 
in a constant state of agitation. One therefore wonders, and Rousseau suggests, 
whether human art and reason are incapable of improving on this situation. As 
Rousseau argues, it is the confederation which is supposed to fulfill that promise. It 
is a rationally designed institution in order to overcome the shortcoming of the 
balance of power.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In Rousseau’s view, all four solutions discussed in this chapter were deficient. Yet, 
the discussion of them helped to explain which conditions had to exist for any viable 
solution. The three suggested solutions were aligned along a continuum from nature 
to culture. The first solution discussed, the European society, was a purely cultural 
solution, with almost no support from nature. This solution was to be founded on the 
cultural ties existing among the European states. Rousseau showed how these cultural 
ties were the remnants of a decayed Roman Empire, which had been able to sustain 
themselves through the Roman Catholic Church. Contrary to the hopes of some for 




among European states than should have been expected. The cultural ties among 
European countries and the state of war among them describe the factual situation in 
Europe. Rousseau does not claim that the cultural ties as they exist represent th  full 
extent of the possibilities of cultural ties. Instead he argues that these cultural ties 
would have to be changed in order to lead to peace. 
The balance of power is a solution which seeks to combine nature and culture. 
The balance of power is based on nature, as the geographic and climatic factors 
provide any attempt to build an empire with “insurmountable obstacles.” Based on 
this natural foundation, the balance of power relies on cultural factors by controlling 
ambition with ambition. However, Rousseau never claimed that the balance of power 
would lead to peace. The balance of power could not and will not remedy this 
situation. Instead, it stabilizes the European system at a low level. Contrary to the 
opinion prevailing in Europe at the time, the progress of the arts and sciences had not 
led to political or moral progress. In particular with regard to international relations, 
the balance of power exemplified a decline rather than progress for Rousseau. While 
the balance of power guarantees the general stability of the system of Europe, it d es 
so at the cost of creating instability at the sub-system level, i.e. at the cost of 
increased conflict, including war, among states. Surprisingly, Rousseau agrees that 
the disorientation in the pursuit of true interests brought about by commerce has a 
war-reducing effect. The Germanic Body is essential for the functioning of the 
balance of power but rests on the weak foundation of public right. If public right 
could be strengthened then the European balance of power might be transformed into 




The third suggested solution of the Germanic Empire exemplifies a differently 
conceived cultural solution. In this case, the Germanic Empire could serve as the 
model for a new European Empire. Contrary to the Christian Empire, the Germanic 
Empire would rely for its stability on the uniting institution of an emperor. The Abbé 
de Saint-Pierre had suggested that the Germanic Empire, which in the Middle Ages 
was checked by the Catholic Church, would now be checked by democratic 
institutions, such as establishing the equality of all European sovereigns and 
periodically rotating the position of emperor. Rousseau rejects this solution as 
impracticable under the conditions of the balance of power. As the balance of power 
is based on countering ambition with ambition, no consensus could be reached to 
transform the current system to a new empire. Furthermore, Rousseau also denie that 
mixing democratic and monarchical institutions would be a possibility. But the 
institution of the emperor is based on the principle of personal ambition and glory, 
and for that reason unacceptable to Rousseau as a solution to bring about peace. For 
Rousseau, this peace would have more in common with the peace of Ulysses and his 
comrades in the Cyclops’s cave than with genuine peace.  
While commerce is the most acceptable moderation of international relations, 
its pursuit is based on the liberation of desires. Differently states, commerce is based 
on luxury and leads politically to a pernicious inequality among citizens. Rousseau’  
rejection of commerce is therefore the best example of his rejection of the 
Enlightenment and especially Locke and Montesquieu. While they give greater 
importance to peace and security, he, Rousseau, will give greater importance to the 




After rejecting all four solutions based on this analysis of the European 
situation, it has become clear that any solution to the state of war among European 
states must artfully combine nature and culture. Rousseau has rejected solution  based 
on Christian compassion or individual glory. The viable combination of nature and 
culture in the form of the European balance of power, is for Rousseau a better 
solution than either the solution of the Christian or secular empire. Furthermore, the 
balance of power could be further moderated by increasing commercial ties mong 
states. However, Rousseau seeks to improve upon the balance of power because of 
the obvious disadvantages it has, in particular because of its disadvantages for the 
subjects of the European aristocracies. Therefore, a confederation should replace the 
balance of power with supra-national institutions. This would be the solution which 
Rousseau set out to seek at the beginning of the Abstract, which was to “put law 
above men.” If the latter would be impossible, and this still has to be seen, Rousseau 
would surprisingly seem to endorse the solution of a European balance of power 




C h a p t e r  4  
“SETTING LAW ABOVE FORCE”: NATURAL LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE LAW OF WAR AS 
LIMITS TO THE STATE OF WAR 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
After the previous chapter had demonstrated that Rousseau rejected the contemporary 
solutions suggested for the pacification of international relations, this chapter pres nts 
with natural law, international law, and the law of war those solutions, which 
Rousseau had set forth in his own name. The discussion of the state of war in chapter 
two has shown that international relations seem to have no inherent limits as to the 
means which a state may use in pursuit of its self-preservation. However, in the last 
chapter of the Social Contract and in the Emile Rousseau had enumerated treaties, 
natural law or right, and right of nations as subjects to be treated. With the exception 
of confederations, their existence and effectiveness in limiting or abolishing war 
would demonstrate that Rousseau could have completed the Social Contract in 
principle. If, however, it could be shown that Rousseau ultimately rejected these 
solutions it would provide further evidence for the hypothesis that the international 




The first subject discussed in this chapter is natural law or right. The question 
regarding the existence of natural law has a long history.52 Contrary to those who are 
of the opinion that Rousseau believed in a natural law ordering political societies, the 
argument in this chapter will show that Rousseau denied the existence of a natural 
law. Instead, he argued that every human being had by nature the right to self-
preservation. This right to self-preservation equally applies to sovereign states. 
Therefore, the sovereign state faces in international relations no restrictions on the 
means it uses to pursue its self-preservation, nor is there any independent standard by 
which to judge its actions.  
The second subject of this chapter is international law. The question raised 
here is whether Rousseau believes that an idea of a universal justice exists which 
governs the relations among states. Rousseau discusses this question most explicitly
in the Geneva Manuscript. However, Rousseau rejects the idea that such a society of 
mankind could effectively provide us with standards and that consequently the idea of 
law derived from anything but political institutions has to be rejected. 
The third subject of this chapter is the law of war. While the law of war is 
usually treated as part of natural law, Rousseau also draws some consequences from 
his conception of the state of war which are not immediately apparent and also do not 
depend on natural law. The discussion will therefore take a closer look at Rousseau’s 
fragmentary essay The State of War and its sections dedicated to explaining the 
meaning of the state of war. While Rousseau does not postulate any standards 
transcending and not depending on political society, he derives some limitations on 
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warfare from the foundation of states on property. Based on the ideal of a legitimate 
state, Rousseau argues that some forms of warfare would be more likely to lead to 
illegitimacy and should therefore be rejected. 
As is the case with most technical terms, Rousseau uses some terms very 
carefully and deliberately in his work. In a response to Mme. d’Epinay’s reaction to 
his work, he advised her “to learn my dictionary” (CC III, 296, March 1756). 
Rousseau does not necessarily use these terms consistently in one work and even less 
so across different works. It is therefore important to get a sense of the meaning of h s 
terms, first based on the context and then how their meaning changes within a work. 
Only then it is possible to compare these meanings and the arguments they support 
across his different works.  
Furthermore, with regard to the term “natural law” a word of caution is 
especially necessary. While the term “natural law” had a long history originating in 
pre-modern political thought, the term was also used in a different sense by modern 
legal scholars as well as by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It suffices here to point
to Thomas Hobbes’ use of natural law in the Leviathan and the very different use of 
the term in Grotius’ Right of War and Peace. Essentially, Hobbes had used the term 
natural law in order to determine those principles which would be necessary to 
constitute a political society. Grotius on the other hand had continued to use the term 
in its Aristotelian sense to indicate the highest ends of men. 
For a discussion of the term “natural law,” but also the closely related terms of 
“law of nature,” “natural right,” “right of the stronger,” “natural justice,” “right of 




Discourse. It is in the Preface to that essay where one finds Rousseau’s most 
extensive discussion of the term “natural law.” On this basis one can then turn to the 
relevant passages in the Social Contract and in the Geneva Manuscript which seem to 
contradict Rousseau’s argument from the Second Discourse. It can be shown that they 
only superficially contradict each other and that the meaning of natural law derived 
from the Second Discourse prevails.  
 
4.2 Natural Law and Natural Right 
The argument on natural law is part of the general argument of the Preface to the 
Second Discourse. In the Preface, Rousseau argues that “the most useful and the least 
advanced of all human knowledge seems to me the knowledge of man” (12[III, 122]). 
Therefore, Rousseau will show in the S cond Discourse the “unshakable foundations” 
(15[III, 127]) on which the political societies of men are erected. It is in this context 
that Rousseau discusses in six of the twelve paragraphs of the Preface the question of 
natural right and natural law.53 After asserting that the nature of man is still unknown, 
Rousseau transitions to the discussion of natural right (droit naturel) and the obvious 
difficulty of deriving natural right from a nature of man if the nature is known. 
Rousseau cites here Jean Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748) by name, a well-known 
Protestant professor of natural right at the Academy of Geneva, in order to suggest 
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agreement with the common opinion on natural law, while disagreeing with it in the 
following paragraphs. 
Rousseau illustrates man’s ignorance about his nature by referring to the 
considerable differences of scholars with regard to the meaning of natural law or 
natural right. The two positions which Rousseau references are those of the “Roman 
jurisconsults” and of the “moderns.” For the former the term “natural law” (loi 
naturelle) means “the Law which Nature has imposed on itself rather than the law 
which nature prescribes” (SD, 14[III, 124]). Therefore, the natural law applies equally 
to men and animals (animaux) and would consequently specify the law which applies 
to men as an animal and not with regard to what makes him human. More concretely, 
the natural law is that law which leads every living being “to their mutual 
preservation” (SD, 14[III, 124]). In other words, every species follows by its nature 
the law of self-preservation or has a natural end.  
On the contrary, the “moderns” use the term law in a different sense than the 
ancient Romans. It is uncertain to whom Rousseau refers when speaking about the 
moderns. He could first of all refer to his contemporaries who were known to defend 
a natural law doctrine, for example, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Christian 
Wolff, or the aforementioned Burlamaqui.54 Yet, even Thomas Hobbes had used the 
terms of natural right and natural law and Rousseau might also refer to him. However, 
later in the Second Discourse Rousseau explicitly distinguishes Hobbes from the 
moderns (35[III, 152]). Moreover, Rousseau could refer to all those who opposed the 
ancient Roman concept of natural law. As Heinrich Meier notes in his edition of the 
Second Discourse, Rousseau does not explicitly mention that the concept of natural 
                                                




law explicitly presumes God as a lawgiver (2001, 52n58). Therefore, the moderns are 
all those thinkers who postulated a natural law based on Christianity, and that 
includes men like Grotius, Pufendorf, or Wolff.  
For Rousseau, the “moderns” use the term natural law as “a rule prescribed to 
a moral being, that is to say intelligent, free, and considered in its relations with other 
beings, limiting the competence of natural law (loi naturelle) consequently to the only 
animal endowed with reason, that is to say to man” (SD, 14[III, 124-125]). Here the 
term natural law has the meaning of guiding the life of man with regard to what is t e 
highest in man and what distinguishes him from animals. While the Roman 
jurisconsults and the moderns both use natural law to indicate the end of man, they 
differ in that the ancient notion is limited to the lowest in man and shared with 
animals, while the moderns use it to indicate what is highest in man and not shared 
with any other animal.  
According to Rousseau, the difficulty with the “modern” definition of natural 
law is that they “all establish it [natural law] on metaphysical principles” (SD, 14[III, 
125]), which is to say that the essence of man remains controversial and beyond the 
reaches of reason. Rousseau finds evidence for the weakness of these definitions of 
natural law because they continue to lead to quarrels among them and the “rule 
prescribed to a moral being” remains controversial. As long as there is no consensus 
among the wise as to the nature of man a natural law cannot exist either. 
An additional complication results from Rousseau’s use of the term “law of 
nature” instead of “natural law.” “So that all definitions of these learned men, 




understand the Law of Nature and consequently to obey it, except by being a very 
great reasoner and a profound metaphysician” (ibid.). The question is whether these 
two terms are at all different. Meier in his notes remarks that Rousseau uses the t rm 
natural law always in a normative sense, while the meaning of the term law of nature
varies. Most often he uses it in the sense of a “physical” law, sometimes law of nature 
is used in the normative sense, and rarely are the two meanings identical. By that
Meier means to say that in some rare cases the execution of the normative law 
becomes a physical necessity (2001, 53n59). This passage seems to fit the second 
possibility most closely, as the “law of nature” referred to is the same as the natural 
law referred to earlier. The consequence is that the prescriptions of natural law apply 
only to men and that men are incapable of obeying them unless they have someone 
else to teach the natural law to them. In a primitive state or if this knowledge is lost, 
men would live their lives without being aware that they are living in violation of the 
natural law. In other words, the natural law requires reason. 
Rousseau draws out this conclusion in the subsequent paragraph. In addition 
to the lack of reason which prevents the natural law to be effective in a more 
primitive or uncivilized time of mankind, Rousseau also rejects the hypothesis by 
Pufendorf, Cumberland, Barbeyrac, and others (Meier 2001, 54n60) that the obvious 
utility of following natural laws would have made natural law effective in a primitive 
state. In order to understand this argument one should imagine an ideal situation in 
which men follow rules in order to achieve the best outcome for all. The great 
difficulty of this procedure is the assumption, which one necessarily has to make, that 




accepted, the rules are indeed the best means to this end. However, men most likely 
could not have imagined the advantages which would follow from living according to 
natural laws (SD, 14[III, 125]).  
Based on his presentation of the two common opinions on natural law, 
Rousseau concludes that law must fulfill the following two conditions: “Everything 
that we can see very clearly about this Law, is, so that it will be Law, that it is not 
only necessary that the will of him whom it obliges could be submitted to it 
knowingly; but it is also necessary, so that it is natural, that it speaks immediately 
with the voice of Nature” (ibid.).55 In order for a natural law to exist it is necessary 
that it simultaneously can be conceived knowingly and effective through one’s 
passions. This appears to be the meaning of the expression “voice of nature.”  
The question is whether both conditions can be fulfilled at the same time, or, 
as Plattner (1979, 106) suspects, it is an ironic reference to natural law because both 
conditions can never be fulfilled. From this Plattner concludes that there cannot be a 
natural law in the strict sense. This appears to be correct insofar as men are either in a 
primitive state and therefore incapable of knowing the natural law or they are in  
civilized state and then the law of nature will not speak to them with “the gentle voice 
of nature” (GM, 77[III, 154]). 
After Rousseau has stated the two conditions for the existence of natural law, 
in the immediately following paragraph he seems, however, to affirm the exist nce of 
natural law.  
                                                
55 I have reproduced this quote as literally as possible even though it reads very cumbersomely. 





Meditating about the first and most simple operations of the human 
Soul, I believe to perceive in it two principles anterior to reason, of 
which the one interests us ardently in our well-being and in the 
preservation of ourselves, and the other inspires in us a natural 
repugnance to see any sensitive Being, and principally our similars 
(nos semblables), perish or suffer. From the conjunction and the 
combination which our mind makes from these two Principles, 
without it being necessary to introduce the principle of sociability, all 
the rules of natural right seem to follow; rules which reason is later
forced to reestablish on other foundations, when by its successive 
developments it has achieved to stifle Nature (SD, 14-15[III, 126-
127]).56  
 
The two principles which Rousseau mentions in the first sentence are amour de soi or 
self-love and pitié or pity or commiseration. As these two principles are the effective 
guidance mechanism of nature, they also establish the rules by which men interact. It 
is important to note, however, that Rousseau speaks here of natural right instead of 
natural law and that consequently none of the natural law definitions can be 
accurately applied to primitive men. Therefore, Plattner’s interpretation of the 
previous passage remains valid. Rousseau does not admit that either of them.  
One additional distinction is important to make. It has to be noted that 
Rousseau gives first a definition of law, before he continues to apply to it the natural 
condition of man. According to Rousseau, a law can exist only if men are capable to 
submit to it knowingly. For Rousseau, this condition already excludes the possibility 
that a natural law exists because for him, as he will make clear later in the Second 
Discourse, primitive men do not have language and reason. It is noteworthy, 
however, that this definition of law remains valid, without the additional condition of 
                                                
56 Méditant sur les premiéres et plus simples opérations de l’Ame humaine, j’y crois appercevoir deux 
principes antérieurs à la raison, dont l’un nous intéresse ardemment à nôtre bien-être et à la répugnance 
naturelle à voir perir ou souffrir tout Etre sensible et principalement nos sembables. C’est du concours 
et de la combinaison que nôtre esprit est en état de faire de ces deux Principes, sans qu’il soit 
nécessaire d’y faire entrer celui de las sociabilité, que me paroissent découler toutes les régles du droit 
naturel ; régles que la raison es ensuite forcée de rétablir sur d’autres fondemens, quand par ses 




the law being natural. The difference between the two conditions is not as easily 
visible in the English translations because they all have a comma where Rousseau 
uses a semicolon in the French. Thereby, Rousseau separates the second condition 
more visibly from the first condition.  
An important consequence can be drawn from this definition of the term law 
and the condition for it to be natural. While it excludes the possibility that a properly 
called “natural law” existed for Rousseau, it still states the conditions for an effective 
law. According to this definition, a good law, made by men themselves, will be most 
effective if it can combine reason and passion. There are two extremes on either side, 
i.e. a rule either relying entirely on reason or a rule relying entirely on passion. Only 
rules to which men submit knowingly are properly called law. The term law, 
however, is inappropriate for rules which men follow because of their passions. For 
those rules it would be necessary to find another name.57 
In the following paragraph, Rousseau indeed specifies on what principles of 
passion one might found effective rules. Rousseau suggests that the human soul 
follows two principles which constitute the basis for the rules of natural right.58 Both 
principles speak directly with the “voice of nature” or with passions and thereby 
establish rules of conduct for primitive men unbeknownst to them. For the above-
                                                
57 Two additional features of a law are that it implies a hierarchy and that it binds the will. Being bound 
by a law means that a man consents to the law as his superior with regard to future actions. For 
Rousseau this submission is unnatural. The necessity of submission only arises if a man is dependent 
on others for his survival. The general will is activa ed by the reasonable insight of the necessary 
conditions for common survival. Laws are the records of the general will in order to hold every 
member of the general will accountable and make the general will enforceable. The general will cannot 
be bound by laws as the individual will could originally not be bound by laws. The purpose of the 
general will is to bind the individual wills. This achieved most effectively if every individual will 
expressed its consent to it.  
58 In his attempt to refute the hypothesis that Rousseau rejects natural law, David Williams seems to 




mentioned reasons it would be inappropriate to call these rules laws. Instead, they 
establish rights. As Rousseau emphasizes, he assumes as the only natural aim of men 
what can be most certainly be established. In particular, Rousseau rejects human 
sociability as an additional principle, whose introduction would have given society 
claims over individuals or imposed duties on individuals, which Rousseau wanted to 
avoid (Strauss 1953, 277-78). The most important consequence of this rejection is the 
unnaturalness of human society. Rousseau rejects here the Aristotelian argument of 
man as a political animal.  
However, between the two principles which determine the rules of natural 
right, the first principle of self-preservation takes precedence over the principle of 
pity. If man’s self-preservation is threatened, and every man is the sole judge, he has 
every right to do whatever it takes to ensure his self-preservation. Because he is the 
sole judge, and he might not always be a perfect judge, there is no means which 
would be closed off to him. The secondary principle of pity will most likely prevent 
him from using unnecessarily cruel means and if there are less cruel means to achieve 
his self-preservation he will instinctively use those instead. As some commentators 
have remarked before (Masters 1968, 136-46, Plattner 1979, 82-87, Meier 2001, 
57n65), one recognizes the different status of the two principles already in the 
language Rousseau uses. While we are “ardently interested” in our self-prervation 
and well-being, we are only “naturally repulsed” by seeing others suffer.  
Rousseau draws out this consequence himself when he writes:  
 
By this means one also ends the old disputes about the participation of 
animals in the natural Law, because it is clear that, deprived of 
enlightenment (lumieres) and liberty, they cannot recognize this Law; 




which they are endowed, one will judge that they should also 
participate in natural right, and that man is committed towards them in 
some kind of duties (SD, 15[III, 126]).  
 
While Rousseau had just rejected the notion of natural law of the moderns, he now 
returns to the ancient or Roman concept of natural law. Rousseau’s concept of natural 
right and the Roman jurists’ concept of natural law agree in applying equally to men 
and animals. The crucial difference between the two concepts is that the Roman
concept assumes the natural sociability of men, which Rousseau had just rejected.  
Therefore, it has been shown that men are only subject to natural right in the 
state of nature. Man is indistinguishable from animals and pursues like all animals 
solely his self-preservation and well-being, and moderated under the right conditions 
by pity. Furthermore, every man and woman is in the beginning the judge of the 
means to his or her self-preservation, which also includes possessing those means to 
self-preservation.  
The other passages in the S cond Discourse where Rousseau uses the terms 
“natural law,” “law of nature,” and “natural right” confirm the interpretation of the 
Preface. Still, these passages give us additional information about the implication of 
these terms. As had become clear in the Preface, the term natural right implied the 
right to self-preservation and well-being. Rousseau uses natural right twice (SD, 53; 
67[III, 177; 194]) in this sense. In the latter passage, Rousseau points out that moral 
or conventional inequality has to be based on natural right, i.e. on everyone’s natural 
aim to self-preservation. In addition, Rousseau once uses the term “Right of Nature”, 
which he uses to further emphasize that everyone is naturally free or has the right to 




nature” twice (SD, 57; 67[III, 182; 194]) to indicate that according to this law there 
are no natural titles of some to rule over others. 
Furthermore, Rousseau also indicates that his understanding of natural right 
implies that the only effective right in the state of nature is the right of te stronger.59 
His first use of the term right of the stronger occurs as a rebuttal that the right of the 
stronger does not give a title to rule in the state of nature (SD, 43[III, 164]). Yet, it is 
still surprising because this remark implies that the effective principle of the state of 
nature is the right of the stronger. A similarly revealing reference is when Rousseau 
writes: „Here everything returns to the sole Law of the stronger, and consequently to 
a new state of Nature different from the one with which we began, in that the one was 
a Nature in its purity and this latter one is the fruit of an excess of corruption” (SD, 
65[III, 191]). Rousseau goes one step further by explicitly identifying the natural right 
with the right of the stronger, when he writes that the rich man was capable to “use in 
his favour the forces even of those who attacked him, …, by giving them other 
institutions which were as favourable to him as the natural Right was against him” 
(SD, 53[III, 177]). Finally, the clearest example that the natural state of man was 
characterized by the right of the stronger was the conflict which characterized the 
state of war prior to the conclusion of a social contract: “There arose betwen he 
right of the stronger and the right of first occupant a perpetual conflict which ended 
only with combat and death” (SD, 52[III, 176]).   
                                                
59 Rousseau only once speaks of the right of the stronger, otherwise he uses the expression law of the 
stronger. This is in accordance with his general notio  of right versus law. The law of the stronger 
refers to the necessary and unavoidable submission to the one with greater force. However, there is 
strictly speaking no right of the stronger because nature did not confer the right to rule anyone. In other 





As Rousseau points out in the Social Contract as well as in the Second 
Discourse, “the rule of the stronger” is a misnomer because there is no political rule 
in the state of nature (SD, 59[III, 184]). The “rule” of the stronger is ineffective 
because someone subject to that rule would simply take his things and walk away. In 
addition, the rule of the stronger is simply based on necessity (SC, I.3, 134[III, 354]). 
In this regard, the use of the term “law of nature” is appropriate because it refers, as 
Meier remarked, to the physical or necessary laws (2001, 53n59). But Rousseau is 
also right in asserting that the rule of the stronger cannot be the basis of political 
society, because the basis of society is religion and property (SD, 50-51[III, 173-
174]), which are both opposed to force. This comes out most clearly when Rousseau 
writes that: “property right differs from the right which results from the natural Law” 
(SD, 51[III, 174]). This remark only makes sense if one understands by right the right 
to appropriate to oneself everything which one needs for one’s own self-preservation. 
Understood in this manner, the right resulting from natural law is different from 
property right, which never gives anyone the right to transgress someone else’s 
property right.  
In sum, the only effective principle in the state of war is the right of the 
stronger. This also characterizes the state of war among sovereign states.   “Th  civil 
right having so become the common rule of the Citizens, the Law of Nature was only 
situated among the different Societies, where, under the name Right of Nations, it was 
moderated by some tacit conventions to make commerce possible and to substitute for 
natural commiseration…”  (SD, 54[III, 178]). Here, Rousseau explicitly indentifies 




every society has the right to pursue its own self-preservation by any means it deems 
necessary to achieve that goal.  
 
4.3 On International Law or the Unlimited Right to War 
Against the interpretation that Rousseau rejected the idea of a natural law limiting the 
actions of men and sovereign states alike, one might level three charges. These 
charges are based on passages in the Social Contract, Political Economy, and the 
Geneva Manuscript. The first argument is to use the Social Contract o show that 
Rousseau’s aim is to make men submit to laws knowingly or to gain their consent to 
political rule. Secondly, the argument is made that Rousseau uses conscience, or the 
“voice of nature,” to indicate that men have a natural intuition of right and wrong. 
Lastly, Rousseau is said to advocate a “transcendent notion of justice” (Williams 
2007, 80). 
With regard to the first argument, the Social Contract is indeed supposed to 
fulfill the function of making men submit to laws. However, the laws which are made 
in a republic are not natural laws. As was shown above, Rousseau gives a definition 
of law and not natural law, which is admittedly difficult to see in an English 
translation. Another category of laws is the constitutional order of a republic. As 
Rousseau says, the republic is supposed to be made in accordance with natural right 
and not in accordance with natural law (SD, 13-14[III, 126]). Secondly, Rousseau 
uses the word “conscience” only twice in the S cond Discourse (7; 26[III, 116; 142]). 
The first mention of conscience occurs in the Dedication in order to appeal to the 




Rousseau uses it in the sense of “awareness” or “knowledge” and not in order to 
indicate a “natural” sense of good and evil. Whatever he might say in his other 
writings, in the Second Discourse nothing leads one to believe that the “voice of 
nature” is the same as conscience. Instead, the “voice of nature” is pity.60 
The case of the “transcendent norms of justice” (Williams 2007, 86-87) rests 
to a large extent on evidence from the G neva Manuscript (Williams 2007, 81-88). 
The Geneva Manuscript is one of the original drafts of the Social Contract. For the 
final version of the Social Contract, Rousseau substantially reworked the manuscript 
and left out two sections in particular, the second chapter from book one, Of the
General Society of Mankind, and the fourth chapter of book two, Of the Nature of the 
Laws, and of the Principle of Civil Justice. Both chapters were deleted from the final 
version but they contain important references to the addressee of the work, 
Rousseau’s motivation, and especially to the connection between the Second 
Discourse and the Social Contract.  
The evidence in favor of transcendent justice comes at the end of the book I, 
chapter 2, Geneva Manuscript, and is then connected to passages in Ge eva 
Manuscript II.4, the Social Contract II.6, and the essay Political Economy. Before the 
evidence is presented it is first necessary to put these passages in the context from 
which they are usually torn. It has to be remembered that the argument of the Geneva 
Manuscript I.2 in particular is about a refutation of a general society of mankind, and 
more specifically a refutation of Diderot’s argument in favor of such a general society 
in the article “Natural Right” in the Encyclopédie.  
                                                





The commonly used arguments for transcendent justice or natural law imply 
the notion of a general society of mankind, or speaking about a general society of 
mankind leads to the idea of natural justice. With regard to international relations, this 
implies in turn that by nature the plurality of political societies is a historical 
aberration and injustice, which eventually must be overcome. The details of 
overcoming the aberration depend decisively on one’s faith or religion, which also 
stipulated the idea of natural justice.61 One’s faith and religion lead then necessarily 
to imperial claims of a universal community. 
In the Geneva Manuscript, Rousseau seems to reject the general society of 
mankind. We had already seen in chapter two that Rousseau consistently made the 
case that political societies will find their perfection in a small republic, and therefore 
necessarily will have to accept the existence of a state of war. As Strau s wrote: “No 
modern thinker has understood better than Rousseau the philosophic conception of 
the polis: the polis is that complete association which corresponds to the natural range 
of man’s power of knowing and of loving” (1953, 254n2; Strauss’ italics). 
The argument in this chapter begins with a reprise of arguments made in the 
Second Discourse: man is by nature self-sufficient and lacks sociability as well as 
reason. It is only the desires which man created which lead him out of the natural 
state.  
Our needs unite us in proportion as our passions divide us, and the 
more we become our fellows’ enemies, the less we can do without 
them. Such are the first bonds of general society; such are the 
foundations of that universal benevolence the sentiment of which 
seems to get stifled by the recognition that it is necessary, and the 
                                                





fruits of which everyone would like to enjoy, without being obliged to 
cultivate it (GM, I.2, 76-77[III, 282]).  
 
As Arthur Melzer has pointed out (1990, chap. 8), Rousseau rejects the general 
society of mankind because a society based on needs alone would end in complete 
tyranny:  
The general society which our mutual needs might engender thus offer 
no effective help to man become miserable, or rather it provides new 
forces only to the one who already had too many, while the weak, lost, 
stifled, crushed in the multitude, finds no refuge to which he might flee,
no support in his weakness, and in the end he perishes a victim of this 
deceptive union from which he expected happiness (GM, I.2, 77[III, 
282]).  
 
This impression is further confirmed in the deleted paragraph which follows. 
Here, Rousseau shows similar to the fraudulent social contract of the Second 
Discourse, which men consent to because they expect individual benefits and not 
because they hope to achieve any common good. This state “would only be a source 
of crimes and of miseries for men” (GM, I.2, 77[III, 283]). But despite the 
disadvantages of political societies, political societies also have the massive 
advantage of making civilization possible, most importantly the “love of virtue” 
(ibid.).  
Rousseau believes that the general society of mankind is “either unknown or 
impracticable” (GM, I.2, 78[III, 284]), because the condition for men’s progress is a 
development of selfish passions, like glory, pride, or vanity (amour-propre), which 
weakens the common sentiment of humanity or compassion, if it then existed. As in 
the Second Discourse, Rousseau admits that some philosophers (ibid.) or 




Yet, Rousseau also strongly affirms that this is a rare exception and by no meas 
extendable to more men or even the people as a whole.  
This fundamental contradiction is at the center of Rousseau’s argument 
against the general society of mankind. Rousseau takes up Diderot’s “violent 
reasoner” from the Encyclopédie article on natural right (V, 116). Diderot had argued 
against Rousseau that the “violent reasoner” would be effectively restrained through 
reason. One could therefore expect every enlightened man to conform to the universal 
and eternal rules of natural right. Non-conformity with these rules implies the 
exclusion of these animal-like men from the universal human society.  Rousseau 
responds that the difficulty is to show this man “what interest he has in being just” 
(GM, I.2, 80[III, 286]). It is important for our concern here that Rousseau explicitly 
draws the parallel between the “enlightened and independent man” and sovereign 
society (GM, I.2, 79[III, 285]).62 Furthermore, in paragraph eleven, Rousseau 
identifies the independent man with the multitude. It is a question of philosophy and 
law to restrain the independent man or multitude.  
So far, Rousseau simply refutes the idea of a general society of mankind. 
However, Rousseau suddenly seems to consider the idea of universal justice, which 
he had apparently outright rejected. In GM II.4, Rousseau writes:  
                                                
62 One answer to the question why the Social Contract is incomplete is therefore that one can restrain 
the violent reasoner but not society. The success of the Social Contract depends on its ability to 
successfully transform the violent reasoner into a citizen. However, Rousseau believes that this 
transformation cannot be extended beyond a certain point because personal interest can never 
completely be eradicated. Furthermore, this transformation does not apply to societies, which means 
that a society cannot be transformed into a citizen of a world-state. This occurs because every society 
necessarily has to deal with an area of responsibility to which the normal rules of goodness do not 
apply, most importantly foreign relations. This would be an area in which the violent reasoner would 
reason correctly. Yet, in order to make citizenship possible, this area would have to be ignored by most 
subjects of a state. Here, we get the sense that Rousseau addresses himself first and foremost to the 
non-gentleman, contra Aristotle, who assumes in the E ics and Politics that the virtues of gentlemen 




Extend this maxim to the general society of which the State giv s us 
an idea, protected by the society of which we are members, or by that 
in which we live, the natural revulsion to do evil no longer being 
offset by the fear of having evil done to us, we are inclined at once by 
nature, by habit, by reason to deal with other men more or less as [we 
do] with our fellow-citizens, and this disposition reduced to actions 
gives rise to rules of reasoned natural right, different from natural 
right properly so called, which is founded on nothing but a true but 
very vague sentiment often stifled by the love of ourselves” (113[III, 
329]). 
 
This seems to point to the existence of universal justice, as Rousseau makes 
clear in the following paragraph. “This is how the first distinct notions of the just and 
the unjust are formed in us; for the law precedes justice, not justice the law” (ibid.).
Williams, following Hendel (1934), in particular has argued that this points to 
Rousseau’s position of a transcendent, universal justice (2007, 84-85). In support, 
Williams cites Political Economy (147-148[III, 250-251]) and Social Contract, II.6 
(152[III, 378]): 
But it always has two infallible rules for acting well on such occasions: 
one is the spirit of the law, which should help decide the cases it could
not anticipate; the other is the general will, the source and supplement of 
all the laws, and which should always be consulted in their absence. 
How, I shall be asked, can the general will be known in the cases in 
which it has not declared itself? ….the chiefs know well enough that the 
general will is always on the side most favorable to the public interest, 
that is to say, the most equitable; so that one need only be just in order 
to be sure of following the general will.  
 
The passage from the Social Contract, is from II.6 entitled On Law.  
What is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and 
independently of human conventions. All justice comes from God, he 
alone is its source; but if we were capable of receiving it from so high, 
we would need neither government nor laws. No doubt there is a 
universal justice emanating from reason alone;63 but this justice, to be 
admitted among us, has to be reciprocal. Considering things in human 
terms, the laws of justice are vain among men for want of natural 
sanctions; they only bring good to the wicked and evil to the just when 
                                                




he observes them toward everyone while no one observes them toward 
him. Conventions and laws are therefore necessary to combine rights 
with duties and to bring justice back to its object. 
 
Williams reads these passages as confirming Rousseau’s acceptance of a 
universal standard of justice. Yet, this standard cannot be eternal because man in the 
state of nature did not have reason and therefore the standards of justice could not be 
known to man. The argument then is to say that once man developed reason, man 
could recognize the universal standard, which must have already existed prior to man 
acquiring reason.  
First, Rousseau never tells us what that universal justice would look like. 
What did Rousseau mean by “universal justice emanating from reason alone?” Fr 
Rousseau, this means first and foremost that there is no natural rule. The universal 
justice is then that everyone has the right to live and that he himself is the best judg  
on how to live. In the case of conflict, we would be able to discern who has the right 
to live or the right to live well and who does not. Reason can give us this rule, but it is 
incapable of ensuring that it will be adhered to among men. We cannot expect that all 
men will always respect this limit towards others. This problem finds its parallel in 
the Second Discourse. There, Rousseau describes the obstacles created by the arts and 
sciences to the rule of reason. Melzer therefore accurately points to Rousseau’s 
criticism of the enlightenment (1990, 135-42). Therefore, reason will never be 
enough, even though it would be best to live without laws and government.  
Then the question is what laws and government one should have. The aim of 
the government and laws must be to ensure the right to live freely and to have the 




As Rousseau continues, this does not happen for men, because under actual 
conditions one will necessarily be subject to others as other people will judge for you 
and in the worst case will declare that your life is worthless and should be sacrificed 
for the good of the whole. 
But contrary to Williams’ interpretation, it appears possible to understand 
these passages differently. First of all, chapter four begins with giving us an 
understanding of “the true foundations of justice and of natural right” (GM, II.4, 
113[III, 328]). If one recalls, Rousseau’s definition of natural right in the Second 
Discourse had been the right to self-preservation. It is certainly possible to understand 
what follows in Geneva Manuscript II.4 in light of this definition. Here, it is indeed, 
as Rousseau writes, necessary that “the first law, the only genuine fundamental law 
that flows immediately from the social pact, is that each man in all things prefer the 
greatest good of all” (ibid.). If this were not the case, then society could not, or only 
with difficulty, exist. Therefore, the natural right to self-preservation is transferred to 
the political society as a whole. “The greatest good of all” is their common self-
preservation and well-being. Further, “right narrowly so called or positive r ght” 
(ibid.) are those decisions or laws which require of men actions to support the self-
preservation of all or the greatest good. All actions which the laws do not or cannot 
demand, but which men still do, are now “called force or virtue” (GM, II.4, 113[III, 
328-329]). This is the context of the above quote which put us in such a quandary. 
 The maxim, which Rousseau mentioned, referred to the acts of civility which 
law cannot require of us. The conditions for civility are the freedom from fear and the 




civility from fellow citizens to all men is based on flawed imagination. This inference 
is based on neglecting the prior fact that civility was supposed to serve the great st 
good of one’s own society, possibly to the detriment of other societies. Moreover, 
civility is necessary in every society because not every action benefiting the common 
good can be regulated by positive laws. Every society therefore relies on having 
citizens who truly prefer the pursuit of the common good, even to their own 
prejudice. This can also be expressed differently. Rousseau writes that “if te law 
cannot be unjust, it is not because it has justice as its basis, which might not always 
be true; but because it is against nature to want to injure oneself; which is [true] 
without exception” (GM, II.4, 113[III, 329]). This, however, implies that any act of 
fighting for one’s country would be against nature. A society therefore relies on 
citizens who will imagine that the common good is also their good.  
 The primacy of law over justice implies that the Christian principle of “do 
unto others as we would wish to be done unto” (ibid.) is a secondary consideration 
over cuique suum or to each his own. The primary rule is cuique suum because 
private property and civil freedom are the “foundations of the community” (GM, II.4, 
114[III, 330]). Here again one needs to recall the Second Discourse. The first rule of 
justice had been: “to give each his own everyone must be able to have something. The 
more men began to look toward what was to come, and seeing that everyone had 
something to loose there was nobody who did not have to fear the retribution for the 
wrongs which he might do to others” (SD, 50[III, 173]). The argument of the Geneva 




both essays Rousseau rejects the Christian golden rule in favor of the golden rule of 
natural right. 
In other words, in case of conflict among men, it is everyone’s right and duty 
to defend what is his; and only when those needs are satisfied to follow the Christian 
golden rule. It is only the experience of ownership and political participation which 
gives men a sense of justice. There is therefore no doubt that Rousseau rejected the 
idea of a justice which somehow preceded civil society. Justice is based on the prior 
injustice of “marking off land” for oneself and declaring it one’s own (SD, 43[III, 
164]). Moreover, men experience civility and virtue as something good, but it is 
based on a deracination and redirection of their natural selfishness. This 
transformation is necessary for the functioning of society and for the civility which 
can prevail among men in general. However, both the deracination and the civility 
toward strangers have their limits in the happiness of the individual.  
An important consideration with regard to international relations, however, is 
the importance of citizenship for dealing with strangers. The people, in particular he 
Christian people, are much more benevolent or civil toward strangers than the 
Ancient Greeks or Romans (GM, I.2). Due to the influence of “love thy neighbor as 
thyself” it is possible for Christian citizens to take the experience of their society and 
to extend to others. This was not always so. “The healthy ideas of natural right and of 
the common brotherhood of all men spread rather late and made such slow progress 
in the world that it was only Christianity which generalized them sufficiently (GM, 
81[III, 287]). As Rousseau writes, in this regard Christianity is more “natural” th n 




which these societies disregarded. It is for that reason that Hobbes was wrong because 
he mistakenly assumed that the political relations among the ancients accurately 
characterized men. Instead from Rousseau’s perspective, Hobbes should have gone 
back even further in time to the entirely non-human beginnings of the human species. 
Similarly, Rousseau takes up this question in Social Contract IV.8 where he 
concludes as well as that the ancients were much more brutal than the moderns. In the 
same passage of the Social Contract Rousseau praises Christianity’s great benefit of 
perpetuating the sentiment of compassion, which was necessary to moderate relations 
among men.  
Another important question is whether the natural right is equivalent to the 
law of nations. In the above quote, Rousseau used the term right of nations (droit de 
gens) synonymously with the right of nature. In the S cond Discourse, this is the only 
occurrence of the term “right of nations.” The relations among sovereign states or 
powers, as Rousseau calls them in the Social Contract (I.6, 139[III, 361]), are 
characterized by a hierarchy based on their strength, by each state’s right to self-
preservation, and of everyone’s right to judge which means are best to achieve their 
self-preservation. 
 If one recalls Rousseau’s outline of the topics which he would cover in his 
treatment of foreign relations, he had subsumed under the heading of right of nations 
the rules of international trade, the right of war and conquest, and the public right, 
covering confederations, treaties, and negotiations (E, V, 466-67). If one contrasts 
this with his remarks in the Second Discourse, one has to come to the conclusion that 




same systematic treatment as the principles of political right. They cannot be subject 
to this because they are based on the constantly changing interests of men or stat s
and not founded on the knowledge of the nature of man (SC, II.10). One gets a similar 
impression from the essay The State of War: 
As for what is commonly called the right of nations, it is certain hat, 
for want of sanction, its laws are nothing but chimeras even weaker 
than the law of nature. This latter at least speaks to the heart of 
individuals, whereas the right of nations, having no other guarantee 
than its utility to the one who submits to it, its decisions are respected 
only as long as self-interest confirms them (62[III, 610]).  
 
As Rousseau clearly states, the right of nations is based on self-interest and utility, 
and the self-interest changes with the conditions. In that case, whenever self-inter st 
changes, the laws of the right of nations which are opposed to self-interest will be
abandoned, without anyone having the power to enforce the previous laws. Self-
interest is an insufficient guarantee for the adherence to self-imposed laws.  
 
4.4 The Law of War 
The above discussion has shown that Rousseau rejected the notion of a normative 
natural law which would provide a transcendent standard of justice for the judgments 
of political actions. This led to the conclusion that the actions of states in foreign 
affairs are not limited by a standard above the state. Furthermore, there are seemingly 
no universal standards based on a law of nations. There only seems to be the right of 
the stronger as the effective principle in international affairs. The contemporary 
interpretations of Kenneth Waltz or Stanley Hoffmann in portraying Rousseau as a 
proponent of Machiavellian foreign policy seem therefore justified (Carter 1987, 210, 




related to the most extreme case – war. Rousseau attempts to derive principles of the 
right of war (CC V, Letter to Rey, March 9, 1758, 50-51) from “the nature of things” 
(SC, I.4, 136[III, 357]).64 What Rousseau means by this is to base his principles of the 
right of war on the conventional character of the state.  
The first possibility to derive a limitation of the state’s foreign policy could be 
based on the sovereignty of the people. In the Social Contract, Rousseau made clear 
that the sovereign, i.e. the people, do not participate in foreign-policy making (SC, 
II.6). The participation of the people, in Rousseau’s case male citizens of a certain
age and wealth, is restricted to law-making. Law-making in turn is defined as the 
activity where all citizens consider themselves as a whole and agree on passi g a law 
which will apply to all. Law-making can therefore take place where these two 
entities, the people as citizen law-makers and citizen subjects, exist. As a vital area of 
policy-making, however, foreign affairs are outside the realm of legitimate law-
making power. Furthermore, the citizens are not directly affected by foreign policy.  
Therefore, foreign policy is made by the government without necessarily 
having to consult the people. One must recall here that one of Rousseau’s most 
memorable contributions to political theory was his clear distinction between the 
sovereign and the government (SC, III.1). While previous thinkers had usually 
equated the two, Rousseau argued that the sovereignty was inalienably the people’s
sovereignty. Yet, the practical impossibility of governing  themselves truly 
democratically, i.e. to achieve a unity between the sovereign and the government, 
made it necessary to derive government from the people. One can find practical 
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examples of this in modern democracies’ use of the terms “administration” (US) or 
“chancellor” (Germany) for the government, implying that they are only carrying out 
the people’s will. However, foreign policy deals most importantly with matters of 
survival and independence. They are therefore of utmost importance to the citizens 
and should concern them. But Rousseau excludes the citizens from any involvement 
in them.  
This raises the difficulty of controlling the government in matters of foreign 
policy. Rousseau recognizes that the people’s sovereignty does not reach beyond its 
border. He also recognizes that the government might use its control over foreign 
affairs to extend its power domestically (JPPP, 54[III, 592]). Rousseau’s references 
to foreign affairs fulfill partially the purpose of deliberating supra-natio l institutions 
which would fulfill the function of limiting the government in international affairs.65 
Rousseau addresses the question of what he understand by the state of war 
most extensively in two sections of his unfinished essay “The State of War.” The 
essay was written while he was working on his Political Institutions between 1756 
and 1758. Parts of this essay were eventually used in the Social Contract, mostly in 
book I, chapter 4. The fragment containing this essay was found only in 1965 and 
published in 1967 by Bernard Gagnebin.66 At first, it appeared to contain only loosely 
related fragments regarding various themes mentioned in the Social Contract, but 
Grace Roosevelt (1990, 15-16) showed that by refolding two of the three pages of the 
manuscript in the opposite direction than had been usually done, the different 
fragments actually formed a continuous whole. Now, the text begins with “I open my 
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books about rights and morals” instead of the version included in the Pléiade edition, 
which begins with “But…”In addition to the new ordering of the manuscript, the 
Geneva fragment discovered by Gagnebin now can be logically included into the 
larger essay by inserting it before the page beginning with “these examples…” This 
reconstruction of the essay has since become the accepted version, for example for 
the new edition of the Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. 11.  
Rousseau had entitled the essay That the State of War Arises from the Social 
State, but later crossed it out. The current title originates with C.E. Vaughan.67 It 
contains four additional sections, entitled by Rousseau, Of the Social State, The 
General Idea of War between One State and Another, What the State of War Is, and 
Fundamental Distinctions. The last three sections are of primary interest b cause they 
relate directly to the limitations of warfare. 
In these sections of The State of War, Rousseau elaborates further on the 
foundation and limits of the state of war. He goes beyond his treatment of the state of
war in the Second Discourse, primarily because the focus of the S cond Discourse 
was to present the decline of the human species. In the essay The State of War, 
however, Rousseau tries to show how the same conditions can lead to progress and to 
an amelioration of the state of war. Ultimately, however, Rousseau is unsuccessf l in 
his attempt to moderate the state of war. 
 The most important aspect of Rousseau’s definition of the state of war is his 
claim that the state of war only exists among sovereign states, and that it 
consequently cannot exist among individuals.  
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Rousseau distinguishes three kinds of states for men: the first being peace 
properly so-called, a state between war and peace, and the state of war. Peace, in 
Rousseau’s conception, comes close to being a perfect state of being. “It [this sweet 
word peace] conveys to the soul the fullness of sentiment that makes us love at once 
our own and other people’s existence” (SW, 70[III, 1902]). As Rousseau says at the 
end of the paragraph, this peace is realized only in the mind of God. “The constitution 
of this universe does not allow for all the sentient beings that make it up to concur all 
at once in their mutual happiness” (ibid.). Rousseau says here as clearly as possible 
that peace cannot be attained. First of all, because one would have to reach a god-like 
state which is only reachable for very few men, if any at all, as Rousseau pointed out 
in the Second Discourse when referring to the “few cosmopolitan souls who are able 
to transcend the borders of the world” (54[III, 178]). Furthermore, peace cannot be 
attained because happiness is a relative sentiment for most men and therefore cause 
for strife. 
Yet, Rousseau argues that the disturbance or imperfection of peace does not 
lead to war. It is by nature impossible that all beings achieve happiness. Injustice and 
the disturbance of peace are inevitable. For most men, most of the time, only two 
states are possible, and these are either a time of “discord, quarrels, sometimes fights” 
or, by becoming part of a political society, a state of war.68 The state of war is defined 
as: “the effect of a mutual, steady and manifest disposition to destroy the enemy 
State, or at least to weaken it, by all means possible. This disposition reduced to 
                                                
68 Rousseau clarifies in this context that the content of the law of nature, which results in each being 
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actions is war properly so called; so long as it remains without consequences, it 
remains nothing but the state of war” (SW, 72[III, 607]). 
The difference between the state of war and the state of quarrels and discord 
must be that:  
war is a permanent state which presupposes lasting relations, and uch 
relations rarely obtain between man and man, where everything between 
one individual and another is in continual flux which constantly changes 
relations and interests. So that the subject of a dispute arises and 
disappears almost instantaneously, a quarrel being and ends in a single 
day, and there may be fights and murders, but never or very rarely 
extended enmities and war (SW, 65[III, 602], also SC, I.4).  
 
The difference between the two states hinges on the presence of self-possession and 
reason. By self-possession, Rousseau refers to the “lasting relations,” or property, 
which are the condition to sustain any war. Furthermore, Rousseau calls the state, 
which is build on property, a moral being or being of reason (SW, 73[III, 608]). This 
means that the state depends on the permanent will of its members to consider 
themselves as a whole with regard to their mutual self-preservation. Therefore, the 
state of war cannot exist among men who are either not endowed with reason or 
property.  
As soon as two sides believe that either one’s existence is incompatible with 
one’s well-being, the state of war exists, even if that state does not manifest itself in 
actions (SW, 71-72[III, 1904]). Rousseau distinguishes here “waging war,” i.e. 
continuous manifest hostilities, from “the state of war,” in which the actions are 
absent even though the intentions of both states for the mutual destruction persist 
(SW, 72[III, 1904]). This resembles what became known in the 20th century as a “cold 




armistice, the peace of God” (ibid.). In order to be able to distinguish between the two 
states one would first have to know the intentions of the states in order to determine 
whether they are in a state of war or in the state previously described as a state of
discord.  
Among the three different types of relations, Rousseau had made it clear that 
the state of war only applies to states. Some have argued that Rousseau seriously 
considered the possibility of peace treaties among states as a way out of the state of 
war.69 However, from his argument it appears that every political society is 
necessarily in a state of war with all other political societies. In order for political 
societies to exist in a state of discord instead of in a state of war, they would regar
another state as not influencing either their own well-being or their self-preservation. 
This is imaginable as one could say that there was no state of war between France and 
China prior to the 18th century. As soon as there are relations among states which can 
potentially affect one another’s happiness, the states are in a state of war. One might 
ask about alliances. But in this understanding alliances are merely a truce against  
more dangerous opponent and do not properly constitute a state in which hostilities 
have become impossible. 
Rousseau does not make this distinction as clear as he might have, either 
because the essay is incomplete or because he intentionally did not want to emphasize 
the fundamental condition among states. He illustrates his view of the impossibility of 
peace treaties, by showing that a peace treaty would only be evidence that “the other 
has ceased to threaten his life” and therefore each state “could not or should not cease 
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defending it at the expense of the other’s life” (SW, 71[III, 1903]). The state of war is 
further characterized by making “preparations, accumulate weapons, materials for a 
siege” (SW, 71[III, 1904]). And lastly, the “overt manifestations of ill-will which 
signal the intentions to harm, such as denying a power the titles that are its du , 
ignoring its rights, rejecting its claims, depriving its subjects of the fre dom to trade, 
stirring up enemies against it” (SW, 72[III, 606]). One sees, that practically speaking 
the state of war exists among almost all countries, unless the state has no necessary 
relations with any other state. Another kind of peace is created through peace treaties 
which end open warfare and either require or prohibit other forms of warfare. 
However, this kind of peace is only a superficial peace. 
After the meaning of the state of war has been clarified, Rousseau derives 
some surprising consequences from it. Most importantly, the state of war is a state
which does not require violence at all, contrary to a common understanding of the 
term. Because the state of war is a relation between states, the aim of the state is to 
destroy the opposing state’s principle, which is its general will.  
The principle of life of the body politic and, so to speak, the heart of 
the state, is the social pact which, as soon as it is injured, causes the 
State instantly to die, collapse and be dissolved; but this pact is no a 
charter on parchment which can be destroyed simply by being torn up; 
it is inscribed in the general will, and that is where it is not easily 
annulled (SW, 69[III, 1900]). 
  
This makes a direct attack on the social contract impossible. One can only indirectly 
attack the social contract through its embodiments, in the “government, the laws, 
morals, goods, possessions, men” (ibid.).  At the end of the essay, Rousseau writes: 




and all that results from it; for that is all the essence of the State consists i ” (SW, 
73[III, 608]).  
As the general will comes into being only by accident, the conclusion is that 
the state of war is essentially non-material or spiritual. The aim of every war is to 
destroy the opponent’s will to fight. Rousseau’s understanding of the areas in which 
war takes place is therefore much greater than a contemporary common 
understanding of war. If violence is only incidental to war, but does not express its 
essence, the question is raised how this close connection between violence and war 
has been made. One might object to Rousseau’s definition that violence fulfills an 
important function in war nonetheless. For once, it deprives the enemy directly of the 
use of some of the embodiments of the general will. Among the five different ways to 
attack an enemy, Rousseau first enumerates financial contributions, seizingland, or 
moving populations, i.e. referring to goods, possessions, and men. These three means 
of warfare are the most obvious kind of warfare. They attack the material basis of the 
state.  
As a means towards the ultimate aim of destroying the enemy state, it is 
therefore most important to attack the citizens and their property. However, in 
contrast to the other means, one cannot benefit from it as directly, as one would from 
attacking the material basis of the enemy state. Such an attack elevates one’s own 
material position and has more tangible benefits for one’s population, without, 
however, achieving one’s true goal as closely as if one were to succeed at weakening 




the superior and more effective aims of warfare, more effective than any att ck on 
goods, possessions, or men.  
As we are seeking the limitations of warfare, the current topic leads Rousseau 
to caution against the danger of pursuing material aims in the state of war. This way 
of thinking about one’s advantage “insensibly changes ideas about things, war finally 
degenerates into brigandage, and from enemies and warriors, one little by little turns 
into Tyranny and thieves” (SW, 72[III, 606]). The way in which political bodies are 
being attacked will cause the moral decline of one’s own political body. It is therefore 
paramount that violence is always used for the spiritual aim of destroying one’s 
enemies and not as an end in itself. This also sheds some light on Rousseau’s 
rejection of Montesquieu’s substitution of warfare with commercial competition. 
Commercial competition has the benefit of reducing violence but it has the 
disadvantage of becoming divorced from the higher aim of spiritual warfare and to 
become an end in itself. For Rousseau, as long as violence is an important part of he 
state of war this has the advantage of being used more cautiously than commercial 
warfare and to better prevent the moral decline of men. 
Rousseau’s main point in the last paragraph of the section is to demonstrate 
that the form of government is a central tool for the administration of a vanquished 
enemy. That does not necessarily mean that one would have to change the form of 
government, as sometimes the continuation of the established laws guarantees with 
greater certainty the continued servitude of the defeated. Rousseau mentions the 
Greek republics, Macedonia, Sparta, the Roman Republic, and, implicitly, Persia. By 




as those of Cyrus and Aristodemus. Beginning with the Greek Republics, Rousseau’s 
examples show increasingly more tyrannical examples: first from the Gre k republic 
to the Greek empire, then from the Roman republic to the Roman Empire, and finally 
the examples of two “truly enlightened princes:” Cyrus and the tyrant Aristodemus.  
These examples illustrate a difference in the means employed by various 
regimes to weaken their enemies. The Greek republics weakened their enemies by 
changing their governments. Also the enemies of Sparta removed the laws of Sparta’s 
lawgiver, Lycurgus. Similarly, the Romans left their enemies their laws. In addition, 
they tried to keep their own way of life as purely Roman as possible. When the 
Romans began to change their way of life, Rousseau uses here the example of the 
looting of Syracusan religious art and bringing them to Rome, the Roman republic 
was showing the first signs of a “decadence of Roman morals” (SW, 70[III, 1901]).70 
The last example, that of Cyrus and the tyrant Aristodemus, who either left an 
effeminate manner of life in place or established it, further illustrates the use of 
morals for the extension of empire or in support of domestic rule.  
The first limitation of war could be derived from its status as necessarily 
aiming at a spiritual goal instead of a material one. The means which a state will 
employ depend on its own regime type and therefore do not allow for any absolute 
restrictions. Yet, Rousseau explicitly warns that the means should never become the 
ends because it will indicate one’s own decline. War carries risks which go farther 
than the loss of men or land. Instead, the greatest danger of war is a decline to 
tyranny. The main consequence is that war does not necessarily take place on the 
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material plane. In fact, the more important conflict takes place on the spiritual plane. 
This in turn implies a preference for non-material warfare simply becaus the e 
techniques might be a more effective means to harm one’s enemies. While some 
might be discontent that these seem like very minor limitations on warfare, Rousseau 
nevertheless maintains a clear hierarchy of ends and means and therefore provides a 
standard by which to judge a state’s actions.  
Another implication of Rousseau’s definition as a state between sovereign 
states is that this allows him to make a distinction between the fighting and the on-
fighting part of each state’s population. Rousseau introduces here a well-known 
distinction between combatants and civilians. This distinction also extends to civilian 
property and state property (SC, I.4). Therefore, the sovereign does damage and the 
state receives it, as Rousseau specified in his definition of war. The surprising 
consequence is that war is never directed at men, and “one can wage it without 
depriving anyone of his life” (SW, 73[III, 608]).  
The distinction between combatants and civilians also implies that the 
termination of hostilities does not give the victorious party any right to kill the enemy 
combatants or take away their property. As soon as an enemy combatant surrenders, 
the victorious party ceases to have any rights over him and must treat him as they 
would normally treat a civilian foreigner in their country. It follows that without a 
right to kill a surrendered enemy, the victorious state also has no right to enslave the 
enemy.  
In this sense, one does find in Rousseau a limitation of warfare. By showing 




one might restrict the state of war to non-violent warfare, i.e. to what we would call 
today propaganda. As Rousseau has shown, it is more important to change the 
enemy’s government, laws, and morals than to plunder, pillage, and kill him. 
Furthermore, the danger is that during hostilities one looses sight of the primary goal 
and the hostilities become an end in themselves.  
Yet, it has been remarked (Hassner 1997, Asbach 2002, 254-256) that 
Rousseau’s critique of warfare is fraught with contradictions. First of all, the 
distinction between combatants and civilians collapses in the case of republics. As 
Rousseau writes in a fragment on war: “All citizens are soldiers in times of war, and 
there are no soldiers in times of peace” (75[III, 614]). Even if there are times of 
peace, which one can reasonably doubt that there ever are times of peace, it raises the 
difficulty that in times of war every citizen becomes a legitimate target for the enemy. 
In fact, Rousseau suggested precisely this consequence in the Emile (I, 39; also see 
note 2). Therefore, the law of war distinguishing between civilians and combatants 
assumes that the war is being fought for anything but survival. In the case of a war of 
survival, the laws of war are likely to be violated, as Rousseau knew. However, in the 
case of a war for anything else, the generally accepted notion of a law of war would 
prevent excesses from taking place. Still, as Rousseau suggested that the only 
legitimate aim of war was survival, the law of war is necessarily of only minor 
importance. 
Furthermore, a second contradiction derives from the prohibition of ending 
war without being able to kill, enslave, or plunder the enemy or his property. The 




goal of annihilating an enemy whose existence it had deemed to be incompatible with 
its own? Rousseau answers that from the perspective of right, the victor is prohibited 
from violating the natural freedom of the defeated. Therefore, the defeated enemy 
cannot be harmed. On the other side, can one really speak about victory if the 
defeated enemy returns to his home in order to quickly take up hostilities again?  
This question was raised by Rousseau in a different form in the Second 
Discourse and in the Social Contract. In both works, the answer was that not 
violence, but only fraud, would be effective to bring about a change in the relations 
between the people. Indeed, Rousseau points here to the difficulty encountered by any 
republic in war. In order to win the war, a republic has to act according to principles 
which are alien to its constitution. Here we encounter again the difficulty which we 
arose in chapter two. On the one hand, the republic is founded on the principle of 
freedom and equality. On the other hand, however, international relations or the state 
of war is based on the principle of self-preservation. A republic can only sustain itelf 
if it is capable of winning wars without violating its own principles of freedom and 
equality. Therefore, the challenge is to win the war while leaving the defeated st  in 
freedom.71 
However, this critique of Rousseau overlooks the true importance of the 
“declaration of war.” Rousseau’s explicit aim, as he expresses it, is to transfo m the 
natural state of war into a legitimate of state of war, which he hopes to achieve 
through the declaration of war.  
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Since according to me the state of war is natural between powers, hy 
need the disposition from which war results be manifest? To this I 
answer that previously I spoke of the natural state, that here I speak of 
the legitimate state, and that in the sequel I will show how, in order to 
make it legitimate, war requires a declaration (SW, 72[III, 606]). 
 
The transformation from the state of war to a legitimate state of war is the same 
transformation which occurs in the Second Discourse and in the Social Contract. In 
the Second Discourse, the state of war is transformed into a state of slavery. In the 
Social Contract, Rousseau argues that he cannot make men free but he can make their 
state legitimate. As the above examples have shown, Rousseau’s understanding of 
war implied that the most important task would be to prevent war from becoming 
detached from is aim, i.e., the destruction of one’s enemy, and instead be about 
acquisition of material goods. For this purpose, it became necessary to exert control 
over a state’s government. If a government were to pursue war for its own benefit or 
for the wrong aims then one could speak about the government being a tyranny or a 
government of thieves. Therefore, the only way to make war legitimate is for the 
people to have some control over their government. As Rousseau explains in the 
Social Contract, the declaration of war is not so much aimed at the enemy but rather 
to signal to one’s own people that hostilities are being undertaken and that the people 
need to be cautious (I.4). This means that the declaration forces the government to 
state the reasons for opening hostilities publicly and therefore provides at leat a
minimum of control over the government’s actions. Ultimately, one can say that the 
state of war is made legitimate by Rousseau’s Social Contract. The standard by which 




Rousseau illustrates how he intended to transform the state of war into a 
legitimate state of war by giving an example of the treatment of Helots, the perpetual 
slaves of Spartans. In this example, the Spartans declared war every year on the 
Helots in order justify the treatment of them and to remind the Helots that they owed 
them their service because they had been beaten in battle. According to this example, 
it is obviously not enough to declare war to legitimize it. For Rousseau this 
declaration was superfluous because the relationship as master and slaves continued 
the state of war. This implies that the social contract is the only solution to the state of 
war, because it ends the state of war within society. Otherwise, as long as there are 
masters and slaves, the state of war continues, even within society. The declaration of 
war by an illegitimate state leads only to the justification of unjust rule, be that the 
rule of the stronger, monarchy (patriarchal rule), etc. Finally, this example of slavery 
takes up the point of paragraph 14, in which Rousseau had criticized Hobbes’ notion 
of the state of war being natural. Instead, Rousseau had argued that not destruction 
but slavery would be the aim in the state of war. “Instead of massacring them all, he 
will put them all in chains, in order at least to have Slaves”(SW, 61[III, 601]). With 
the First Discourse and the Social Contract in mind, i.e. that slavery is a fact and that 
one can only, with the help of the arts and sciences, legitimize it, one wonders how 
the slavery of the Helots could be made legitimate. Apparently not with a declaration 
of war as the Spartans had done. A different declaration of war is needed, which 
Rousseau provides with the Social Contract.  
 In criticizing Rousseau, Asbach (2002) and Hassner (1997) forget this 




legitimate government would be much more bound in its foreign policies if it derived 
its power from the people alone. Further, as remarked above, Rousseau had no 
illusions about the extent and cruelty of republican warfare (E, I, 248n2). Asbach 
(2002, 255) pointed to this passage but did not question his own interpretation. 
Moreover, the injection that the distinction between citizens and soldiers would 
become difficult is also not a serious objection. Rousseau was careful to identify the 
citizens as the potential fighting part of the republic, which excluded women and 
children. This objection seems to be more motivated by a look at contemporary 
regimes and their extension of citizenship to almost everyone older than eighteen. 
Therefore, the limitations of Rousseau’s state of war could very well be upheld. 
  
4.5. Conclusion 
The question of this chapter was whether Rousseau admitted any standards by which 
the actions of the state would be limited in international affairs. For this purpose, 
natural law, international law, and the law of war were suggested as potential limi s of 
the modern state. As was shown, none of these laws could provide an effective 
standard by which to judge a state’s foreign affairs. Rousseau tried to ensure the 
sovereignty of each state by avoiding the formulation of any concrete standard by 
which to measure a state’s actions. Fundamentally, international relations can be 
characterized by the law of the stronger. Every state is like a “violent reasoner” who 
sees no reason to be just.  
In the Geneva Manuscript, Rousseau announces that the purpose of the Social 




his anti-social position and become a virtuous citizen. That this is indeed the intention 
of the Social Contract can be gleaned from Rousseau’s opening paragraphs:  
I want to inquire whether in the civil order there can be some 
legitimate and sure rule of administration, taking men as they are, and 
the laws as they might be: In this inquiry I shall try always to combine 
what right permits with what interest prescribes, so that justice and 
utility may not be disjoined (I.intro, 131[III, 352]). 
  
Here Rousseau says concisely what he said in so many words in book I, chapter 2 of 
the Geneva Manuscript.72 
Rousseau, however, never does anything comparable for the great violent 
reasoners of the world, the sovereign states. We might find the reason for this 
omission in the failure of the Social Contract o achieve its goal. Despite his best 
efforts, Rousseau concluded that the Social Contract is insufficient to convince or 
persuade the “violent reasoner.” The Social Contract, i.e. Rousseau’s new 
formulation of the idea of a social contract, might be enough to convince those who 
are already decent men, but it is incapable of convincing those ambitious men who 
seek first and foremost their own glory. For them, it is necessary to have recours  to a 
semi-divine legislator and a civil religion. Both additional devices are necssary to 
prevent most ambitious men to seek their own good at the cost of everyone else. With 
these additional requirements in place, one sees why Rousseau thought that it would 
exceed his powers to restrain sovereign states as he had tried to restrain individual 
men. One would need a legislator powerful enough to convince all of mankind and a 
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civil religion universally accepted for a peaceful world-state to be created. Rousseau 
strongly doubted that such a legislator could ever exist. 
Yet, the Social Contract also shows that the “violent reasoners” of the world 
are restrained by past lawgivers and religions. Regardless of their truth, they all share 
a number of structural features which allows them to maintain political order. Th  
best regime is the one most capable of maintaining the rule of law. This is to say that 
Rousseau puts forth a regime which is held to be universally the best and which 
provides the standard by which to measure all other regimes. In the absence of a 
natural law, Rousseau introduces a new universal standard to which every regime 
should aspire. One might call this a law of reason. The law of reason stands in 
opposition to natural right. 
This explains the confusing spectacle of the law of war. The first approach t 
understand Rousseau’s law of war begins by rejecting any external standard by which 
to judge a state’s foreign policy or conduct with regard to war. The foreign policy of 
illegitimate as well as legitimate regimes alike does not allow for an outside or 
objective judgment using the categories of good or bad. Instead, the winner or the 
stronger has right on its side. The second approach, however, looks at the law of war 
from the perspective of the legitimate regime. Instead of being neutral with regard to 
external affairs, a state’s foreign policy can now be judged by its conformity to the 
standards of legitimacy and political right. If one looks at the three categories of the 
law of war, i.e., the ius ad bellum, ius in bello, and the ius post bellum,73 one sees in 
the first case that the distinction between just and unjust war becomes possible. An 
illegitimate regime, for example, can engage in a just war only if it is in self-defense. 
                                                




All other wars are unjust because these wars are made for the benefit of their 
government instead of being for the benefit of the country. On the other hand, a 
legitimate regime can make a just war. As it was the will of the people to make war, 
and they make war only if their self-preservation or well-being is threaten d, their 
wars will be, by definition, just.74  
Similarly, the conduct in and after war will be influenced by the legitimacy of 
the regime. A legitimate regime will distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants, it will treat the defeated soldiers as regular civilians once they lay down 
their weapons, and it will refrain from taking any property away from the defeated 
enemy. Among the means of warfare, the legitimate regime prefers non-viole t 
means because they attack the enemy more directly. More directly means here that it 
attacks the enemy’s social contract, the enemy’s hearts and minds, instead of the 
enemy’s property. If violence is used, it will be strictly in the service of the spiritual 
aim of warfare. “War confers no right that is not necessary to its end” (SC, I.4, 
136[III, 358]). Any unnecessary violence will be avoided. On the other hand, an 
illegitimate regime will observe neither of these limitations. Instead, illegitimate 
regimes will engage in warfare in order to acquire property instead of aiming to 
destroy the enemy out of necessity.  
The most difficult case is conquest. From the perspective of the legitimate 
regime, conquest is impossible because two different principles collide. On the one 
side, a legitimate state might have engaged in warfare and won the war. However, 
after the conclusion of war the legitimate state is incapable of using the vic ory to its 
                                                
74 This does not mean that a corruption of the lawmaking-process could not lead a people to wrongly 




advantage because it has acquired no rights over the property or the inhabitants of the 
vanquished. While this is certainly another incentive to avoid warfare, it seems 
difficult to avoid in practice. The law of war is therefore an ideal which can never b  
reached. 
Consequently, the law of war becomes subject to the same restrictions as the 
Social Contract as a whole. While it exercises an influence over most people, it is not 
by itself capable of restraining ambitious men. However, as the Social Contract gives 
voice to a standard which most men will find easy to accept, and at the same time 
makes it mandatory for them to participate in lawmaking, they will outnumber the 
few ambitious or “violent reasoners.” For many domestic matters this structure is 
satisfactory and more stable than alternative regimes. However, in foreign affairs the 
high standards of the many might be insufficient to ensure prudent action. Rousseau 
therefore separates the actual foreign policy making from the people, while at th  
same time restraining the government through the standards which the people hold 
about foreign policy. The law of war as formulated in the Social Contract provides a 
standard for the people to judge their government. It provides a standard from the 
perspective of the city. Therefore, any violation of it by the government, which might
very well be necessary, always risks to undermine its own power. Then it becomes a 
question whether the people can limit the government or if the government will usurp 
the power given to it by the people. Any violation of these standards implies a 
violation of the principles of political right and therefore of the principles on which 




It was demonstrated in this chapter that neither natural law nor international 
law could provide an effective standard for the limitation or abolition of war. 
Furthermore, the laws of war express prudential maxims of international politics. The 
incompleteness of the Social Contract is therefore due to the international structure 
constituted by the Social Contract itself. Yet, Rousseau argued in the Social Contract 
and in the Emile that confederations, could alternatively maintain peace among 





C h a p t e r  5  
“IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IT EXIST:” JEAN-JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU AND THE PLAN FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In the following I will show that Rousseau argues in the Abstract of Monsieur the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace nd the Judgment of the Plan for 
Perpetual Peace that reason is an insufficient foundation for cooperation among 
nations. Instead, Rousseau suggests that the appeal to compassion might hold out the 
promise for more peaceful international relations. First, I show that most interpreters 
have misunderstood Rousseau’s essays because they chose either the Abstract or the 
Judgment o represent Rousseau’s true opinion. Second, I demonstrate how Rousseau 
argues for confederations in the essays and how he argues against confederations. The 
arguments for and against confederations are developed throughout both essays. 
Finally, I suggest that the importance of the Writings on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre 
results from Rousseau’s attempt to moderate “princes” by creating new ideals.  
The chapter takes Niccolò Machiavelli’s fundamental change of political 
philosophy as its background. As Leo Strauss argued in Natural Right and History, 
Rousseau attempted a return to ancient political philosophy on the basis of modern 
political philosophy. According to Strauss (1953, 178), Machiavelli is the first 
modern philosopher and it is therefore Machiavelli who supplies the basis on which 




strikingly different topics each philosopher chose. Violence, weapons, conquest, 
sieges – warfare in general – are central topics for Machiavelli whie they are 
peripheral issues for Rousseau. Rousseau instead chose more uplifting issues, 
especially if one considers his most popular book, the Juli  or New Heloise. If 
Strauss’ argument is correct it would imply that the main reason for the disappear nce 
of the language of warfare in Rousseau’s work and, in the language of most moderns, 
is due to Machiavelli’s victory on this matter. The “new modes and orders” carried 
the day and all modern political philosophy became a footnote to Machiavelli. The 
language of warfare became largely unnecessary. Furthermore, the primary or most 
basic audience of modern political philosophy became increasingly democratic; and, 
for the demos, the language of warfare might be unfamiliar or repulsive.  
Instead of the language of warfare, the moderns following Machiavelli will 
speak a language which deals with civil war at most. It possibly becomes a language 
of civil war or revolution because the conflicts are among Machiavelli’s followers 
and not with his fundamental opponents. After Machiavelli’s revelation of the “force 
and fraud endemic to political rule and especially to its founding” many of his 
successors try to moderate his teaching (Lynch 2003, xxv). One attempt to moderate 
Machiavelli is made by John Locke and Montesquieu and their suggestion of a 
commercial republic.75 Another attempt is made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau who 
sought to recover the “imagined republics and principalities” which Machiavelli had 
sought to abandon (Prince, XV). I will show in the following essay how, in his 
writings on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace, Rousseau suggested 
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that Machiavelli’s “captains” should be moderated by popularizing the use of 
appropriate “imagined republics.” This will confirm Strauss’ argument that Rousseau 
was in decisive questions a follower of Machiavelli. 
In his Judgment of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace 
Rousseau makes a puzzling remark. “At first the Abbé de St. Pierre’s work on 
perpetual peace appears useless for producing it and superfluous for preserving it; 
thus some impatient Reader will say it is a vain speculation. No, it is a solid and well 
thought out book, and it is important that it exist” (53[III, 592]). The argument 
Rousseau discusses here is that the plan for perpetual peace describes an ideal state of 
European confederation, which would certainly continue if such perfection could 
come into being.76 But such perfection would not be in need of the institutions 
described by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. The alleged “uselessness for producing it” 
results from the false assumptions about the nature of “princes” underlying the plan 
for perpetual peace. It is for this reason that Rousseau claimed those institutio  
would apparently be “superfluous for preserving” the state of peace.  The puzzle is 
that despite its apparent uselessness and superfluity, due to its disregard for the nature 
of real sovereigns, Rousseau thought the plan for perpetual peace is not “a vain 
speculation,” that it is “solid and well thought out,” and that “it is important that it 
exist.”  
 
                                                




5.2 How to Read the Two Essays 
One obstacle to gaining a clear understanding of Rousseau’s assessment of Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre’s peace plan—and, by extension, of the propriety of confederations for 
ending war—is that Rousseau wrote two separate (and apparently conflicting) essays
on Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s book:  the Abstract of Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s 
Plan for Perpetual Peace and the Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace.  To 
discern what Rousseau really thought, one must first explain why he proceeded in this 
manner.  
One explanation is presented by Rousseau himself in the Confessions and the 
Emile.  In the Confessions, Rousseau argues that his reasons for separating the essays 
into an abstract and a judgment were due to his “obligation to treat the author [Abbé 
de Saint-Pierre] with respect” (C, IX, 355[I, 423]). Therefore, Rousseau decided to 
“present the author’s ideas separately from my [Rousseau’s] own and, in the process, 
to enter fully into his views, to clarify them, to expand them, and to spare no effort in 
demonstrating their true value” (ibid.). Similarly, in the Emile, Rousseau claims that 
“the arguments for have been expounded in the extract from the Abbé’s project; the 
arguments against – at least those which appeared solid to me – are to be found in the 
collection of my writings that follows this extract” (E, V, 467). Taken together theses 
statements suggest that Rousseau summarized the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s work 
accurately in the Abstract, and then balanced this with his own arguments against 
confederations in the Judgment.  
Unfortunately, this explanation is problematic. First of all, Rousseau by his 




Abbé’s original position. Rousseau writes that he expanded the Abbé’s ideas (cf. C, 
IX, 355[I, 423]). The comparisons between the Abbé’s and Rousseau’s position have 
demonstrated that there were substantial differences between the Abbé and Rousseau. 
Most importantly, the Abbé suggested a political science in a purely geometric spirit 
(see Carter 1987, 125-126; Roosevelt 1990; Asbach 2002), i.e. entirely based on 
calculative reason. Rousseau himself remarked on the Abbé’s singular focus on 
providing reasonable solutions to practical problems. “His political works revealed 
only superficial opinions and projects that were useful but impracticable because of 
the mistaken idea, of which the author was never able to divest himself, that men are 
governed by their reason rather than their passion” (C, IX, 354[I, 422]). However, 
Rousseau’s Abstract was also shown to modify the Abbé’s in important respects. 
In addition to his substantive disagreements with the Abbé’s method of getting 
his projects adopted, Rousseau also had good reasons to dissemble the extent of his 
disagreements with the Abbé and consequently the extent to which the essays are his 
works. As Rousseau comments in the Confessions, the Abbé’s projects were 
politically dangerous for Rousseau and had been dangerous to the Abbé. The Abbé 
had lost his seat at the Academie Francaise because of the Polysynodie, the second 
work which Rousseau would abstract and judge, in which the Abbé had argued for 
the “bureaucratization” of every political position in the state, including the 
monarch’s. Rousseau’s claims to present merely summaries of the Abbé’s works are 
therefore prudent claims to protect himself from persecution. But even with this 
additional protection Rousseau still felt that his work of abstracting and judging was 




thought which had offered the Abbé protection from persecution but his status as a 
French member of the clergy and the nobility as well as his ineffectiveness as a 
writer. The Abbé’s manner of writing prevented him from persuading his intended 
audience. Rousseau could lay claim to none of these refuges. 
Furthermore, Rousseau admitted that he sought to “shape …[his own] work in 
such a way as to include in it many important truths, which it would be much better 
should they appear under the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s mantle than under my own” (C, 
IX, 342[I, 408]). This leads to a plausible explanation for why Rousseau modified the 
Abbé’s position so extensively in the Abstract. This made it possible for him to reveal 
the “true value” of the Abbé’s ideas (ibid.), and provided the reasons for Rousseau’s 
assessment that “it is important that it exist” (JPPP, 53[III, 592]). In addition to 
dealing with the Abbé’s politically dangerous ideas Rousseau modified the position 
of the Abbé to such an extent to include in it politically dangerous ideas of his own.  
While Rousseau might have been inspired by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre to write 
about confederations and perpetual peace, one could, together with the original editor 
of Rousseau’s work, Bastide, also assume that Rousseau used the Abbé’s work as an 
external front in order to set forth his own political ideas. “From the simplicity of he 
title it will appear at first to many people that M. Rousseau here has only the merit of 
having made a good abstract. Do not be deceived by this, as here, in many respects, 
the Analyst is the creator” (APPP, Foreword, 26). Similarly, the immediate 18th 
century readers took the Abstract to be Rousseau’s work and addressed their public 
comments to Rousseau directly.  The best known of these early readers were Voltai , 




18th century commentators did not know of Rousseau’s J dgment. However, this does 
not lead to any great difficulties with regard to the establishment of authorship as the 
Judgment is unquestionably Rousseau’s. Their knowledge of the Judgment would 
have possibly led them to revise their criticism of Rousseau, but it does not change 
the fact that they undoubtedly considered Rousseau the author of the Abstract.  
Furthermore, the titles of the Abstract and Judgment indicate that Rousseau 
understood both essays to contribute to a single main argument. If one categorizes 
Rousseau’s writings into either indicating a person or object (e.g. Emileand Julie), a 
genre (Discourse or Dialogues), or an activity (e.g. Confessions), the two titles of the 
Abstract of Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace by J.J. 
Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva and the Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace r  
unique among Rousseau’s writings. As both essays clearly belong together, they refer 
to all three different categories. The Abstract refers to a specific genre and its person 
and object (Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Plan for Perpetual Peace).77 The title of the 
Judgment refers to an activity as well an object. In the case of the title of the Abstract, 
Rousseau emphasizes his passivity with regard to the objects of the essay, i.e. the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre and the plan for perpetual peace. This puts Rousseau in a 
mediating position between the original author and the public on the object of the 
Plan for Perpetual Peace. Rousseau as author of the Abstract remains in the 
background, thereby reducing the distance between the reader and the plan for 
perpetual peace. This impression is confirmed by Rousseau’s comments that he has 
done his “best to put them [the Abbé’s projects] in a condition to be read. It is up to 
                                                




the citizens to read them in the same spirit that dictated them and that abstracted 
them” (Pl., II, 652).  
In the title of the Judgment Rousseau becomes the subjective critic of the Plan 
for Perpetual Peace. In that title, the name of the Abbé disappears indicating that in 
the Judgment Rousseau will speak immediately about the subject of the essay, the 
Plan for Perpetual Peace. Rousseau is not the mediator anymore but one of the judges 
of the plan. “It is up to the public to judge them [the Abbé’s projects]. … Thus my 
judgment is not a rule, but an example. I wish that it might be followed by all my 
readers and that, for the public utility, each might want to state his opinion about it, 
for or against it, as frankly as I have stated mine” (ibid.). Rousseau’s judgment is 
supposed to start the debate and not end it. The Judgment assumes the prior success 
of the Abstract, which was to introduce the readers to confederations as an object 
requiring their attention (C IX, 354-355[I, 421-423]). While Rousseau wants the 
debate to proceed according to reason, he does not want any authority to interfere 
with the reader’s own reasoning about the utility of the Abbé’s projects.  
Rousseau does not decide the question for or against confederations because, 
as he wrote, they are impossible to put into practice; yet their existence in sp ech is 
important. Rousseau speaks to two diverging opinions with regard to confederations 
or perpetual peace. In order to achieve this, the separation of his argument into an 
Abstract and a Judgment is instrumental, as well as the separation between a 
discussion of what is desirable in the Abstract and what is realistic in the Judgment. 
The Judgment assumes that the Abstract successfully described a desirable goal for 




agree with him that peace is a desirable goal. What he has to overcome is their 
skepticism with regard to the possibility of a confederation ever becoming real. 
Therefore, Rousseau’s task is to make the connection for his readers that the desirable 
could be possible by means of a confederation, even if it is very unlikely that it will 
ever become real.  
 
5.3 Rousseau’s Case for Confederations 
Therefore, one has to read the two essays as a whole in order to discern Rousseau’s 
intention. It seems reasonable to begin with Rousseau’s advice and to look at his 
arguments for and against confederation separately. Only after the surface of the 
arguments has been made explicit is it possible to see the deeper layer of Rousseau’s 
argument. Rousseau’s essays are first and foremost a critical review of the Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre’s argument for confederations. Moreover, the essays criticize 
contemporary foreign policy in Europe and the philosophes, like Voltaire, supporting 
it. Rousseau tries to find a middle ground among these three positions. One should 
expect that Rousseau is most amicable toward the Abbé’s position in the Abstract, 
while only carefully hinting at his criticism. In the Judgment, Rousseau is able to 
distance himself from the Abbé’s position, but in his criticism he has to avoid the 
impression of simply agreeing with Voltaire and the European status quo. This leads 
Rousseau to justify the Abbé’s Plan for Perpetual Peace on his own grounds.  
A look at the structure of the argument of the Abstract will illustrate this point. 
The structure of the argument of the Abstract is divided into four parts consisting of a 




central problem, which is the coexistence of the civil state with the state of nature. In 
the second part (APPP, paras. 5-29) a society of European states is described, which 
is defective but perfectible. Thirdly, (APPP, paras. 30-85) the path to perfection, to 
the “real confederation” (APPP, para. 30), is proposed.78  Lastly, (APPP, paras. 86-
87) Rousseau argues that if all involved followed their “true interests” (APPP, para. 
87) then confederations would be established.  
In the first four paragraphs Rousseau lays out his task as well as its 
limitations. He begins with a praise of the plan for perpetual peace: “no greater, finer, 
or more useful Plan has ever occupied the human mind” (APPP, 27[III, 563]) He 
encourages his reader to “[resist] the pleasure of persuasion” (APPP, 28[III, 563]) and 
he begs them to not “deny anything that he [the reader] does not refute” (ibid.).
However, Rousseau indicates that his plan will be based on emotional zeal, opposed 
by reason, will see in the “mind’s eye… the image of felicity that does not exist at 
all,” (ibid.) and will be opposed by readers who are incapable of reasoning but reject 
the plan for perpetual peace anyway. In sum, Rousseau begins with an appeal to his 
readers to give in to compassion and brotherly feelings and then to reason on that 
basis.  
Therefore, Rousseau does not prove that peace among mankind is desirable, 
but he appeals to his readers’ emotions to deliver the proof. Rousseau appeals to those 
emotions of his readers which connect them to their fellow citizens. He puts them in 
the position of extending in their imagination this feeling to all of mankind. In the rest 
of the Abstract Rousseau describes by reasonable arguments how peoples can be 
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united “by bonds similar to those which unite individuals,” eventually enabling 
mankind finally to “equally subject both of them [peoples and individuals] to the 
authority of Laws” (APPP, 28[III, 564]). 
However, the creation of the emotional state is still an insufficient preparation 
for the introduction of the Abbé’s Plan for Perpetual Peace. If he had moved to the 
Plan at this point his readers would have objected that there is no need for such a 
plan, that wars inevitably occur from time to time, that they are necessary to defend 
one’s rights against others, and that war cannot be avoided by human art. Therefore, 
Rousseau must describe a practical problem for which the Plan for Perpetual Peace 
appears to be the only reasonable solution. He makes this argument in paragraphs 5-
29.  
We have already closely analyzed the next argument and this is only a short 
summary of it. Here, Rousseau rejects four possible solutions to the state of war 
among European states - the Christian Empire, balance of power, commerce, and th  
Roman Empire – all of which he finds wanting. Rousseau first establishes that there 
are bonds connecting European peoples, forming a kind of hidden or imaginary 
confederation (APPP, 28-31[III, 564-567]. Among the bonds he mentions, religion is 
the most important, although a common Roman citizenship and Roman civil law are 
part of that tradition as well. Rousseau evokes here the memory of better times when 
Europe was a single whole. This is particularly appropriate for the kind of audience 
he could have expected in France. Of course, Rousseau is far from suggesting that the 
old Roman Empire should be revived, which is indicated by Rousseau’s placement of 




confederation. Instead, Rousseau shows his audience here that there are bonds which 
connect them to their fellow Europeans. This is entirely in line with the emotional 
feeling of brotherhood he had appealed to in paragraph two. Yet, Rousseau must also 
explain why these traditional bonds are insufficient. His answer is that there is no 
“real community of interests, of rights or of dependency” but only of “maxims and 
opinions” (APPP, 31[III, 567]). Therefore, despite everything which connects 
European peoples, the bonds are too weak to prevent war.  
Instead, what prevents war in Europe at the moment is a quasi-natural balance 
of power. “One can say that the political order of this Part of the world is, in certain 
regards, Nature’s work” (APPP, 33[III, 569]). Rousseau quickly asserts that the 
balance of power was not established by anyone; i.e. it is not the work of any nation, 
people, prince, or God. If one accepts that a balance of power exists, one cannot but 
conclude that this state is unsatisfactory. The belief in a balance of power leads on  to 
the conclusion that any war is a pointless exercise because one will, by nature’s force, 
always be thrown back to where one started, and one therefore might as well use 
human art to perfect nature.  
Rousseau suggests that based on the bonds of Europe’s “religion, its morals, 
its customs, and even its laws” one should choose confederations instead of a balance 
of power. (APPP, 31[III, 567]). As the balance of power leads nowhere except to the 
misery of European peoples, one might as well complete those bonds. This recalls the 
beginning of Rousseau’s argument in paragraph four and its conclusion in paragraph 
twenty-nine, in which he argues that European peoples are caught in a mixed state, 




situation has been presented by Rousseau as the imperfect consequences of the 
decline of the two Roman Empires, one secular and one spiritual, the reader is 
prepared to agree with Rousseau that human art could correct this state of affairs. 
For the whole Abstract, these arguments were meant to lead the reader from 
their initial skepticism to the desirability as well as the possibility of a confederation. 
In the following fifty-eight paragraphs Rousseau describes the plan for perpetual 
peace and how it would be advantageous for almost everyone. Beginning with 
paragraph thirty, the confederation is supposed to show that “this great work, begun 
by fortune, can be completed by reason; and how the free and voluntary society 
which unites all the European States, taking on the force and the solidity of a true 
Body politic, can change itself into a real confederation” (APPP, 36[III, 574]) 
Rousseau will show in the remaining half of the Abstract how Europe can be 
transformed by reason. For this purpose, he will first describe which actions and 
institutions are necessary to create a “firm and durable” (ibid.) confederation (paras. 
31-39). Then, Rousseau will argue that the confederation is in the general interest
(paras. 44 to 55) as well as in the particular interest (paras. 56-74) of all European 
states. The three most difficult problems he has to solve are the effects which will 
result from the confederation, “what means are suited for establishing it, and what 
reasonable hope one can have of putting it into execution” (APPP, 37[III, 574]). 
The confederation will be established by signing a treaty which has to include 
five articles. First, the treaty, which has to be irrevocable, will establi h a permanent 
congress of the confederation. The congress will resolve all conflicts among the 




without consent of the other members. The presidency of congress will rotate in fixd 
intervals, and the financial contributions of each member will be established. Thir , 
“the confederation will guarantee to each of its Members the possession and the 
government of all the States it possesses at present, likewise elective or her ditary” 
(APPP, 37[III, 575]). This includes a guarantee of the confederation against domestic 
enemies or uprisings. It further means that the borders of all states are now fixed and 
that there is explicit prohibition on the use of force. Fourth, it stipulates that the 
conditions under which a state can be held to be in violation of treaty and how the 
treaty will be enforced. Lastly, the congress will have lawmaking powers by at least a 
plurality of votes. This is the basic structure of the confederation as Rousseau 
suggested it.  
Rousseau then proceeds to take up the questions of whether the treaty as it was 
just described would be able to secure peace and whether it is possible to establish it 
(APPP, 38[III, 576]). With regard to the first issue, Rousseau wants to show that the 
confederation can effectively establish and secure peace. Here the confederation must 
defend against two essential causes of war: rebellion (paras. 44-49) and ambition. 
Rousseau asserts that the confederation is able to put down rebellions and restrain 
ambitious men (paras. 50-55). Rousseau shows that the confederation secures peace 
by demonstrating that the confederation does not have to fear rebellion (paras. 44-49). 
This means that the institutions of the confederations have sufficient power to 
maintain internal peace. It is an important insight into Rousseau’s view on the 





Furthermore, Rousseau needed to show that a confederation can be 
established. For that purpose, Rousseau tries to show that, according to the “true 
interests” of sovereign states, peace is preferable to war. He takes up six separate 
arguments which sovereigns might make in arguing against perpetual peace. These 
arguments are the advantages of conquests, the subjection of the sovereign to law, the 
danger to border countries, the decline of the military art, and the possibility of 
surprise attacks. Rousseau rejects these arguments, and he makes one argument that 
perpetual peace would increase a sovereign’s wealth because of reduced military 
expenditures. He concludes with a summary of the “inconveniences” of the current 
state (para. 76) and the advantages of the future state (paras. 77-85).  
These are the arguments in favor of confederations. Rousseau has 
demonstrated that Europe could be transformed into a peaceful confederation if a 
supra-national government could be established with a legislature and an executive. 
These institutions would be able to establish peace in Europe by suppressing 
rebellions and thwarting ambitious power. Furthermore, the confederation could be 
established if everyone were convinced to follow their “true interests.” However, 
Rousseau ends the Abstract by doubting that there is much hope that the 
confederation will ever see the light of day (APPP, 48-49[III, 589]). 
 
5.4 Rousseau’s Case Against Confederations 
5.4.1 The Abstract 
In his outline of his discussion of confederations (APPP, 36-37[III, 57]), Rousseau 




the Abstract by highlighting that it is in some important respect incomplete. The Plan 
for Perpetual Peace, despite its apparent rationality, is an impossible plan. The 
reasons must be grounded in either a false assessment of political realities or in a 
flawed argumentation with regard to its necessity, efficacy, or desirability.  
Furthermore, Rousseau had promised in paragraph thirty to solve two 
important problems, i.e. “what means are suited for establishing it [a real 
confederation], and what reasonable hope one can have of putting it into execution” 
(ibid.). Rousseau only addresses the first problem very briefly in paragraph thirty-
two. The monarchs or their negotiators are somehow all overcome at the same time 
by “common sense” to conclude the treaty founding the confederation. That is a 
highly unlikely occurrence and as Rousseau does not address the question at any 
other point, we should conclude that Rousseau wanted to indicate that the founding of 
the confederation remains a massive problem. Voltaire refers to this difficulty in 
particular in his famous criticism of the peace plan (Rousseau 2005, Vol. XI, 50-52).  
The second question of how much hope we can have to see the confederation 
established is answered ambiguously in the last paragraph. Rousseau claims “that the 
establishment of perpetual Peace depends solely on the consent of the Sovereigns” 
(APPP, 48[III, 589]). For the reader this suggests that if the monarchs only desire it 
they could establish peace in Europe. However, Rousseau writes that “this is not to 
say that the Sovereigns will adopt the Plan; (Who can answer for anyone else’s 
reason?) but only that they would adopt it if they consulted their true interests…” 
(ibid.). As Rousseau has repeated twice in the Abstract (35; 48[III, 573; 589]) the true 




“this Plan remains unexecuted, … not because it is chimerical; it is because men are 
insane, and because it is a sort of folly to be wise in the midst of fools” (APPP, 49[III, 
589]). If we recall Rousseau’s comment that the Plan for Perpetual Peace is the 
product of cool reason (cf. APPP, 28[III, 564] and Fragments, 2, 3, 11[III, 658-659]) 
then we understand that the Plan for Perpetual Peace is the reasonable and therefore 
desirable solution to our mixed condition.  
The two arguments against confederations which Rousseau already expressed 
in the Abstract are with regard to the sovereign’s will and the necessary combination 
of force and law. The Plan for Perpetual Peace seeks to remedy the current situation 
in Europe by measures described in paragraph twenty. However, this remedy is “a 
compulsory force…, which orders and concerts its Members’ movements, in order to 
give the common interests and reciprocal engagements the solidity they cannot h ve 
by themselves.” The aim of this is described in paragraph five, which states th  the 
“authority of Laws” should be established above all bysovereigns. This is achieved by 
putting “all its [the confederation’s] Members into such a mutual dependence that 
none might be in a position to resist all the others by itself” (APPP, 36[III, 573]). 
Even though Rousseau at first seems to suggest that the confederation would be the 
result of peaceful negotiations he argues here that it would be established instea by 
combining force and law. As the limitations of the plan for perpetual peace mentioned 
in paragraph three, this again serves to prefigure Rousseau’s judgment of 
confederations.  
Furthermore, as Rousseau admits in paragraph fifty-seven, the establishment 




right of carrying out justice for themselves; that is to say of being unjust when it 
pleases them” (APPP, 42[III, 580]). Of course, it is the essence of the sovereign to be 
above the law. If the sovereign accepted law above himself he would not be sovereign 
anymore. Rousseau expresses his own doubt here very carefully by ridiculing the 
position of the sovereigns. It is the essence of sovereignty as Rousseau understands it 
of being the last arbiter and enforcer of worldly justice. This implies that his critique 
of the sovereigns is moot at this point because the same criticism would apply to the 
confederation. The confederation as well would be “unjust when it pleases [it].” 
Rousseau’s statement is effective because he can count on his audience to have a very 
negative prejudice against monarchs. They forget that a confederation would confront 
them with the same issue. It is in this context that we find Rousseau’s only explicit 
criticism of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Rousseau writes: “I would not dare respond 
along with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre: That the genuine glory of Princes consists i  
procuring the public utility, and their Subjects’ happiness” (APPP, 42[III, 581]). 
Rousseau continues to list the differences between the Abbé’s assumptions about 
sovereigns and Rousseau’s assessment of them. In the Abstract, Rousseau refrains 
from drawing out the consequences from these different assessments. It is only in the 
Judgment where Rousseau takes that additional step.  
Moreover, Rousseau hints at one more difficulty with the Abbé’s argument. In 
paragraphs forty and fifty-six, Rousseau shows that peace is always in the geeral 
interest. However, he also shows that war can be preferable to peace if one pursues 
particular interests. It is therefore much more difficult than we are led to believe in 




Summing it up, in the Abstract Rousseau leaves the question of the founding 
of the confederation unsolved. This suggests, therefore, that one should have little 
hope that the confederation will ever come about. The founding is so difficult because 
it has to be able to put law above the sovereigns. Any sovereign would resist the 
attempts of anyone to take away their natural freedom to judge what is just and unjust 
for themselves. This right could only be taken away by force and fraud, and would 
therefore more likely lead to perpetual war instead of peace. 
 
5.4.2 The Judgment 
In the Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace, Rousseau elaborates on the criticism 
which he had carefully alluded to in the Abstract. The Judgment is about a third of the 
length of the Abstract and consists of twenty paragraphs. The first two paragraphs 
defend the Abbé’s plan, but they raise the concern that the sovereigns will refuse to 
adopt the confederation. Rousseau justifies his criticism in paragraphs 3-14 by 
showing what the political realties of governments are like explaining why this would 
render them highly unlikely to found a confederation. Paragraphs 15-19 deal with the 
Abbé’s main example, Henri IV and his minister Sully, who had earlier suggested a 
peace plan. Rousseau shows that the intentions behind this peace plan were far less 
benign than the Abbé had made his readers believe. Finally, Rousseau concludes that 
for all practical purposes the peace plan should not be pursued. 
The question of “true interests” is the first and main issue in Rousseau’s 
Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace. In the Abstract, Rousseau was inclined to 




While he had already expressed some doubt about this in the Abstract, Rousseau 
made it the focus of his critique in the Judgment. The pursuit of true interests is 
possible if one always acts according to reason and can expect everyone else to act 
according to reason. Otherwise force and fraud are necessary. In the Judgment 
Rousseau demonstrates why true interests are rarely or never pursued. Even though 
true interests would lead to cooperation, they are ignored because it is not the case 
that  
wisdom is equal to their [the sovereigns of Europe’s] ambition and 
that the more strongly they desire their advantage, the better they 
see it; whereas it is the great punishment of the excess of amour-
propre always to have recourse to means that deceive it and the 
very ardor of the passions is almost always what diverts them fro  
their goal (JPPP, 54[III, 592]).  
 
This reminds one of Rousseau’s comment in paragraph four of the Abstract that 
society is not based on reason but passion. 
Furthermore, instead of pursuing their true interest, sovereigns, as well as 
everyone else, will pursue their particular interest. Contrary to what Roussea  had 
suggested, sovereigns cannot simply be assumed to pursue their true interest. Instead, 
they pursue their “apparent interests” (ibid.). It now becomes clear that his discussion 
of the particular utility of perpetual peace was based on an abstraction from personal 
interest, therefore allowing him to make the case that everyone would equally benefit
from peace (cf. JPPP, 53[III, 592]). It also now strikes the eye more directly that 
Rousseau had in the Abstract carefully avoided discussing whether these advantages 
would hold up in the eyes of sovereigns.79 The possibility of sovereigns accepting 
perpetual peace was based on a denial of passion. As society and personal interest are 
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based on passion it is of no importance whether the sovereign is a monarch or a 
people. In contrast to Rousseau’s readers the sovereigns will not be moved by his 
appeals to compassion and brotherhood. This means that the sovereigns would have 
to desire perpetual peace solely based on the reasonable argument set forth in the 
Abstract beginning with paragraph twenty or based on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s 
books. As Rousseau writes in Judgment, it was Henry IV’s life-long plan to establish 
peace with every means available to him, including great armies, whose “same 
establishment [i.e. perpetual peace] … the Abbé de Saint-Pierre claims to do with a 
book” (60[III, 599]).  
In the Judgment Rousseau reintroduces passion or amour-propre as an 
important factor to determine the interests of sovereigns and the possibility of change. 
Rousseau makes an “excess of amour-propre” (JPPP, 54[III, 592]) responsible for 
clouding the sight of sovereigns with regard to their true interest. The main exampl 
for Rousseau is the pursuit of “apparent interests” by kings. “The entire occupation of 
Kings … relates to only two objects, extending their domination abroad and rendering 
it more absolute at home” (JPPP, 54[III, 593]). In recalling the Abstract, Rousseau 
had only once explicitly distanced himself from the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s opinion. It 
was precisely with regard to the Abbé’s characterization of the personal interest of 
“Princes” that Rousseau wrote in paragraph fifty-eight that he “would not dare 
respond along with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre: That the genuine glory consists in 
procuring the public utility…” (APPP, 42[III, 581]). This explicit rejection of the 
Abbé’s opinion at the point in Rousseau’s argument when he was beginning to 




hint at the fact that the Abbé based his confederations on false assumptions about 
sovereigns. But Rousseau does so only after having prefaced it with the caution that 
sovereignty is about being unjust (raison d’etat).  
I would not dare respond along with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre: That 
the genuine glory of Princes consists in procuring the public utility, 
and their Subjects’ happiness; that all their interests are subordinate to 
their reputation; and that the reputation that one acquires among the 
wise is measured by the good one does for men; that, since perpetual 
Peace is the greatest undertaking that has ever been done, it is most 
capable of covering its Author with immortal glory; that, since this 
same undertaking is also most useful for Peoples, it is also the most 
honorable for Sovereigns; above all the only one that is not soiled with 
blood, rapine, tears, curses; and finally that the surest way to 
distinguish oneself in the crowd of Kings is to work for the public 
happiness (APPP, 42[III, 581]). 
 
Not without reason was it that this particular paragraph caused the French 
censors to reject Rousseau’s essay. They saw that Rousseau revealed the monarchy to 
be free from its traditional religious bonds, and he revealed Roman Catholicism to be 
ineffectual in checking the power of kings. This also highlights Rousseau’s arg ment 
in last paragraph of the Abstract where he writes that “we have not at all assumed 
men to be as they ought to be, good, generous, disinterested, and loving the public 
good out of humanity; but as they are, unjust, greedy, and preferring self-interest to 
everything” (APPP, 48-49[589-590]). As this is the first mentioning of this 
assumption it becomes clear that this assumption did not refer to the entire Abst act 
but only to the last paragraph and Rousseau’s argument that the sovereigns would 
lack the will to establish confederations. These arguments suggest that the use of 
force and personal interest are connected.  
The primary or apparent interest of sovereigns lies in “a state of absolute 




them to that of fortune, like an insane pilot who, in order to make a show of a vain 
knowledge and command his sailors, would rather drift among rocks during the storm 
than tie down his vessel with anchors” (para. 4).  
Furthermore, in the Judgment Rousseau shows that kings in particular will not 
be convinced by the proposal for perpetual peace. “The entire occupation of Kings, or 
those they charge with their functions, relates to only two objects, extending their 
domination abroad and rendering it more absolute at home” (54[III, 593]). He shows 
how important war is for them, that they would reject the rule of law, that monetary 
calculations do not matter, and that relative advantages are as good for them as 
acquiring absolute advantages (JPPP, paras. 6-11).  
Rousseau takes a realistic assessment of the aims of Kings or Sovereigns and 
comes to the conclusion that the Abbé’s appeal to reason and true interest will not 
lead to the founding of a confederation. In particular, the “two fundamental maxims” 
of Kings, by which Rousseau not only means monarchs but more generally 
governments, will be limited by a confederation. Their own power would be greatly 
limited and this would lead them to oppose a confederation. A confederation would 
not only guarantee the government of any state by the confederation, as the Abbé had 
suggested, but it would also guarantee “the subject against the Tyranny of Princesat 
the same time” (JPPP, 54[III, 593]).80 In addition to the domestic disadvantages of a 
confederation, the external disadvantages of a confederation are also manifest. In 
Rousseau’s view, the Abbé neglected the advantages which war has to stabilize 
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confederation which would stabilize monarchical government (Asbach 2002, 268-276 and Carter 1987, 
chap. 4). However, Rousseau says here only that a confederation would transform a monarchy into a 
constitutional monarchy. As one can see from the Social Contract, Rousseau would have supported 




political rule. “War and conquests and the progression of Despotism mutually 
reinforce each other…. Each sees well enough that conquering Princes wage war 
against their subjects at least as much as against their enemies and that the position of 
the conquerors is not any better than that of the conquered” (JPPP, 54-55[III, 593]). 
Rousseau continues to show that a sovereign would not consent to be subject to a 
“superior tribunal” (JPPP, 55[III, 593]), that the dangers of war are always trumped 
by the hope in victory (JPPP, 55[III, 594]), and that monetary gains are less valuable 
if another has even greater gains (JPPP, 55-56[III, 594]). 
Finally, Rousseau shows that the Abbé’s example, which supposedly 
demonstrated the good intentions of Henry IV and Sully to establish a confederation 
in Europe, was based on the adept manipulation of personal interests against 
Habsburg while concealing the personal interests of France. The confederation of 
Europe described in the Abstract would have been based on force and not on reason. 
These are two of the three explicit instances in the Judgment when Rousseau 
criticizes the Abbé (56; 60[III, 595; 599]). The last instance not mentioned so far 
occurs in paragraph one where Rousseau criticizes the Abbé “that this healthy soul … 
measured the efforts it gave to things solely upon the greatness of utility without … 
ever considering personal interest” (JPPP, 53[III, 592]).  In other words, the Abbé 
wrongly assumed that every man could be made to put their self-interest aside for the 
public good. 
In the Judgment, Rousseau supplements the Abstract with a realistic portrayal 
of the personal interests of sovereigns which will make the founding of a 




wise, the means for executing it make one feel the author’s [i.e. the Abbé de Saint-
Pierre’s] simplicity… He saw rather well the effect of things if they were established, 
but that he judged means for establishing them like a child” (JPPP, 56[III, 595]). 
Similarly to what Rousseau had suggested in the Abstract, “if a harmony does not 
take place, force is the only thing that can take its place, and then it is no longer a 
question of persuading but of constraining and what is necessary is not to write books 
but rather to raise troops” (ibid.). 
Most interpreters have understood Rousseau’s criticism to mean that the 
confederation cannot be realized because of the political situation in 18th century 
Europe. This misinterpretation has a long history and originated with the peace 
movement after World War I. The experience of that war had demonstrated that the 
warnings about war as well as the suggested peace plans had not been taken seriously 
enough (see Dickinson 1927; Hemleben 1943; Leroy 1915; Marriott 1936; Meyer 
1928; Patterson 1920; Souleyman. 1941). One might indeed read Rousseau as saying 
that it is only due to monarchical governments that confederations have so forth 
remained practically impossible. With the replacement of legitimately elected 
government, so runs the arguments, one would also allow the governments to fi ally 
pursue their true interests and the true interest of the people. Yet, this seems to be a 
misleading interpretation.  
First of all, Rousseau identifies the pursuit of apparent interest with the end 
pursued by the legitimate republic: independence. It is in particular the legitimate 
regime which is much more adamant about pursuing a strategy of autarchy or 




acknowledged independence as the aim of the legitimate political regime, they have 
failed to see that Rousseau identifies this aim here with the pursuit of an apparent 
interest.81 
 Furthermore, Rousseau seems to focus more on the essential features of any 
government or sovereign than the feature of monarchical governments in particular. A 
government in a legitimate state is also free to pursue whatever course it pleases in 
international affairs. It therefore is subject to the same pressures which Rousseau lists 
here as contributing to the reluctance to submit to a confederation. Also, a 
government of a legitimate state might use war to stabilize its own political order. 
Rousseau acknowledges the necessity of the same connection between despotism and 
war in the Social Contract, III.4. One of the extra-legal institutions of the Social 
Contract, Rousseau sees the necessity of having recourse to it from time to time. That 
includes accepting the danger that the dictator might usurp domestic power and 
extend his dictatorship by seeking new wars instead of ending the first one.  
In addition, it does not make a great difference whether the sovereign is a 
people or a single individual with regard to accepting a confederation. The difficulties 
which Rousseau mentions of a sovereign or monarch accepting an authority above are 
the same for a sovereign or people. Neither easily suffers a superior tribunal (even in 
the Social Contract his is a problem, not to mention a tribunal completely constituted 
by foreigners), the dangers of war, and the relativity of wealth. The difficulties of 
relinquishing sovereignty are insurmountable in both cases. The prevalent 
interpretations of these sections speak more about the democratic bias of the 
interpreters than about Rousseau’s intention. He certainly meant them to appear to 
                                                




apply first and foremost to monarchies, but as the Social Contract showed, they apply 
equally to his legitimate republic. One therefore has to conclude that the 
confederation would be equally unlikely for a republic as for a monarchy. 
 
5.5 Reason vs. Passion 
The central point of Rousseau’s critique of confederations was the apparent 
impossibility of founding it. The Abbé had falsely assumed that sovereigns could be 
persuaded by reason to follow their true interest. It was first of all the Abbé’s manner 
of writing which made the achievement of his goal impossible. But the Abbé’s 
manner of writing also reflected his presumption that his readers would be open to 
rational argument. Instead, Rousseau showed that one had to assume that sovereigns 
are motivated by amour-propre. Therefore, if one wanted to bring about change one 
would have to write in such a manner as to appeal to amour-propre.  
 The appeal to amour-propre, however, can take many forms as amour-propre 
can refer to different passions which Rousseau collapses under this general term. As 
Rousseau understands it, amour-propre refers to all passions which human being 
experience in and due to society. In particular, amour-propre refers to vanity or pride 
(SD, 91-92[III, 219]; Corsica, 153-154[III, 937]). But amour-propre also includes 
such feelings as anger, ambition, envy, or affection.  
As we have seen, Rousseau built his arguments for perpetual peace in the 
Writings on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre on compassion for other human beings. This led 
him to the conclusion that if sovereigns could only be made to see their true interests 




compassion; it ends with an appeal to the reader’s moral indignation that the 
sovereigns are so foolish and unjust to pursue their own interests while burdening the 
people with their wars. Rousseau appeals in the Abstract to those feelings which will 
be held by ordinary people. They will likely respond to the appeal that there is a basic 
similarity among people everywhere, a feeling which has been fostered by 
Christianity. They will also believe that powerful men pursue their own interest, 
which explains their inability to pursue the common good. Also, they are likely to 
overhear the quiet voices reminding them of the shortcomings of the argument. This 
would lead to calls for a revolution. 
Rousseau corrects his appeal to moral indignation in the Judgment. He now 
states loud and clear that the Abbé had misjudged the passions of sovereigns. While 
he had framed this conclusion by appealing to moral indignation in the Abstract, he 
now frames it by appealing to reason. In the Judgment, Rousseau’s argument is made 
in response to someone who dismisses the Abbé’s plan as unrealistic and therefore 
worthless. Rousseau then presents the reasons why the Abbé’s plan can not be 
realized. However, by praising the Abbé’s plan at the beginning and criticizing him 
for “judging … like a child” the means necessary to create change, the conclusi 
would seem to be that if one could change sovereigns and kings the confederation 
should become a reality. In putting forth the motivations of sovereigns, Rousseau 
creates the illusion that only monarchs are characterized by ambition and amour-
propre. Therefore, Rousseau can suggest that without monarchs confederations would 




in short, better place. Instead of bringing about change with books one should take up 
arms.  
However, there is a second way of reading the Judgment, which leads to the 
exact opposite conclusion. Instead of extending the argument of the Abstract, the 
Judgment is here a harsh criticism of the Abbé and is supposed to disabuse the 
readers of the Abstract of their moral indignation by showing them how unrealistic 
and hopeless the founding of a confederation is.  
The last paragraph of the Judgment illustrates the two ways of reading nicely:   
Let us admire such a fine plan, but console ourselves for not seeing it 
executed; for that cannot be done except by means that are violent and 
formidable to humanity. One does not see federative Leagues 
established by any way other than by revolutions, and on this 
principle who among us would dare to state whether this European 
League is to be desired or to be feared? Perhaps it would cause more 
harm all at once than it would prevent for centuries (60[III, 599]).   
 
One can read this quote as either saying that violence is necessary for the 
establishment of a confederation and for the public good, or one can read it as 
saying that the confederation would not improve politics and possibly even 
make it worse. In the Abstract and the Judgment Rousseau mentioned the 
word revolution twice. In paragraph twenty-one of the Abstract, Rousseau 
writes that “every great revolution is impossible from now on” (33[III, 569]. 
However, this statement is limited by the claim that “this violent state could 
ever change by the force of things alone, and without the aid of art” (ibid.). 
Therefore, Rousseau suggests that the current state of affairs can be changed 




The second reference to revolution is made in paragraph nineteen of the 
Judgment. Contrary to his suggestion in the Abstract, Rousseau specifies now that art 
in general can improve the current situation in Europe, but that a confederation cannot 
be created through art. Instead, a confederation has to be based on force. In order to 
prevent anyone from pursuing this road even further and to dream about using force 
to bring about the apparently greatest public good, Rousseau points out that the force 
required for the foundation of a confederation would be equal to the force at the 
command of Henry IV. Of course, only a fool would think of himself as this 
powerful. The Judgment can therefore be read as either a call for a violent revolution 
or as an acceptance of the status quo.  
Based on the evidence from the Social Contract cited above, Rousseau would 
have considered the conservative reading of the essays as the accurate one. Howev r, 
one cannot deny that they also contain an explosive revolutionary, anti-monarchical 
argument which is in many ways more obvious than the more moderate reading. In 
Rousseau’s essays on perpetual peace it is the first opinion, i.e. compassion mixed 
with moral indignation, which retains the upper hand as the example of revolutions 
demonstrated. If Rousseau wrote the essays being fully aware of both readings one 
must conclude that Rousseau tries to moderate the few who are more likely to look at 
politics coolly and rationally with the “good” passions of the many.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the contradictory interpretations of the Writings on the Abbé de Saint-




indicating this intention, it was demonstrated that the Abstract convinced its readers 
that based on their humane passions perpetual peace would be the reasonable and 
useful remedy for an unsatisfactory situation. In the Judgment Rousseau argued solely 
against the Abstract’s abstraction from passions.82 Therefore, Rousseau’s separation 
of his argument into two essays mirrors the separation between reason and passion, 
but forms a single argument for the rule of passions over reason in politics. 
Most interpreters chose either the Abstract or the Judgment as Rousseau’s true 
opinion. If they argued for confederations that showed them to be good human 
beings; at the same time they argued unconsciously based on passion. If they argued 
against confederations they would admit that it would be impossible to overcome the 
gap between self-interest and the public good, which is an unsustainable position in 
public discourse, especially if the people have the power. Rousseau argued in the 
Judgment hat self-interest is apparent interest for most people because of corrupt 
amour-propre. In the Abstract however he showed how amour-propre extended to 
mankind can make people pursue perpetual peace. Yet, Rousseau believed that 
corrupt amour-propre is the case most of the time while one only extraordinarily 
succeeds in the extension of compassion to mankind.  
At the beginning I quoted Rousseau’s paradoxical second paragraph from the 
Judgment on Perpetual Peace. The reason for Rousseau’s assertion that “it is 
important that it exist” results from his exemplary demonstration of how one passion, 
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from passions presupposing the possibility of a confederation. Perpetual peace will only be possible if 
those holding political power will be capable to approach the issue based on reason. If their passions 
were to interfere with their rational judgments they would not sign the peace treaty. On the other hand, 





i.e. self-interest, could be opposed by another, i.e. compassion. The opposition of one 
passion with another passion is appropriate for Rousseau in the public realm. In the 
private realm, reason might be still superior to passion, but that would require a 
separate argument. It is certain that it was virtue which led Rousseau to conceive of 
his argument. The two essays are important for Rousseau in at least four ways. First, 
they were important because they created for the public an image of how the world 
could be. This image gave the public hope so it could relish in the pleasant feeling of 
compassion, and it gave the public a goal. Rousseau recognized the importance of 
hope, compassion, and an aim for the public. Second, it showed that monarchs must 
be held accountable to some standard and the Plan for Perpetual Peace revealed them 
as frivolously engaging in war.83 It further supplies a standard for judgment for non-
monarchical regimes as well. Third, it showed that Christianity by itself has become 
an insufficient bond to regulate affairs among sovereigns. Finally, and above all, th
Enlightenment itself is attacked because the rule of reason, as exemplifid in the 
original Plan for Perpetual Peace, is an “evident impossibility” (APPP, 28[III, 564] 
and CC, VI, Letter to Madame Dupin, May 6, 1759).84 The Enlightenment is also 
revealed to woefully lack moral standards by which to hold the sovereign 
accountable. Furthermore, the progress foreseen by the Enlightenment does not 
promise either individual happiness or peace, which questions the usefulness of the 
entire project. 
                                                
83 Note, however, that every monarch fails this test because every monarch’s war is frivolous. 
84 “Not any further question, if you please, Madame, of the little writing of which your goodness for 
me has made you desire a copy. In editing this abridgment I discovered that the project was 
impracticable, and if it would not have been it by it itself, it would have become it by the form whic I 
had given it; but I wrote for the public and not for ministers. I hope that in my life I would never have 




The answer to the initial problem, i.e. why is it important that the plan for 
perpetual exist, can be explained by the impact it has on the people’s opinion of 
foreign affairs. Similarly to the result of chapter four, the confederation served as a 
critical ideal of a state’s foreign policy. While Rousseau was convinced that it w s an 
unrealistic and not even desirable hope to create perpetual peace, he also believed that 
the people’s imagination of foreign affairs as potentially peaceful would provide a 
standard of judgment by which to hold governments accountable. This applied to 
legitimate republican regimes and even more so to illegitimate monarchical regimes. 
The imaginary confederation would force a monarch to become more moderate 
because he still had to rely on the people’s willingness to fight. Also, he might be 
forced to justify his actions and to demonstrate to the people that he was engaged in 
war to further the goals of the entire state and not only of his own personal goals. The 
same limitation would be imposed on a legitimately elected government which as as 
free in foreign affairs as an illegitimate despot. In addition, Rousseau made it more 
difficult or impossible to disprove the people in their suspicion of him and therefore 
further undermine monarchy as a viable political regime.  
The difference between the solutions proposed in this chapter and in chapter 
four are based on a different imagination of international relations. While both had as
part of their goal the limitation of government with regard to foreign affairs and to 
create a public opinion of foreign affairs which would force the government to limit 
its actions for fear of undermining its legitimacy, the two different images w re based 




was based on compassion. In this sense it used the Christian culture in order to show 
the people how they form in truth one great society.  
In chapter three, however, Rousseau had considered this solution as secondary 
to patriotism or amour de patrie. For Rousseau, the love for one’s own fatherland and 
one’s own culture had to precede the more general and therefore weaker feeling of 
compassion for all of mankind. In Political Economy, Rousseau had written that “the 
sentiment of humanity dissipates and weakens as it spreads to the whole earth” (151, 
III, 254]). In the Second Discourse, Rousseau had also shown that the passion for 
one’s own tribe or nation even precedes the formation of political societies altogether. 
While part of the task of political societies is to transcend the limits of the tribes and 
to unite them under law instead of patriarchy, the nation as well as the family is closer 
to human nature than political society. Christianity as well as philosophy are opposed 
to these pre-political ways of life and are therefore in danger of destroying them.
Rousseau’s opposition to both can therefore be explained by his concern that the new 
power of enlightened philosophy, together with Christianity, was in danger of 
destroying the possibility of a content life for most people. As a corrective, Rousseau 
emphasized patriotism to ensure that ordinary men would not be robbed of that 
chance.  
As Rousseau remarked in the Judgment, confederation is based on “real 
interest” or a truly reasonable view of mankind. But to maintain such a view is 
beyond the possibility of most men, although a civilized Christian gentleman might
firmly believe in it. The other view is to hope for “absolute independence” or 




that hope which was stirred by the Social Contract. The two images of international 
relations are therefore incompatible. While they both fulfill an important political 
function, they also are at odds with regard to the possibilities of international relations 
and what should be done to remedy them.85 
Therefore, one can see that Rousseau addresses himself to two types of 
readers who will come away with different lessons from reading the Writings on the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre. The first type will be morally indignant against the sovereign. 
These are decent men who are outraged at all the suffering due to the vanity of kings. 
The second type of reader will see that perpetual peace is a practical impossibility 
because the amour-propre of sovereigns stands in the way of making it a reality. 
Rousseau’s writings appeal to their belief that self-interest rules in society and that 
any solutions to war are therefore in vain. One could say that the first opinion is more 
common than the second and that the first is therefore the common opinion of the 
people while the second is the opinion of the powerful. In Rousseau’s essays on 
perpetual peace it is the first opinion, i.e. compassion mixed with moral indignation, 
which retains the upper hand as the example of revolutions demonstrated. This leads 
to the conclusion that Rousseau tries to moderate the few who are more likely to look 
at politics coolly with the “good” passions of the many.  
One might surmise that Rousseau found both images of international relations 
necessary in most political regimes. As both have the benefit of leading to a limitation 
of the government’s power and the harmful effect unnecessary foreign adventures 
have for the people, Rousseau could support both of them. For practical purposes he 
                                                
85 In Social Contract IV.8, Rousseau seeks a compromise between pure Christianity and pure 





would have preferred the patriotic image because it would have relied less on 
Christian principles and could move the heart more powerfully than compassion 
could.  
But one should not go so far to conclude that Rousseau himself held either 
opinion. In fact, it seems likely that Rousseau would have put himself in the category 
of those “rare cosmopolitan souls” instead of the category of “patriot,” despite his 
frequent referrals to himself as “Citizen of Geneva.” Rousseau’s own image of 









6.1 Summary of the Argument 
The question of Rousseau’s theory of international relations begins with the question 
of the incompleteness of the Social Contract. Yet, Rousseau never completed the 
Social Contract or the political teaching in the Emile. It was the primary task of this 
dissertation to state why the completion was neither possible nor desirable. This 
answer can now be given. First, Rousseau ultimately shared Machiavelli’s opinion 
about the nature of politics. Second, Rousseau believed that it was imprudent to leave 
a Machiavellian account of politics unmitigated. Therefore, Rousseau set forth his 
much more idealistic view of domestic politics with a view to a good society. 
However, Rousseau indicated his agreement with Machiavelli by pointing repeatedly 
to international relations, where the natural principles of politics become mor  clearly 
visible. Third, the completion of the Social Contract would have dealt with a new 
international law. The new international law could have only taken the form of a 
universal moral doctrine. This universal moral doctrine would have been properly 
called a law of nations, because it would have established the rights and duties of 
every republic, and because it would have provided for the law’s enforcement. 
However, Rousseau neither thought that this law of nations existed or could ever 
exist. Rousseau’s rejection of international law and of a universal moral doctrine 




Furthermore, the question was raised why Rousseau nevertheless repeatedly 
referred to the incompleteness of the Social Contract. If the completion of the Social 
Contract was an evident impossibility, as many previous commentators had claimed, 
then one wonders what motivated Rousseau to refer to it. It has become clear that 
Rousseau preferred to allude to the law of nations, instead of making the inexistenc 
explicit, because the inexistence would have been damaging to the intention of the 
Social Contract.  The intention of the Social Contract was to demonstrate to the 
reader which political institutions would best secure legitimate political rule or the 
consent of the people to political rule. If Rousseau had made the inexistence of a law 
of nations explicit it might have led to the undesirable conclusion by some of his 
readers that monarchy is more urgently needed than legitimacy or that Christian 
compassion is more necessary than patriotism.  
In order to substantiate these hypotheses, the argument of the dissertation 
began by setting forth the structure of international relations as a permanent stat  of 
war. Chapter two demonstrated that the conditions of legitimacy set forth in the 
Social Contract would necessarily lead to geographically and numerically limited 
republics and therefore to the plurality of states. On a global scale this meant that 
Rousseau’s best regime could not become a world empire but had to coexist with 
many other regimes. The plurality of states is grounded in Rousseau’s belief that 
every regime is conditioned by the unique factors of its environment. Therefore, there 
is no universally valid solution to create legitimate political regimes. As the plurality 
of regimes did not necessarily imply conflict among states, the argument proceeded to 




continuation of the state of war it did not matter whether the world is made up of 
legitimate republics or illegitimate tyrannies; the state of war persists nonetheless.  
 Opposed to the Social Contract’s predominant theme of creating legitimate 
political rule was the universal challenge of the state of war prior to the founding of a 
political society. Instead of pointing to a plurality of regimes, the universal character 
of the state of war would suggest the necessity of a universal regime in order to 
overcome the state of war. It was demonstrated that the intention of men to leave the 
state of war would not lead to the legitimate regime as prescribed by Rousseau, but 
instead would lead to monarchy. In addition, the legitimate regime rests on a 
foundation which contradicts the principles of its own existence. Both, the founding 
and the continued existence of the legitimate regime, point beyond the existence of 
the legitimate regime during normal times (and distinguished from extraordinary 
times). The permanence of the state of war would therefore continue to exert 
pressures on the legitimate regime to transform itself from a republic into a 
monarchy. 
The fundamental problem posed by the state of war led Rousseau to explore 
various alternatives. In chapter three it was shown that Rousseau rejected four 
possible alternatives, which his predecessors or contemporaries favored. In particular 
in the Abstract on Perpetual Peace, Rousseau had begun to suggest Christian society, 
balance of power, empire, and commerce as possible alternatives. He rejected 
Christian society because it failed to provide for the necessary force, empire he 
rejected because it assumed a universal natural law, and the balance of power he 




Rousseau rejected commerce because it replaced the true citizen with the bourgeois. 
This provided the positive image for Rousseau’s own solution, which would combine 
force and law, subject force to law, allow states their independence and security, and 
provide for true citizenship.  
The three alternatives were united by being placed along a continuum of 
nature and culture. While Christian society and commerce were cultural solutions 
which neglected nature, Empire was based on a solution which subjected culture to 
nature. The balance of power was a natural solution which neglected culture. 
Rousseau sought a solution which would use perfected culture to overcome nature 
while giving nature its due.  
After the exploration of the four rejected alternatives, chapter four begins by 
exploring natural law, international law, and the law of war. Instead of following 
Christian society, balance of power, empire, or commerce, Rousseau could have 
sought to apply different notions of law to international relations. If Rousseau had had 
such a law in mind it would have provided an independent standard by which to 
measure their actions. This standard would have meant that all states around the 
world would have to adhere to this standard if they were sufficiently civilized. This is 
the standard which Rousseau had referred to in the last chapter of the S cial Contract.  
The result of the analysis in chapter four was that Rousseau rejected the idea 
of natural law as a solution for the state of war. Instead of a natural law, Rousseau 
argued that men followed instinctively natural right. This natural right meant the right 
to one’s self-preservation and the interest one has in ensuring one’s survival. 




natural right does not impose any duties on man if these duties would conflict with 
one’s self-preservation. All the benevolent actions which one might observe by 
natural men are the consequence of one’s natural goodwill or compassion of man 
with other living beings, but especially with other men. 
The second question treated in this chapter is whether natural right and the law 
of nations are used synonymously by Rousseau. While there is no law of nations by 
nature, Rousseau derives instead a law of nations from the artificial nature of the 
state. The state’s existence is based on a quasi-religious belief in the justness of the 
state’s existence. The difficulty is that this belief is not shared by other stat s, which 
see only unjust appropriation of land. Therefore, each state will necessarily have to 
extend the principles of its existence to international relations. For republics, this 
creates unique difficulties. The best example is a defensive war of a republic, which, 
if won, puts the republic in the impossible situation of not being able to secure its 
own victory. Victory would imply the right to kill he vanquished and to divide the 
enemy’s possessions among themselves. However, the principles of the legitimat  
republic negate any such right and would require the republic to restore all property 
and freedom to the defeated. This puts the republic in the quandary between 
following its highest aims of freedom and equality or security. A different way of 
expressing this paradox is that the state should do everything in its power to ensure its 
survival, but for that purpose it has to violate its principles of political right.  
The principles of political right lead not only to the constitution of the 
legitimate republic, but they also lead to a particular self-understanding of the 




lead to the ideal of a self-sufficient and autarkic republic. It leads to the understanding 
of citizens as essentially different from other men, which is given expression through 
great variations in mores.  
 As the autarkic ideal increases the barriers among states, it leads o a reduction 
in external ambitions because the outside world has nothing, or only very little, to 
offer. In addition, it makes it more difficult to conquer a republic because the force 
necessary for its conquest seems much greater than the possible benefit one could 
derive from it. Also, it leads to a limitation of governments in international affairs 
because it becomes more difficult to justify foreign war to the citizens. 
Furthermore, the law of war, determined by the principles of political right, 
will restrict warfare to combatants only, will protect non-combatants fromthe effects 
of warfare, will protect prisoners of war, and will determine the conditions of victory. 
In effect, it will clearly delineate warfare from non-warfare. Moral reasoning is given 
much greater force in a republic because the people are much less aware of the 
contradictions of international relations than aristocrats. These would have either 
much greater personal experience with the choices inherent in foreign relations or 
would be able to reason about these matters themselves. It has the consequence that it 
reduces foreign ambitions as well as dependencies on foreign states. A disadvantage 
of republican warfare is that most wars will be fought as a just or defensive war for 
survival. As most wars are therefore connected to the highest possible stakes it 
requires a massive effort which allows for no compromise.86  
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Lastly, it was shown that the autarkic ideal used to be the ancient ideal of 
republics in international relations. However, modern republics are different from 
ancient republics as they are united on the highest level by Christianity or Islam. This 
makes the ancient ideal of the autarkic republic entirely unattainable. It a so has the 
advantage that modern republics cannot be as harsh to foreigners, especially if they 
are Christians. Yet, the vulnerability of republics to the institutionalized Christian 
empire leads Rousseau to the introduction of a universalized civil religion with 
tolerance as it theoretical core. This is meant to provide a shield against any renewal 
of a Christian empire while at the same time preserving a softer modern republic.  
This is the theme of chapter four. Rousseau’s primary solution to the state of 
war, i.e. domestic reform, could only give limited relief from the political necessiti s 
of international relations. The domestic reforms did not amount to a complete 
subordination of force under law. Instead, they remained limited to small republics. In 
the Abstract and Judgment on Perpetual Peace, Rousseau explored one option to 
achieve this change not only for a small republic but on a much larger, or even a 
world-wide, scale. The foundation of this unity had to be man’s compassion with 
their fellow men. 
However, Rousseau in the end took an ambiguous position toward this 
proposal. He rejected the solution of subjecting force by law in international relations. 
He did not belief that this change was either possible or desirable. In his opinion, a 
confederation would necessarily become a despotic government which would enslave 
men on a large scale. As it had to rely on transferring governmental power to supra-




themselves. Moreover, a confederation would accelerate the decline of virtue. As 
virtue is primarily political virtue for Rousseau, the apparent solution of the political 
problem by the confederation would make the practice of virtue superfluous. This 
would also imply the disappearance of citizenship. It then is confirmed that the 
existence of a general will among a people also constitutes a permanent declaration of 
war.  
Based on Rousseau’s judgment of confederations one might be tempted to 
dismiss the entire project outright. But Rousseau’s criticism must be balanced with 
his explicit praise of confederations. Confederations remain an ideal because 
Rousseau considers them incapable of reliably putting law above force or at too great 
cost. Still, the ideal has a number of positive effects on monarchies and republics 
alike. As an ideal, it maintains in the people’s opinion what the political aims of states 
in international relations should be. It thereby creates a standard by which to measure 
any government’s actions. At the least, it forces even a despotic government to couch 
its external ambitions in terms of the common good. It also benefits a republic 
because a republic occasionally has to rely on dictatorships and their potential to 
substitute republics with tyrannies. Here the ideal of a confederation helps to restrain 
the dictator or the government.  
The confederate ideal is based on man’s foolish hope for perpetual peace. The 
religious element is here important because Christianity promised a path to eternal
peace, although only in the after-life. The Enlightenment promised the attainment of 
eternal peace in this life. This hope is derived from a belief in the natural harmony of 




a false opinion, he also realized that this opinion was prevalent among all Christian 
peoples and used by the powerful for their selfish goals. He therefore thought to turn 
this belief against the powerful by showing that the confederation should really b  in 
their power and that eternal peace could be achieved if the powerful only pursued the 
interest of the common good. In addition, peace could be achieved without war. This 
ingenious proposal meant that a monarch or tyrant could hardly claim that a war was 
required to achieve peace. Instead, he first had to show that he had tried everything 
through negotiations to come to a compromise.87 
In sum, the Social Contract is incomplete because its completion would 
undermine the dominant theme of patriotism in the legitimate republic. First, it would 
lead to an argument to unite all republics into ever larger confederations. In this
scenario the individual republics would not be sovereign because their law-giving 
authority would be severely circumscribed by the supra-authority of the 
confederation. But it was the essence of the legitimate republic that each citizen
would continue to participate in law-making. Completing the Social Contract would 
have meant to set forth the terms of confederations, law of nations, etc. But that 
would have limited  the sovereignty of the republic.  
The second reason why Rousseau did not complete the Social Contract was to 
avoid speaking about the character of the state of war. As he had done in the State of 
War and in the Second Discourse, the state is insurmountable. The Social Contract 
                                                
87 Civil religion is a universal religion and therefore leads inevitably to considerations of international 
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by a strong patriotic sentiment. Especially the demand of toleration of other religions leads to renewed 
calls of compassion and understanding for those who are different. This is certainly in tension with the 




always remains in a state of war, even though it ameliorates it in many regards. But it 
ameliorates by avoiding it rather than solving it (Hoffmann 1964). The main purpose 
of the Social Contract was to tell all citizens what they should expect of their political 
order. That message would have only been confused if Rousseau had told them that 
their regime is part of a state of war. This would have given renewed power to 
monarchs or aristocrats who could have claimed that the republic was too weak 
internationally (an opinion Rousseau shared). It also would have increased the 
tendency of the people to submit to a dictator. In sum, it would have given more 
power to those who claimed that survival, and the institutions that go along with it, is 
primary. Instead, Rousseau pursued the aim to strengthen the institutions which foster 
participation, or freedom and equality.88  
 
6.2. Implications for Current International Relatio ns 
Rousseau’s analysis of the structure of international relations has implications for 21st 
century’s debates on international relations, in particular with regard to the debates on 
democratic peace and international cooperation.  
The central argument of this study was to show that Rousseau is a realist in 
the tradition of Machiavelli. While Rousseau was convinced that the structure of 
international relations was anarchical, he also believed that it would be imprudent to 
advertise this insight. Instead, for the stability and well-being of a political regime it 
is necessary to utilize the predominant prejudices. These predominant prejudices are 
Christianity and patriotism, which present to the reader a strange and contradictory 
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spectacle of opposing opinions on international relations. Rousseau believed that it 
would be more beneficial to suggest the compatibility of a legitimate republic and 
international peace. In the language of contemporary international relations theory, 
Rousseau is a structural realist with an important idealistic inclination.89  
But Rousseau did not leave it at that. Instead, he joined Hobbes in trying to 
find a more salutary, even if rhetorical, teaching. Rousseau shared Hobbes’ faith in
the power of rhetoric to transform men by removing any obstacles to the effectiv n ss 
of force. The importance of Rousseau was that he, the actor-author, would instill in 
the educated and moderate men new hopes and desires. Instead of leading to a new 
world of virulent, even if non-violent, competition, Rousseau’s vision would lead to 
brotherhood. Rousseau’s structural realism is balanced by an imagined idealism. 
 In contemporary international relations theory the most important hypothesis 
states that democratic states will not fight against each other (Doyle 1983a, 1983b, 
1986). As this hypothesis assumes that regime type has a crucial impact on 
international interactions, it counters an important claim of the realist school of 
international relations theory. In the version of Kenneth Waltz (1979), the claim is 
made that the structure of international relations is anarchical independent from the 
characteristics of the elements constituting the structure.  
Logically, the democratic peace hypothesis implied that international war 
could be eradicated if states could be transformed into democracies. At the same time, 
this provided a “regime change” agenda for Western democracies and in particular for 
the United States. In recent years, this theory seems to have had a powerful influence 
                                                




on the administration of George W. Bush to change the regime in Iraq.90 Democratic 
peace theory justifies an aggressive foreign policy and constitutes the core ofa so-
called “liberal” theory of international relations opposed to the classic realist 
position.91  
 Doyle’s hypothesis has been refined in recent years. At first it was thought 
that democracies were simply more peaceful than other regimes. First of all, here is 
in fact hardly any evidence for war among democracies (Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter and 
Huth 1996). However, it now is a commonly held opinion that democracies are not 
more peaceful regimes. In addition, the hypothesis is most persuasive with regard to 
wealthy, well-established democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Finally, 
democracies seem to choose and conduct their wars differently than other regims: 
their wars are usually shorter and overwhelming successful (Reiter and Stam 2002). 
Still, as Gates, Knutsen, and Moses (1996; also Layne 1994, 38) have pointed out, the 
main difficulty of democratic peace theory has been to give a comprehensive account 
of the causes underlying the correlation between peace and democracy.92 
We are now in a position to state Rousseau’s view of democratic peace theory. 
By writing his essays on perpetual peace, Rousseau suggested democratic peace and 
became the inspiration for Immanuel Kant, the most famous democratic peace 
theorist. In particular, Rousseau suggested that the existence of a ruler abov  the law 
led to war, and that the sovereignty of the people would lead to war only in the case 
of self-defense. Yet, as was shown, Rousseau did not consider republics to be 
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91 See Kant and his awareness of the danger of any moralistic interpretation (cf. Pangle 1978, 1394). 




intrinsically more peaceful than monarchies. He thereby agrees with the argument of 
democratic peace theory which claims that republics and non-republics are equally
war-prone. In addition, democracies could band together in confederations. Rousseau 
believed that regimes of the same kind could strengthen their internal stability 
through international organizations like a confederation. Rousseau’s emphasis is 
much more on the impact of confederations on internal stability than on external 
peace.  
Rousseau’s apparent support of contemporary democratic peace theory is 
contradicted by his opinion that the prospect of democratic peace is not only unlikely 
in Rousseau’s opinion but also undesirable. Rousseau’s rejection of democratic peace 
theory is based on four arguments. First of all, for Rousseau the expansion of 
democratic peace, while a laudable project in itself, would depend on commerce, 
balance of power, and religion. Second, each of these conditions has the tendency to 
undermine the legitimacy of political rule. Democratic peace would lead to, or 
require, mutual dependence, further contributing to the weakness of moral virtue. 
Moreover, the prospect of democratic peace leads inevitably to an imperial temptation 
by the established republics. Lastly, Rousseau denied that a confederation could be a 
reliable means to peace, and that a confederation could stabilize monarchical regimes 
as much as democratic regimes. While suggesting democratic peace in general, 
Rousseau thought it to be a secondary aim which would be more than a pious dream 
rather than a plan for action.  
The first argument against democratic peace theory reveals that this theory 




thought. As it was demonstrated, the summum malum of Hobbesian political thought 
was the fear of violent death which commanded everyone to seek refuge under the 
wings of the modern state. The logical consequence of this principle was world-wide 
peace. The aim of Hobbes’ political philosophy is to convince men that their only 
rational self-interest lies in their survival and comfortable well-being. Violent 
conflicts are consequently the most irrational behavior. The more influential Hobbes’ 
arguments would become the more “peaceful” the world would be. One therefore has 
attributed to Immanuel Kant what should have been primarily attributed to Hobbes.  
In addition, Rousseau accuses Hobbes of founding regimes singularly 
dedicated to peace and commerce. Similarly, Rousseau criticizes Locke’s and 
Montesquieu’s modification of Hobbes by putting an even greater emphasis on the 
commercial republic. He rejects the redirecting of ambition from violent toward 
commercial conquest. He is convinced that the pursuit of peace, understood as the 
absence of physical violence, does not lead to a true state of peace but instead to war 
by other means.  
 Rousseau claims that his republic would revive the communal bonds without 
the traditionally attributed disadvantage of being overly bellicose. Instead, he 
legitimate republic would be peaceful because it would be devoid of foreign 
ambitions. It is a more complete suppression of ambition, and the remaining ambition 
would be entirely used for public service. It would only fight in case of self-defense. 
There would be a democratic peace, but its peace would depend on isolation instead 




One sees this most clearly if one realizes that the Hobbesian regime is 
incapable to defend itself. If every citizen of Hobbes’ regime were as rational as 
Hobbes assumed then it would lack soldiers. It has to rely on mercenaries or fools for 
its self-defense. On the contrary, Rousseau’s regime can defend itself with its own 
citizens. Every citizen’s readiness to fight for their country depends on their desire to 
be free. One’s own country becomes endowed with a new sanctity. One also sees that 
Rousseau’s world would be less peaceful than Hobbes’ because in Rousseau’s world 
there is room for wars – accidental war if based on a false sense of threat as well s 
necessary wars if based on self-preservation. Also, the possibility of war isclosely 
connected to the existence of citizenship and in that sense desirable. Despite 
Rousseau’s negative comments on war, violent death is not the absolute evil it had 
been for Hobbes. 
For Hobbes and his followers, commerce fulfilled an important function 
because the accumulation of material goods and the satisfaction of material desi es
are supposed to become the activity constituting the highest in men’s life. Commerce 
will become the substitute for warfare. Rousseau on the other hand considered 
commerce as a source of tension among men. Rousseau did not go so far to claim that 
commerce would be the source of warfare, but he did claim that commerce would 
expand the state of war into man’s life.93 Human relationships which had been 
previously protected from commerce would be folded into this pervasive state of war. 
Rousseau feared that avoidance of civil war was to be purchased by more widely 
spreading the condition of (non-violent) civil war.  
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This amounted to the thesis that an inverse relation between international war 
and civil war exists. As there is always a structural war, there are different ways to 
hedge against the state of war. Based on the inverse relations between international 
war and civil war, Rousseau could choose either to fully pacify external relations by 
completely internalizing conflict or the reverse. Rousseau opted in the Social 
Contract for the extreme of domestic peace.  
As the more pacified internal relations implied more violent external relations, 
Rousseau hoped that republics could be moderated by wholesome prejudices. One of 
these prejudices, Christianity, Rousseau found in ready supply in Europe and he knew 
it was necessary to use it for this purpose. The more effective prejudice, however, 
was to state clearly the most beneficial foreign policy for a republic – isolation – and 
prevent the republic’s demise through external ambitions.  
Rousseau also showed that a civil war would prevent external wars. The short-
term reaction of any government would be to use foreign wars to pacify internal 
relations. In the long-term this strategy would not work. This implies that a monarchy 
is a more pacific regime than a republic, because a republic tends to foreign wars 
more easily than a monarchy as the republic’s government is tempted to solve 
domestic tensions by seeking refuge in military campaigns. On the contrary, a 
monarchy has greater control over domestic affairs. Rousseau’s argument that 
tyrannies and war are intimately related is correct in so far as he assumes that the 
political regime is fundamentally a republic and that the tyrant is unjustly trying to 
pacify domestic relations. But he is speaking here with a republican bias about a 




  Given Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes’ political philosophy we might surmise 
that his critique of democratic peace theory amounts to a critique of the understaing 
of modern democracy. For Rousseau, Hobbes’ regime amounted to despotism. The 
lack of continuous participation in lawmaking deprived men of their natural right to 
judge for themselves the means to ensure their survival. Representation, Hobbes’ 
central institutional feature, leaves only a reflection of man’s original power. 
Representation makes it possible to separate virtue from political rule and 
consequently makes citizenship impossible. One cannot call these “liberal” regimes 
democracies. Therefore, Rousseau suggests that the democracies which establish 
peace among themselves are in fact not democracies. From Rousseau’s perspectiv , 
the democratic peace should be called despotic peace. Michael Doyle (2005), who 
almost single-handedly revived Kantian democratic peace theory in the late 20th 
century, argues that representation, human rights, and interdependence are the “thre 
pillars of democratic peace.” It does not come a surprise that Rousseau rejects each 
one of them as indicative of an illegitimate regime.  
 Lastly, one is confronted with the apparent success of international 
institutions, such as the United Nations or the European Union. Can one therefore 
argue that Rousseau, given his critique of confederations in the Judgment, was 
accidentally much more successful than he had himself dared to hope? From 
Rousseau’s perspective, contemporary international cooperation is difficult to explain 
because it appears to contradict his arguments against confederations. Instead,
international cooperation appears to approach Rousseau’s argument of the Abstract 




national democratic government without infringing on the nations’ sovereignty. In 
particular, there seem to be a number of very successful security arrangements, for 
example NATO, which reliably have prevented warfare and have made war 
unthinkable among some countries.  
The most difficult case of international cooperation to explain for Rousseau is 
the European Union. It is so difficult to answer because it seems to be the fulfillment 
of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s project and Rousseau’s presentation of it. Primarily, the 
European Union has made war unthinkable among its members. Furthermore, the 
European Union is militarily so strong that it does not have to fear any external 
enemies; in particular as the most powerful state, the United States, is integrated into 
the European security arrangements. The members of the European Union are then 
free to pursue their individual commercial interests. In case these interests collide, the 
European Union has established institutions with the authority to judge these 
conflicts, even directly adjudicating individual citizens’ claims.94 Moreover, the 
European Union has been able to function without its own enforcement mechanism. 
The enforcement of these judgments continues to lie with the individual member 
states. Contrary to Rousseau’s opinion, a confederation can work without necessarily 
having to use force.   
In contemporary studies of international relations, the topics of sovereignty 
and the basis for international cooperation have been hotly contested (Haas 1964; 
Keohane 1984; Krasner 1999; Mitrany 1964; Ruggie 1993). The central question is 
whether the European Union is a confederation, i.e. an inter-governmental 
                                                
94 The direct power over individuals is the distinction made in Federalist #15 between a confederation 




organization, or a federal state with its own sovereign personality. Based on the 
analysis presented here, Rousseau’s position is that international cooperati n is 
accurately described as revolving around a limited number of issues. The competence 
over vital issues, such as religion or survival, cannot be subject of cooperation unless 
a true shift in sovereignty has occurred. Expressed differently, sovereignty exists 
where the lives of men are directed towards a unified experience (Manent 2006, 8). 
For Rousseau, the European Union remains essentially an inter-governmental 
organization based on large number of international treaties. These treaties could be 
abrogated at any time.  
Yet, the European Union has been extraordinarily stable and successful. Over 
the period of now more than fifty years it has increasingly expanded its extent and 
depth. In order to find Rousseau’s explanation of the European Union’s success one 
should remember his famous statement in the Consideration on the Government of 
Poland: 
Today there are no longer any Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, even 
Englishmen, whatever might be said about it; there are only 
Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same 
morals, because none of them has received any national form by 
means of a distinctive foundation. In the same circumstances all of 
them will do the same things; all will say they are disinterested and 
be scoundrels; all will speak about the public good and think only 
about themselves; all will praise moderation and wish to be Croesus; 
they are ambitious only for luxury, they have no passion except for 
gold. Sure of having, along with it, everything that tempts them, all 
will sell themselves to the first who is willing to pay them. What 
does it matter to them which master they obey, the law of which 
State they follow? As long as they find money to steal and women to 






For Rousseau, European unity was a consequence of Christianity and the 
Enlightenment. As he had argued, Christianity had introduced a powerful belief in the 
fundamental equality of all men. This belief was given a new political expression by 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and their successors. The belief in the equality of all men as 
sinners was transformed into the equality of all men as mortals. The orientation 
toward eternal life was removed and the desires were liberated, “commodious living” 
became the substitute for eternal life. This implies the equal desire of all to replace 
violent conflicts with commercial conflicts. This can be readily observed in above 
quote from the Government of Poland. A confederation based on Hobbesian political 
thought would seek to outlaw war while providing the institutional foundation for 
international commerce.  
Yet, according to Rousseau these conditions had already been present in his 
times. However, Rousseau believed that a confederation could not come into 
existence except through force. The main obstacles in the way to a confederation 
were the hereditary aristocracy and monarchs. While contemporary theories of 
European integration do not speak about these conditions one might argue that it 
simply took two hundred years and two world wars to remove this obstacle.  
Once this additional condition is fulfilled, the current theories of European 
integration provide explanations of the integration process in agreement with 
Rousseau’s theories. The best known explanation of European integration is 
functionalism. The founding father of European integration, Jean Monnet, had argued 
that the cooperation in one economic area would lead to so-called “spill-over effects” 




cooperation among France and Germany, as well as Belgium, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands, was made possible by the temporary mutual need for cooperation. While 
France wanted to prevent the renewed rise of German military power, Germany 
wanted to overcome its international isolation after World War II. For Rousseau, once 
there is an agreement among different peoples that their main interest in life is 
monetary gain and luxury the conditions are ripe for commercial integration. 
Functionalism therefore accurately reflects Rousseau’s opinion on the forces at work 
leading to European integration. 
 The stability of the European Union follows at least in part from the stability 
of the cultural conditions. A contrary opinion is held by the so-called “inter-
governmentalists” who claim that the success and stability of the European Union is 
due to the threat formerly posed by the Soviet Union, by balancing the power of the 
United States, and by American military preponderance. The adherents of this theory 
further hold that the loci of sovereignty remain in the individual member-states of the
European Union. The European Union is therefore not a federal government.  
 Rousseau’s writings are insufficient to deduce his opinion of the stability of 
the European Union. As was argued above, Rousseau attributed an important function 
for the establishment and viability of a confederation to cultural factors. Hwever, he 
also argued that without a transfer of sovereignty a confederation would quickly 
collapse. The European Union, however, seems to be the exceptional case which 





 The only argument against the European Union’s viability derives from the 
fourth book of the Social Contract. In chapters five, six, and seven, Rousseau 
enumerated censorship, the tribunate, and the dictator as three institutions having 
authority above the law (see Gildin 1983). While censorship in a culturally 
homogenous liberal regime has a very weak position95 a d the tribunate, i.e. a 
supreme court, exists in the European Union,96 a dictator is absent from the EU’s 
institutions. Rousseau might therefore argue that the European Union is ill-equipped 
to deal with military threats, or relies on NATO and the external security provided by 
the United States. This would imply that the United States is the final arbiter of the 
EU’s emergency situation. If this accurately reflects Rousseau’s opinion then he 
would argue that the European states are part of federation which finds its sovereign 
entirely outside their realm. But this is admittedly a very tenuous position which is 
not reflected in the contemporary academic literature. Therefore one has to conclude 
that the nature of the European Union cannot be fully explained with the arguments 
provided by Rousseau. 
While Rousseau can at least partially explain European integration, it is also
true that Rousseau would have lamented European integration. For him, the 
confederation remained undesirable because it relied on the cultural homogenization 
of all men and the substitution of the hereditary aristocracy and monarchs with the 
bourgeois or a commercial aristocracy. While it appears that, if pressed to choose 
between these two evils, he would have preferred the commercial aristocracy as 
closer to the natural aristocracy than the hereditary aristocracy, he considered both 
                                                
95 See the introduction by Allan Bloom to his translation of Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert (1960). 




solutions as illegitimate political rule. Instead, Rousseau had hoped to prevent the 
further progress of luxury and, as the 19th century and its nationalist movements 
showed, he initially had some success. Rousseau’s own hope lay in fostering the 
patriotic spirit. Accessible by all, regardless of birth and wealth, the pridin one’s 
mores was supposed to allow states to peacefully coexist. Patriotism meant to 
highlight one’s differences, as small and superficial as they might be, against one’s 
similarities. Furthermore, Rousseau would have been concerned that European 
integration would be achieved by destroying citizenship. This concern, most fully 
elaborated in Rousseau’s First Discourse, would lead to the inability of the 
confederation to defend itself as the confederation’s inhabitants would be unwilling to 
fight and die for it. In other words, Rousseau saw virtue disappear from a 
confederation which had achieved such wealth and peace. Rousseau’s position still 
finds adherents today who opt for the polis against both empire and cosmopolitanism 
(e.g. Plattner 2008; Manent 2006). 
In sum, democratic peace theory and international cooperation find an 
important advocate as well as critic in Rousseau. For him, democratic peace theory is 
at the same time an inevitable outcome of modern political theory as well as a serious 
threat to liberty.97 The apparent success of global commercial relations and 
democracies in the past twenty years has shown that modern liberalism and the 
Enlightenment had much greater strength than was believed after the two world wars. 
Therefore, the current peace is best described as a liberal peace. Similarly, 
cooperation through international institutions was traced back by Rousseau to its 
                                                
97 Note that this also explains the curious alliance of left-wing and right-wing groups in their fight 
against globalization. While left-wing groups see th hreat of global economic exploitation, right-wing 




modern origins. As he had criticized democratic peace in the name of liberty and 
human nature, so he emphasized the disadvantages of international cooperation.   
With the contemporary success of the Enlightenment in the form of greater 
international cooperation, international interdependence, and economic globalization, 
Rousseau’s arguments against the Enlightenment continue to resurface. However, 
while Rousseau continues to speak to men’s hearts, one wonders whether his political 
philosophy can provide a viable alternative. Historically, his political philosophy led 
to the radicalization of the French Revolution. Furthermore, the patriotism of the 19th 
century was insufficiently stable to prevent the wars of the 20th century. In addition, 
the withdrawal from society in the form of the artist’s life was never meant as an 
option for most men. [After the historic experience it should be easier to look at 
Rousseau with much more moderation than his contemporaries could. We have to 
take him seriously in order to avoid the mistake of constituting an end to history, as 
too many have before. After all, Rousseau never wavered in his opinion that human 
life is a state of war.] Therefore, Rousseau’s criticism seems most appropriate as a 
warning against the possible excesses of the Enlightenment. It cannot provide an 
alternative to the Enlightenment. Whether it has become necessary for us to search for 







1. Primary Sources 
a. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1991-2009. Collected Writings of Rousseau. Edited by 
Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly. XIII vols. Hanover, N.H.: University 
Press of New England. 
———. 1917. 'A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe' and The State of 
War'. Translated by Charles Edwyn Vaughan. London. 
———. 1959-1995. Oeuvres Complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Edited by 
Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond. 5 vols. Paris: NRF-Editions de la
Pléiade. 
———. 1960. Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre. 
Translated by Allan Bloom. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1964. The First and Second Discourses. Translated by Judith R. Masters and 
Roger D. Masters. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press. 
———. 1978. On the Social Contract. Translated by Judith R. Masters and Roger D. 
Masters. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press. 
———. 1979. Emile or on Education. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic 
Books. 
———. 1992. The Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Translated by Charles E. 
Butterworth. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. 
———. 1993. Diskurs über die Ungleichheit/Discours sur l’inégalité. Edited, 
translated and interpreted by Heinrich Meier. Fifth ed. Paderborn: Fe dinand 
Schöningh.  
 
b. Modern Political Philosophy 
 
Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des méti res, par 




Grotius, Hugo. 2005 [1625]. The Rights of War and Peace. Translated by Richard 
Tuck. 3 vols., Major Legal and Political Writings of Hugo Grotius. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2009 [1800-1802]. Die Verfassung Deutschlands. 
Vol 1. Eds. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt:Suhrkamp. 
 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1998 [1647]. On the Citizen. Translated by Richard Tuck and 
Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1996 [1651]. Leviathan. Translated by J.C.A. Gaskin. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1985 [1513]. The Prince. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat Baron de. 1989 [1748]. The Spirit of the Laws. 
Translated by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel 
Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mably, Gabriel Bonnot Abbé de. 1988. De l’Etude de l’Histoire: Suivi de la Maniere 
d’Ecrire l’Histoire. Paris : Fayard,  
 
Madison, James. “Universal Peace” National Gazette, February 2, 1792, 
www.constitution.org. 
 
Pufendorf, Samuel. 1994 [1667/1706]. Die Verfassung des deutschen Reiches. 
Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 
 
Saint-Pierre, Charles Irénée Castel Abbé de. 1927. A Project of Perpetual Peace: 
Rousseau’s Essay. Translated by Edith M. Nuttall. London: R. Cobden-
Sanderson. 
 
———. 1713-1717. Projet pour Rendre la Paix Perpetuelle en Europe. 3 vols. 
Utrecht: Chez A. Schouten. 
 
Vattel, Emmerich de. 1964 [1758]. The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural 
Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns. 
Edited by Albert De Lapradelle. 3 vols. New York: Oceana Publications. 
 
Wolff, Christian. 1934 [1749]. Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractum, The 
Classics of International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 





Aiko, Yuichi. 2006. Rousseau and Saint-Pierre's Peace Project: A Critique of 
“History of International Relations Theory”. In Classical Theory in 
International Relations, edited by Beate Jahn, 96-120. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Aron, Raymond. 1967. Peace and War. Translated by Richard Howard and Annette 
Baker Fox. New York: Praeger. 
———. 1967. What Is a Theory of International Relations? In Journal of 
International Affairs 21: 185-206. 
Asbach, Olaf. 2002. Die Zähmung Der Leviathane: Die Idee einer Rechtsordnung 
zwischen Staaten bei Abbé de Saint-Pierre und Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Edited by Herfried Münkler. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 
Barber, Benjamin R. 1996. Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are 
Reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine.  
Beitz, Charles. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
———. 1985. International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Best, Geoffrey. 1980. Humanity in Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Bloom, Allan. 1960. Introduction. In Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D’Alembert 
on the Theater, xi-xxxiv. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1997. Rousseau’s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism. In The Legacy of 
Rousseau, eds. Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, 143-167. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Boucher, David. 1998. Redemption through Independence: Rousseau's Theory of 
International Relations. In Political Theories of International Relations: From 
Thucydides to the Present, 289-307. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Boucher, François-Emmanuel. 2004. Les Fondements de la Paix et les Origines de la 
Guerre: Charles Irénée Castel De Saint-Pierre et Jean-Jacques Rousseau." 
Neophilologus 88: 353-65. 
 
Blanchard, William H. 1967. Rousseau and the Spirit of Revolt: A Psychological 





Brandt, Reinhard. 1973. Rousseaus Philosophie der Gesellschaft. Stuttgart: Fromann-
Holzboog. 
 
Brandt, Reinhard and Karlfriedrich Herb, eds. 2000. Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag oder 
Prinzipien des Staatsrechts. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 
 
Brown, Chris. 1992. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches. 
London: Harvester Wheathsheaf. 
 
Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. 1996. Debating 
the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Bush, George W. 2004. "President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle 
East." (http://www .whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/ll/20041112-5.html). 
 
Carter, Christine Jane. 1987. Rousseau and the Problem of War. New York: Garland 
Publishing. 
 
Cassirer, Ernst. 1954. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Peter 
Gay. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Chan, Steven. 2003. On Different Types of International Relations Scholarship. In 
Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6: 747-56. 
 
Clark, Ian. 1980. Reform and Resistance in the International Order. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cobban, Alfred. 1964. Rousseau and the Modern State. Hamden, CT: Archon Books. 
Cohler, Anne M. 1970. Rousseau and Nationalism. New York: Basic Books. 
Cranston, Maurice. 1991 [1983]. Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1991. The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Cranston, Maurice, and Richard S. Peters, eds. 1972. Hobbes and Rousseau: A 
Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. 
Crocker, Lester G. 1961-62. The Priority of Justice to Law. In Yale French Studies 
28: 34-42. 
Callières, François de. 2000. On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes. New York: 
Houghton Mifflin.  
Derathé, Robert. 1970. Rousseau et la science politique de son temps. 2nd ed. Paris: 




Dickinson, G.L. 1927. Introduction. In A Project of Perpetual Peace, v-xxii. London: 
R. Cobden-Sanderson. 
Dougherty, James E., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. 2001. Contending Theories of 
International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. 5th Edition. New York: 
Longman. 
Doyle, Michael W. 1983a. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. In Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer): 205-235. 
———. 1983b. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2. In Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (Autumn): 323-353. 
———. 1986. Kant, Liberalism, and World Politics. In American Political Science  
Review, 80, no. 4: 1151-1169. 
 




———. 2005. Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace. In American Political Science 
Review, 99, no. 3: 463-466. 
 
Duffy, Christopher. 1985. Frederick the Great: A Military Life. London: Routledge.  
 
Durkheim, Emile. 1960. Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology. 
Translated by Ralph Manheim. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 




Einaudi, Mario. 1967. The Early Rousseau. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Ellenburg, Stephen. 1976. Rousseau's Political Philosophy: An Interpretation from 
Within. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. 1993. Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Fetscher, Iring. 1960. Rousseaus Politische Philosophie: Zur Geschichte des 
demokratischen Freiheitsbegriffs. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.  
———. 1962. Rousseau's Concepts of Freedom in the Light of His Philosophy of 
History. In Nomos 4: 29-56. 
Fidler, David P. 1996. Desperately Clinging to Grotian and Kantian Sheep: 




International Relations, edited by Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, 120-141. 
Basingstoke: MacMillan. 
Forschner, Maximilian. 2007. Jean-Jacques Rousseau über Krieg und Frieden. In 
Macht und Moral - politisches Denken im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. 
Markus Kremer and Richard Reuter, 306-320. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Friedrich, Carl J. 1948. Inevitable Peace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free 
Press.  
Gagnebin, Bernard. 1967. Un Inedit de Rousseau sur l’État de Guerre. In D  Ronsard 
a Breton. Hommage a Marcel Raymond, 103-106. Paris: Librairie Jose Corti. 
Gallie, W.B. 1978. Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, 
and Tolstoy, Wiles Lectures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gartzke, Erik. 1999. War Is in the Error Term. In International Organization 53, no. 
3: 567-87. 
———. 2007. The Capitalist Peace. In American Journal of Political Science 51, 
no.1: 166-191. 
Gates, Scott, Torbjørn L. Knutsen, and Jonathon W. Moses. 1996. Democracy and 
Peace: A More Skeptical View. In Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1: 1-10. 
Gildin, Hilail. 1983. Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Goldschmidt, Vitor. 1974. Anthroplogie et Politique: Les Principes du système de 
Rousseau. Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.  
Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. 7th Edition ed. 
New York: Pearson and Longman, 2006. 
Gourevitch, Victor, ed. 1997. Introduction. In Rousseau: The Social Contract and 
other later political writings, ix-xxxi. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Goyard-Fabre, Simone. 1995. La Guerre et la Droit International dans la Philosophie 
de Rousseau. In Études Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 45-78. Montmorency: Musee 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
———, ed. L'État de Guerre. Paris: Acte Sud, 2000. 
 





Grimsley, Ronald. 1983. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Brighton, Sussex: Barnes & Noble 
Books. 
 
———. 1973. The Philosophy of Rousseau. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
 
Hall, John C. 1973. Rousseau: An Introduction to His Political Philosophy. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Hassner, Pierre. 1994. Beyond the Three Traditions: The Philosophy of War and 
Peace in Historical Perspective. In International Affairs 70, no.1 (Winter): 
737-756. 
 
———. 1997. Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations. In 
The Legacy of Rousseau, eds. Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, 200-19. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hemleben, Sylvester John. 1943. Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hendel, Charles. 1934. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist. 2 vols. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill. 
 
Hinsley, F.H. 1963. Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the 
History of Relations between States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1963. Rousseau on War and Peace. In American Political Science 
Review 57, no. 2: 317-33. 
 
Hoffmann, Stanley, and David P. Fidler, eds. 1991. Rousseau on International 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Holsti, K.J. 2006. Reversing Rousseau: The Medieval and Modern in Contemporary 
Wars. In The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People, edited by 
William Bain. New York: Routledge. 
 
Horowitz, Asher. 1987. Rousseau, Nature, and History. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. Democracy’s Third Wave. In Journal of Democracy 2, 
no. 2: 12-34. 
 





J. R. Jacob and M. C. Jacob, eds.1972. Peace Projects of the Seventeenth Century. 
New York: Garland Pub. 
 
Kainz, Howard P. 1987. Philosophical Perspectives on Peace. London: Macmillan. 
 
Kelsen, Hans. 1942. Law and Peace in International Relations. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
———. 1944. Peace through Law. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1944. 
 
Knutsen, Torbjørn. 1994. Re-Reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World. Journal 
of Peace Research 31, no. 3: 247-62. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Krauthammer, Charles. 1990/91. The Unipolar Moment. In Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 1: 
23-33. 
 
Lange, Lynda. 1981. Rousseau and Modern Feminism. In Social Theory and Practice 
7, no. 3: 245-77. 
 
Laslett, Peter. 1988. Introduction. In John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lassudrie-Duchêne, Georges. 1906. Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le Droit de Gens. 
Paris: Henri Jouve. 
 
Leroy, Maxime. 1915. La Guerre et la Paix selon Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In Journal
de Geneve: 1-2. 
 
Lynch, Christopher. 2003. Introduction. In Art of War, xiii-xxxiv. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
Manent, Pierre, 2006. A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of 





Marriott, J.A.R. 1936. Projects of World Peace. In Quarterly Review, no. 267: 153-
69. 
 
Martin, Lisa L. 1999. The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism. 
In International Security 24, no. 2: 74-83. 
 
Masters, Roger D. 1968. The Political Philosophy of Rousseau. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
MacPherson, C.B. 1962. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: From 
Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: 
Norton. 
 
Melzer, Arthur. 1990. The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s 
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Meier, Heinrich. 2005. “Les rêveries du Promeneur Solitaire:” Rousseau über das 
philosophische Leben. München: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung.  
 
Meyer, E. 1928. L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et Briand Kellogg. In 
Grand Revue 77: 403-13. 
 
Mitrany, David. 1964. A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle.  
Molinari, G. de. 1857. L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Paris: Guillaumin et cie. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace. New York: Knopf. 
 
Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1965. Man's Nature and His Commitments. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons. 
Niou, Emerson M.S. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1999. Return of the Luddites. In 
International Security 24, no. 2: 84-96. 
Nys, Ernest. 1907. Le Droit des Gens et les Écrits de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In 
Revue de Droit International 9: 77-89. 
Orwin, Clifford and Nathan Tarcov, eds. 1997. The Legacy of Rousseau. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Orwin, Clifford and Nathan Tarcov. 1997. Introduction. In The Legacy of Rousseau, 




Riley, Patrick. 1973. Rousseau as a Theorist of National and International Federalism. 
In Publius 3, no. 4: 5-17. 
Pangle, Thomas. 1973. Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on 
the Spirit of the Laws. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.   
———. 1978. Review of ‘Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Histor cal 
Illustrations’ by Michael Walzer. In American Political Science Review 72, 
no. 4: 1393-1395. 
Pangle, Thomas, and Peter J. Ahrensdorf. 1999. Justice Among Nations: On the 
Moral Basis of Power and Peace. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Parkinson, F. 1977. The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History 
of Thought. London: Sage. 
Patterson, S.G. 1920. Introduction. In 'L'Etat de Guerre' and 'Projet de Paix 
Perpétuelle', xvii-iv. New York. 
Perkins, Merle L. 1959. The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-
Pierre. Genève: E. Droz. 
———. 1967. Rousseau on History, Liberty and National Survival. In Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 53: 79-169. 
———. 1974. Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the Individual and Society, Studies in 
Romance Languages, 10. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 
Plattner, Mark. 1979. Rousseau’s State of Nature: An Interpretation of the Discourse 
on Inequality. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.  
———. 2008. Democracy without Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal 
Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Roosevelt, Grace G. 1990. Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Rosenblatt, Helena. 1997. Rousseau and Geneva: From the “First Discourse” to the 
“Social Contract,” 1749-1762. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth. 1996. 
Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988. In 




Schmitt, Carl. 1974. Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht der Jus Publicum 
Europaeum. 2nd ed. Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt. 
Scott, John T. 1992. The Theodicy of the Second Discourse: The “Pure State of 
Nature” and Rousseau’s Political Thought. In American Political Science 
Review 86, no. 3: 696-711. 
Sheetz, Mark S. and Michael Mastanduno. 1997/98. Debating the Unipolar Moment. 
In International Security, 22, no. 3: 168-174. 
Shklar, Judith N. 1964. Rousseau's Images of Authority. In American Political 
Science Review 58, no. 4: 919-32. 
———. 1969. Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Souleyman, Elizabeth V. 1941. The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth-Century France. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 
Stelling-Michaud, Sven. 1964. Ce Que Jean-Jacques Rousseau a Doit a L'Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre. In Etudes sur le Contrat Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 35-
45. Paris. 
Strauss, Leo. 1947. On the Intention of Rousseau. In Social Research 14: 455-87. 
———. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1959. What is Political Philosophy? and other Studies. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
———. 2000 [1961]. On Tyranny. Eds. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2001. “Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft in ihrer Genesis.“ In Gesammelte 
Schriften, Leo Strauss, Vol. 3. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 3-192. 
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000/01. Security-Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism 
Reconsidered. In International Security, 25, no. 3 (Winter): 152-86. 
Tuck, Richard. 1999. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the 
International Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Vaughan, Charles Edwyn. 1915. The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Vol. 1-2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1917. Introduction. In 'A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe' 




———. 1917. Introduction. In 'A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe' 
and 'the State of War', 113-19. London. 
Velkley. Richard L. 2002. Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in 
Question. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations Theory: Realism, 
Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond. 3rd Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Viroli, Maurizio. 1988. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the 'Well-Ordered Society'. 
Translated by Derek Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Von Aretin, Karl Otmar. 1993-2000. Das Alte Reich 1648–1806. 4 Vol. Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta  
 
Von Raumer, Kurt. 1953. Ewiger Friede: Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der 
Renaissance. München: Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg. 
 
Wade, I.O. 1930. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Dubois. In Journal of Modern 
History 2: 430-47. 
Walt, Stephen M. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. In 
Foreign Policy 110: 29-47. 
 
———. 1999. Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice in Security Studies. In 
International Security 23, no. 4: 5-48. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2001 [1954]. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
———. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. 
 
———. 1986. Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My 
Critics. In Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 322-45. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
Wendt, Alexander.  1992. Anarchy Is What States Make of It. In nternational 
Organization 46, no. 2: 391-425. 
 
———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Wight, Martin. 1966. Why Is There No International Theory? In Diplomatic 
Investigations, edited by Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, 17-34. 





Wight, Martin, and Herbert Butterfield, eds. 1966. Diplomatic Investigations. 
London: G. Allen and Unwin. 
 
Williams, David Lay. 2007. Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment. University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.  
 
Williams, Michael C. 1989. Rousseau, Realism and Realpolitik. Millenium 18, no. 2: 
185-203. 
———. 2005. The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Williams, Howard. 1992. International Relations in Political Theory. Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press. 
 
Windenberger, J.L. 1900. La République Confédérative des Petits États: Essai sur le 
Système de Politique Étrangère de J.-J. Rousseau. P ris. 
 
Wokler, Robert. 1995. Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wright, Ernest Hunter. 1963. The Meaning of Rousseau. New York: Russell & 
Russell. 
 
Zagare, Frank C. 1999. All Mortis, No Rigor. In International Security 24, no. 2: 107-
14. 
 
